Cox, Noel --- "FW: The Influence of the Common Law and the Decline of the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of England" [2002] ALRS 1; (2001-2002) 3(1) Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion 1-45

Last Updated: 16 August 2010

THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMON LAW ON THE DECLINE OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

NOEL COX*

(2001-2002) 3(1) Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion 1-45 <http://www-camlaw.rutgers.edu/publications/law-religion/cox1.pdf>

I. INTRODUCTION

The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963[1] established the present judicial hierarchy for the provinces of Canterbury and York of the Church of England. This hierarchy comprises Church courts at diocesan and provincial levels,[2] with further appeals heard by the Court for Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved[3] and, in some instances only, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.[4] Final appeal from the Court for Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, and from ad hoc Commissions of Convocation,[5] are heard by Commissions of Review, appointed by the Queen in Council.[6]
The changes made to the judicial structure of the Church of England in 1963 were widespread, and were especially significant at the appellate level. One of the most notable of the changes was the reduction in the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This was largely motivated by long-standing opposition from certain elements within the Church to the perceived subordination of the ecclesiastical courts to secular tribunals.[7] This opposition was fuelled by the nineteenth century controversy over ritual and ceremonial and the legality of ornaments, most of which disputes had doctrinal implications, yet were being decided in secular courts.[8]
But this preoccupation with a perceived subordination to the secular authorities distracted, it will be argued, attention from a more subtle weakness in the judicial apparatus of the Church. Although the Church had largely freed itself from subordination to secular tribunals, it was not free from the continuing influence of the parallel secular legal system. This is due to two major factors that had influenced, and continue to influence, the ecclesiastical courts. The first is that, because the Church of England is established by the general law of the country,[9] the Church courts are the Queen's courts.[10] The second and arguably much more important factor is the influence of the common law and its practitioners upon the jurisprudence of the Church courts. Both of these influences will be examined in the course of this paper, though the emphasis will be upon the second.

The ecclesiastical courts are a special system of courts administering the ecclesiastical law.[11] In a general sense ecclesiastical law means the law relating to any matter concerning the Church of England administered and enforced in any court. In a technical sense- which is the sense in which the term will be used in this paper- it means the law administered by ecclesiastical courts and persons.[12]
It has been customary to distinguish between ecclesiastical courts proper, and secular courts hearing Church appeals. But, to some extent this has been to make an artificial distinction.[13] The new Court for Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, and the Commissions of Review, may be classified as Church courts proper also, although they may include secular members. Only the Commissions of Convocation would not normally include secular judges. However, since none of these courts hear causes on matters not within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical law, they may be classified as ecclesiastical rather than secular courts. Even the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will transform itself into a quasi-ecclesiastical court to hear Church causes, although it is properly a secular court or tribunal.
Of more importance is the influence of the common lawyers, particularly those who have practised in the ecclesiastical courts since the middle of the nineteenth century, and who have profoundly affected the way in which the Church courts have operated.
Although the Church law included canon law, rather than Roman civil law or the secular common law, in the absence of formal education of canonists in England after 1535,[14] the civilians, or practitioners in the civil law, were, to some extent at least, the guardians of the learning of the Church courts.[15] These were the practitioners in the ecclesiastical courts until the late nineteenth century. Clerical judges were to sit in ecclesiastical courts until at least the nineteenth century, though they may have lacked effective legal training.[16]
If there is one lesson to be learnt from the experience of the Church courts since the Reformation, it is that their strength depended not just upon retaining the confidence of the bishops, clergy and laity, but that without a strong cadre of professional judges and counsel “learned in the ecclesiastical law”, they fall under the increasing influence of the common law. Without these personnel, and an understanding that secular judicial procedures are not necessarily appropriate to decide religious questions, the ecclesiastical courts were condemned to satisfy few when contentious issues are decided.
This paper will examine the provision for pre-Reformation appeals from the provincial courts, and the nature and effect of the Reformation settlement, including the Court of High Commission, and the Court of Delegates. The settlement at the Restoration will be assessed. We will then look at the later role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as an ecclesiastical court, and at the newer Court for Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, as well as the Commissions of Convocations and Commissions of Review. The common law influences on the ecclesiastical courts are then reviewed. Finally an assessment is made of the influence of counsel in the ecclesiastical courts.

II. PRE-REFORMATION APPEALS FROM THE PROVINCIAL COURTS

Spiritual courts, separate from the secular, existed in England from shortly after the Norman Conquest.[17] This process of separation seems to have occurred around 1072-76,[18] although it seems to have not been a deliberate move but rather the effect of the increasing sophistication of the legal system in late Saxon England.[19] But precise identification of courts was still not easy, even at the end of Henry I's reign. Leges Henrici Primi (c.1118) does not distinguish between a tribunal to try lay and a tribunal to try ecclesiastical cases.[20] However, ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the immediate post-Conquest period was primarily over moral offences.[21] In subsequent centuries the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was gradually enlarged,[22] and was eventually to cover such important aspects of what is now predominantly secular law as marriage,[23] divorce,[24] and succession.[25] Although the Church courts were to lose most of this jurisdiction to the secular courts in the nineteenth century, the influence of the Courts-Christian upon the development of the law in these areas cannot easily be exaggerated.[26]
In theory at least the Courts-Christian and the king's courts were supreme within their own fields. Medieval jurists were accustomed to what we might call shared sovereignty, and saw nothing amiss with the pope having a concurrent jurisdiction with temporal sovereigns,[27] nor with the Church exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the king. In accordance with this principle, espoused in particular by the Bologna school of canonists,[28] the Church courts were, and remain, as unfettered within their jurisdiction as the temporal courts within theirs.[29] As a general principle, no appeals lay from an ecclesiastical court to a secular court.[30] Appeal from the courts of the archbishops lay to the patriarch, in the west the bishop of Rome. The right of English litigants to appeal to the pope dates from at least the time of king Stephen,[31] and probably before.[32]
Such appeals were heard either by the pope himself, from the time of pope Gregory VII by his permanent legates, or by special delegates appointed to hear a particular cause.[33] An appeal to the papacy might omit some preliminary steps, omisso medio. Any appeal heard by a subordinate could be appealed to the pope himself, and even appealed from the pope to the pope “better informed”.[34]
Partly because of the omisso medio, but also due to the increasing jealously of the common law courts, the right to appeal to Rome was in England long subject to restrictions by the king. For, although the church courts were supreme within their jurisdiction, precisely what that jurisdiction was could be the subject of dispute. Nor were the courts immune from contemporary political controversies, particularly those concerned with the respective roles of church and State.[35] Attempts were made to limit appeals to Rome, as well as original trials by papal delegates.[36] But appeals continued nevertheless, perhaps with the king's licence.
One attempt of many to limit further appeals to Rome was in the Constitution of Clarendon 1164, which gave an additional right of appeal from the primate to the king: “If the archbishop shall have failed in doing justice recourse is to be had in the last resort to our Lord the king that by his writ the controversy may be ended in the court of the archbishop, because there must be no further process without the assent of our Lord the king”.[37]
But the king did not hear the cause or adjudicate upon it in person. He merely corrected slackness or lack of doing justice si archiepiscopus defecerit in justitia exhibenda and by his writ[38] directed that the controversy be determined in the metropolitan's court. There would then be a rehearing before the archbishop.[39]
The most common reason for recourse to the king (recursus ad principem) was delay by the Courts-Christian. But the secular power did not, as a general rule, purport itself to decide ecclesiastical questions. These were a matter for the Church, subject to correction if there was a complaint of undue delay.[40] Otherwise, the jurisprudence of the Church was in the hands of Church courts, presided over by ecclesiastical judges, and whose advocates were trained in canon and civil law rather than the secular common law of the king's courts. As such, the Church courts were, at least to a significant degree, an intellectual island, largely isolated from English common law developments, yet attuned to canon law developments on the Continent.[41]

III. REFORMATION SETTLEMENT

The Statute of Appeals 1532[42] took away the right to appeals to the papacy in causes testamentary and matrimonial, and in regard to the right to tithes and oblations. A final appeal was given to the archbishop of Canterbury, but in causes touching the king a final appeal was given to the Upper House of Convocation in each province.[43]
The ending of appeals to Rome was confirmed by the Act of Submission of the Clergy 1533,[44] which ended all appeals to Rome, and gave a further appeal “for lack of justice” from the archbishops to the King in Chancery.[45] But, unlike the medieval recursus ad principem, these latter appeals were heard not by the archbishops' courts by way of rehearing, but by the king or his deputies.[46] For the first time appeals from Church courts would be heard, not by Church dignities or the pope, but by a secular judge, the king.
The judges of the post-Reformation Church courts were appointed by the Church hierarchy, but as the Church now was required to acknowledge that the king was “supreme Head in earth of the Church of England”,[47] they were also the king's judges. The judges of the new Church courts were laymen, recruited from the practitioners of the ecclesiastical law Bar, the civilians.[48] Now, for the first time, the Courts-Christian were also the king's courts. And where once the pope or his delegates might hear appeals, of necessity the pope gave way to the king and his council, now supreme in all questions spiritual as well as temporal. The abolition of the papal jurisdiction in itself had little effect on the substantive law applied in the courts,[49] nor upon the structure of the courts.[50] Overall however, the Reformation in England may be characterised as relentlessly juridical in nature.[51]
Some common lawyers advocated the abolition of ecclesiastical courts. But this would have required the fusion of common and canon law, a truly monumental task. A commission was appointed to prepare a code of “the king's ecclesiastical laws of the Church of England”,[52] but the report was shelved. The canon law therefore was to continue in force, except where it was contrary to the common or statute law, or the king's prerogative.[53]
The two jurisdictions thus exist side by side, but with the balance now weighted in favour of the common law. The law applied by the ecclesiastical courts was now regarded as part of the law of England and the (at least in later centuries) reports of relevant cases in either jurisdiction were cited in the courts exercising the other jurisdiction.[54] The ecclesiastical law was now fully a part of the laws of England, even if it were not part of the common law.[55] The ecclesiastical courts were now overtly influenced by developments in the common law courts, and not merely obliged to consider the political or temporal consequences of spiritual judgements, as before the Reformation.
The specialised nature of the jurisdiction and the survival of the civilians preserved the separate Church courts in the face of the jealousy of the common lawyers and the common law judges.[56] The settlement did not however survive intact for long, and it was that element most closely associated with the royal prerogative which was to suffer first in the seventeenth century struggle between king and commons, and this was to have important consequences for the development of the ecclesiastical law.

IV. COURT OF HIGH COMMISSION

It was almost inevitable in view of the impetus of conciliar control in the sixteenth century, that the Privy Council should have intervened judicially in many spiritual matters. The council was the agent of the royal supremacy, and the agent of the council was the Court of High Commission.[57]
The Act of Supremacy 1534[58] recognised Henry VIII as “supreme Head in earth of the Church of England”, and assigned to the Crown the power of ecclesiastical visitation. This was given practical effect in 1535 when Thomas Cromwell was appointed vicegerent,[59] invested with the plenitude of royal authority in ecclesiastical affairs and directed to delegate part of it from time to time to such persons as he thought fit.[60] The first general commission replacing a single vicegerent, was issued by Edward VI in 1549.[61]
The royal powers were confirmed by the Act of Supremacy 1558[62] which declared the Queen to be: “supreme Governor of this realm ... as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal” and authorised the Crown to nominate by letters patent persons to exercise on its behalf “all manner of jurisdictions ... touching ... any spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction ... and to visit, reform, redress, order, correct and amend all ... errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts and enormities whatsoever”.
This idea was repeated in the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, enacted in 1562, and confirmed in 1571.[63] Thus the ecclesiastical commission was a device to effectively enforce the laws of the Reformation settlement and exercise control over the Church.
By the Court of High Commission the authority of the Church was to be at once controlled and supplemented by that of the State. It exercised the pope's supreme personal jurisdiction, particularly in criminal matters.
Until 1565 its work was mainly visitorial, and its authority regarded as temporary. But the continued difficulties experienced in enforcing the settlement, the development of additional administrative functions by the commission itself, and the increasing delegation to it of ecclesiastical or semi-ecclesiastical business from the Privy Council gave the commissioners a sufficiently permanent tenure to enable them to establish traditions and judicial forms which, in time, transformed a temporary device into a permanent, regularised prerogative court.[64]
In the course of its history the High Commission gradually grew in membership. There were in all 24 members in 1549,[65] 108 in 1633,[66] of which three bishops had to sit. Of these one had to be one of the quorum, which numbered 11 in 1549,[67] and 68 in 1633.[68] There was an effective nucleus of canon lawyers.[69]
The Court of High Commission was an attempt to claim for the Council a jurisdiction modelled on that exercised by the pope, of hearing a complaint at first instance, where a party was sufficiently powerful to prejudice a fair trial in the ordinary courts.[70] It also incorporated the power assumed by the early chancery of interfering with normal procedure where for some reason it appeared to have perpetuated an injustice. But the court was quickly denounced, its jurisdiction opposed by puritans, common lawyers, and common law judges alike, and was abolished in 1641.[71]

V. RESTORATION SETTLEMENT

The Civil Wars of the seventeenth century ended with a general acceptance of Erastian ideology by Restoration prelates and their allies.[72] This approach, which stressed the interdependence of Church and State, was consistent with the traditional lay perception of the Church, nor was it entirely novel in clerical circles.[73] The desirability of a liturgical and doctrinal uniformity after a period of upheaval was expressed in the new Prayer Book,[74] and was for a time achieved, to a degree unmatched since.[75]
With the coming of king William III and queen Mary II, the High Church understanding of the royal supremacy suffered a serious setback. Erastians saw the supremacy as that of the whole apparatus of government, carried out in the name of the Sovereign.[76] No longer could it be seen as the supremacy of the Sovereign personally- still less could this be true under the Catholic king James II. The ecclesiastical law itself was seen as being as much a part of the law of the land as the common law itself.[77] The spirit of the age was very much in favour of the Church courts and the common law courts working as part of a unified system of laws.[78]
Till the Civil Wars the two systems had operated largely independently, now they were motivated by a sense of common purpose.[79] Before the Reformation the ecclesiastical courts had paid no attention to either common law or statute, and had accepted writs of prohibition from the Court of King’s Bench only as force majeure.[80] The period 1533-1660 had been one of adjustment. After 1660 an intellectual rapprochement occurred. Canonists made greater use of common law precedents and statutes,[81] and even the common lawyers were less inclined to deny the canonists their jurisdiction- though it was by now largely limited to testamentary and matrimonial matters.
The estrangement of the bishops and clergy from their courts was in part attributable to the integration of the latter into the unified Erastian structure. But it may have had its roots in Elizabethan ecclesiastical administration. The first generation after the Reformation was less legalist, and more efficient, than the medieval. That after the Restoration was more legalist, but perhaps less central to Church life.[82] Rather than strengthening the position of the Church courts, this had the effect of emphasising their increasingly marginal role within the Church, and their weakness when compared to the secular courts.

VI. COURT OF DELEGATES

The royal supremacy remained theoretically and practically real. This was so whether this was exercised through the Church courts or lay courts, for all were the king's courts.[83] One post-Reformation element in this supremacy was the Court of Delegates.
King Henry VIII exercised the ecclesiastical jurisdiction conferred by the Act of Supremacy 1534[84] through his vicegerent. King Edward VI exercised it through a Commission of Delegates (the Court of Delegates),[85] established under the Act of Submission of the Clergy 1533.[86]
The Court of Delegates heard appeals that formerly would have been assigned to papal delegates. Its members were secular judges and civilians, appointed by the Court of Chancery[87] and, frequently, lords spiritual and temporal.[88] From the Court of Delegates appeal lay to specially appointed Commissions of Review.
Unless the king was to be regarded as an ecclesiastical person,[89] these were not properly speaking ecclesiastical courts, although spiritual persons might sit in them, for they sat only as royal commissioners.
The Court of Delegates was criticised on the grounds that members were appointed afresh for each cause,[90] and because it gave no reasons for its decisions,[91] and didn't follow a formal rule of precedent.[92] The members were often common law judges unfamiliar with the ecclesiastical law, and the procedures of civil and canon law courts.[93] The resulting lack of continuity and uncertainty can be imagined. But more importantly, the intellectual independence of the ecclesiastical law began to be affected by the involvement of common lawyers.
The ecclesiastical judges refused to follow the decisions of the Court of Delegates, and, following a review of its operation[94] it was replaced in 1833 by the newly regularised Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.[95]

VII. THE PRIVY COUNCIL AS AN ECCLESIASTICAL COURT

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council followed common law procedures, and applied precedents according to the common law doctrine of stare decisis.[96] It was a manifestly lay institution, and one driven by common law traditions. Doctrinal or liturgical questions did not loom large in the regular business of the Court of Delegates, and most ecclesiastical appeals had involved the probate and matrimonial jurisdiction.[97] However, these were to be lost from the middle of the century, in time for the liturgical controversies surrounding the High Churchmen of that time.[98]
Although the Church Discipline Act 1840[99] made all archbishops and bishops members of the Judicial Committee, and required their presence as assessors for an ecclesiastical appeal, they were removed by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876.[100] Prelates were now eligible to be appointed members of the Judicial Committee, and an archbishop or the bishop of London, and four other bishops are called as assessors for ecclesiastical causes.[101]
In the 1840s a series of liturgical and doctrinal cases were decided in the Judicial Committee. In its approach to doctrine the Judicial Committee was very clear that its role was not to bear witness to any particular truth, but simply to set the limits of what was legally permissible.[102] Early and famous instances of this legalist approach were Gorham[103] and the Essays and Reviews Case.[104]

In the course of the century some obsolete jurisdictions were allowed to become defunct. The Public Worship Regulation Act 1874[105] was an ill-fated attempt to simplify procedures in liturgical cases.[106] It increased rather than allayed discontent, a resentment in particular being that the final appellate authority was a non-ecclesiastical body.[107]
The first judge appointed under the 1874 Act, which effectively combined the offices of Dean of the Arches and Official Principal of the Chancery Court of York, was Lord Penzance. He refused to take the customary oaths and execute the canonical subscription that had been required for the offices now merged into his. Although he may have been legally correct, his stand did nothing to commend the legitimacy of his subsequent judgments to those who felt that only an ecclesiastical court could decide liturgical questions.[108]
Since 1884 some dissatisfaction had been expressed with appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in its existing form.[109] It was not necessarily the lack of canonical learning of the judges in that tribunal, even its decisions, but rather the secular character of the body, and the secular means by which the judges decided the outcome, which aroused criticism.[110] It must be said that the High Church party were at times curiously inclined to oppose the decisions even of undoubtedly ecclesiastical courts.[111] Such an attitude was not maintained without criticism.[112]
Six commissions inquiring into Church courts were conducted 1883 to 1952, and the recommendations of the last were enacted 1963.[113] The three most recent commissions had suggested adding clergy to the Judicial Committee. In matters not concerning doctrine or ritual the commission expressed some doubt as to the need for a second appeal, beyond the provincial courts.
The 1951-54 commission on ecclesiastical courts chaired by Lloyd-Jacob J recommended that these courts be divided into conduct cases (morality and neglect of duty), and reserved cases (doctrine and ritual). The former would be heard by consistory courts and the provincial courts. The latter would be heard by a new Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved. The power of the Queen in Council to hear and determine suits of duplex querda (the refusal by a bishop to institute to a benefice) was abolished in 1964.[114]
Whether an appeal will be heard by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council depends upon whether the matter involves a point of doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial. It hears appeals from the Arches Court, and the Chancery Court of York, except on matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial.[115] If the matter does not involve a reserved cause, appeal remains from the consistory court, to the provincial court, and finally to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
If the Chancellor certifies that such a reserved matter is involved, then a civil or criminal case is appealed to the new Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved directly from the consistory court, bypassing the provincial court. It also has jurisdiction to hear appeals against pastoral schemes of Pastoral Committees,[116] and against schemes prepared by the Cathedrals Commission.[117] Proceedings are governed by the Rules in Ecclesiastical and Maritime Causes.[118] From the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved appeal lies to the new Commission of Review. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is excluded altogether.[119]
Fear of repetition of the ritual prosecutions of the nineteenth century, and a dislike for many of the decisions reached on these matters by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,[120] meant that the Privy Council is not now authorised to decide any matter which involves a question of Church doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial. Such matters have passed to a new court.

VIII. THE COURT FOR ECCLESIASTICAL CAUSES RESERVED

When the Court for Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved was created in 1963, the Church of England gained a new court for deciding appeals in matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial. In keeping with the principal that the Church courts are also the Queen's courts the five judges are appointed by Her Majesty the Queen. Two must be or have held high judicial office and be a communicant; three must be or have been diocesan bishops.[121] In criminal matters there must be not less than three nor more than five advisers selected by the Dean of the Arches and Auditor[122] from a panel of eminent theologians and liturgiologists.[123]
A complaint against a priest or deacon may be vetoed by his or her bishop, and one against a bishop by his archbishop. Before a case is heard, a preliminary enquiry by a Committee decides whether there is a case to answer. In the case of a priest or deacon, the Committee of Inquiry consists of the diocesan bishop, two members of the Lower House of Convocation of the Province, and two diocesan chancellors. There are other provisions where the accused is a bishop.
If the Committee allows the case to proceed, the Upper House of Convocation appoints a complainant against the accused in the Court for Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, where the procedure resembles that of the High Court exercising jurisdiction but without a jury. However, the Court sits with five advisers chosen from panels of theologians or liturgiologists.
The Court has to date sat only twice, and in both cases the appeal was allowed. The first case concerned a faculty authorising an icon and candlestick introduced into a church without a faculty. [124] It was a comparatively straightforward case, and a single judgment applied a decision of the Court of Arches.[125] In the second case, a ten-tonne circular Henry Moore marble sculpture was not allowed as a holy table.[126] This was a much more substantial case, with the hearing occupying eleven days.[127] The decision reached may not have been a legally sound one, but it was more theological than one which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council might have reached.[128] That was doubtless one of the reasons for constituting the body as it is.[129]

IX. COMMISSIONS OF CONVOCATION

Commissions of Convocation are appointed by the Upper Houses of the two Convocations to try an archbishop or bishop.[130] Both Convocations make the appointment if an archbishop is involved.[131] This would comprise four diocesan bishops[132] and the Dean of the Arches, who presides.[133] Doctrine, ritual, and ceremonial are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commissions of Convocation. Appeal would lie to a Commission of Review.

X. COMMISSIONS OF REVIEW

A Commission of Review may be appointed by Her Majesty the Queen on the petition of an appellant[134] to hear appeals from the Court for Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, and from the Commissions of Convocation.[135] This would comprise three Lords of Appeal (being communicants), and two Lords Spiritual sitting as Lords of Parliament.[136] If doctrine is in issue the Commission sits with five advisers chosen from panels of theologians. Decisions of previous Commissions of Review are binding, but not those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on matters of doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial.[137] This procedure has not yet been used.[138]
Like appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, those to a Commission of Review are not strictly to a Church court. Like the Judicial Committee, the Commission of Review acts as an advisory body for the Sovereign. Though the membership of a Commission would comprise Church members, lay and clerical, it is nevertheless as much a secular as it is an ecclesiastical body. This is a consequence of the history of the Church of England, and its continued links with the secular power. Yet it need not be seen as in any way restricting the authority of the Church to regulate its own doctrine.
Whilst concentrating on the perceived subordination of Church courts to secular judicial bodies, the Church overlooked the less obvious, but more invidious, effect that the common law was having on the Church courts. For the Church courts have themselves chosen to adopt the rule of stare decisis, and to cite judgments of the common law courts. As these latter courts based their judgments solely upon the common law, the judgments of the ecclesiastical courts came to be imbued with the spirit of the common law.

XI. COMMON LAW INFLUENCES ON THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS

Only with the reign of king Henry VIII did the ecclesiastical courts become king's courts. But applicants could always sue for writs of prohibition[139] or mandamus[140] from the king's courts. These may still issue out of the Queen's Bench Division to restrain ecclesiastical courts from exceeding their jurisdiction, or to compel them to cease delaying hearing any matter.[141] There is no recorded instance of a writ being issued to papal legates, though suitors have been prohibited from appealing to the pope.[142] The tribunals subject to these writs are likely to include the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. For the enforcement of their own judgments, and the maintenance of order, contempt of a consistory court would be dealt with by the High Court.[143]
The temporal courts constrained excesses of jurisdiction by the Church courts even before the Reformation. The influence of these writs and orders since then upon the substantive ecclesiastical law has probably not been significant. What was significant was the influence of the principles of the common law.
The common law was hostile at once to the prerogative and the ecclesiastical law. Both limited the scope of actions possible in the common law courts. The criminal jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts included heresy, adultery, incest, fornication, simony, brawling in Church, defamation,[144] and others. Some Tudor and Stuart legislation made secular offences of conduct that had fallen within the Church’s exclusive jurisdiction.[145] This led to a shared jurisdiction, which in the long term proved more harmful to the ecclesiastical courts in the face of the jealousy of the common law, and the more efficient processes of the common law courts. The settlement of the Church after the disruption of the civil wars of the seventeenth century may have led to an intellectual rapprochement, but this encouraged intellectual borrowing from the common law which was to erode the distinct identity of the ecclesiastical law.[146]
Although the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was further confined in the course of the nineteenth century, this was more a symptom than a cause of this decline. The ecclesiastical courts lost their power to punish laymen for brawling in 1860.[147] The residual criminal jurisdiction over the laity was abolished 1963.[148] They retain a power to discipline clergy, and (it would seem) laymen holding office in the Church, to determine questions of doctrine and ritual, to protect Church property, and decide civil disputes relating to ecclesiastical matters.[149]

The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was reduced in England in the nineteenth century in part because of a lack of understanding of the procedure of the ecclesiastical law.[150] In an 1830 report ecclesiastical courts were criticised for failing to give reasons for their decisions, and for not following a system of precedent.[151] Yet theirs was a canon law-based system, and not bound to follow the principles or procedures of the common law.[152]
It was inevitable that the Church courts themselves were to change under this pressure. In 1854 oral evidence in open court was allowed.[153] The courts were still forbidden to cite anyone outside the diocese where he lived, and it was not clear that the courts could even hear legal arguments in London unless the litigants lived there.[154] The inadequacy of powers to punish for contempt were obvious.[155]
The binding force of precedent was accepted by the judges in the course of the nineteenth century,[156] and received statutory recognition in the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963.[157] However, the Court of the Arches is not bound by decisions of the Chancery Court of York, and vice-versa. Both are bound by their own decisions.[158] The Consistory Courts are bound by their own decisions,[159] but not by decisions of those of a consistory court in another diocese.[160]
The substance of the canon law administered by the ecclesiastical courts of the Church of England was strongly influenced by the civil law, and even the Vice-Chancellor's Court of the University of Oxford followed civil law procedures until 1854.[161] Yet the Church courts, attacked for adhering to the procedures of the civil law (of which clerics and laymen alike were increasingly ignorant), were compelled to adopt many of the procedures of the common law courts. The common law courts no longer fought to wrest jurisdictional victories from the ecclesiastical courts, but the latter were required to surrender much of their jurisdiction to the supposedly more modern and efficient common law courts. As a consequence, the Church courts began to lose something their intellectual connection with their canon law heritage. This loss was encouraged by the decline of the civil law practitioners in the late nineteenth century.

XII. COUNSEL IN THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS

In all of these Church courts the practitioners were distinct from the body of common law lawyers. The advocates were trained in the canon and civil laws at Oxford or Cambridge, obtaining the degree of DCL[162] or LLD[163] respectively.[164] Doctors were eligible for admission as advocates of the Court of Arches, whose Dean of the Arches admitted advocates on a rescript (mandate) of the Archbishop of Canterbury,[165] if they had studied the civil and canon laws for five years,[166] and attended the Court of Canterbury for a year[167]. Once admitted, they were qualified to practice in the other ecclesiastical courts and civil law courts.[168]
There were never very many practitioners in the canon and civil law, with an average of only one advocate admitted annually in the early nineteenth century, of whom some never practised.[169] There were rarely more than five or six active practitioners at a time, and the civilians were never a dominant force in English law, administration or politics.[170]
Advocates were appointed as judges in the archbishop's courts,[171] the Admiralty Court, as masters of the Court of Requests, and to the Court of Chancery. King's Advocates were also members of Doctors' Commons. Practitioners in the canon and civil law courts served the ecclesiastical courts, the Court of Admiralty, and for arbitration involving questions of international law.[172]
They were members of Doctors' Commons, the Association of Doctors of Laws and of the Advocates of the Church of Christ at Canterbury, which existed between c.1490 and 1858.[173] Established 1511, this was a self-governing teaching body, on a similar pattern to the Inns of Court, and was governed by Fellows elected by the existing fellows, from among its advocates.
The advocates had a monopoly in the ecclesiastical courts and the Court of Chancery. However, at a time when pressure was on the Church courts to adopt common law procedures or be abolished, so the jurisdiction of these courts can gradually reduced. The Court of Probate Act 1857[174] abolished the testamentary jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and other prerogative courts, and set up the new Court of Probate. This was open, not only to the advocates, but also to serjeants-at-law and barristers.[175] Advocates were given the right to practise in any court of law or equity in England as if they had been called to the Bar on the days on which they had been admitted as advocates.[176]
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857[177] set up the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, and provided that all persons admitted to practise as advocates in any ecclesiastical court, and all barristers should be entitled to practise in the new court.[178] An Act to enable Serjeants, Barristers-at-Law, Attorneys, and Solicitors to practise in the High Court of Admiralty,[179] passed in 1859, ended the last surviving monopoly of the advocates, with the exception of the High Court of Chivalry.[180]
The members of Doctors' Commons were authorised by the Act to enable Serjeants, Barristers-at-Law, Attorneys, and Solicitors to practise in the High Court of Admiralty 1859[181] to sell their real and personal estate, and to surrender their 1768 charter.[182] Upon surrender they were to be dissolved.[183] With the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil and canon law courts rapidly shrinking, recruitment of new advocates became difficult. The College did not surrender its charter and the order only became extinct however with the death of the last advocate,[184] Chancellor TH Tristram, DCL Oxford, who died in 1912. He had been admitted 2 November 1855, as the last Fellow of the College.[185]
With the extinction of the advocates, in both the ecclesiastical courts and the Court of Chivalry barristers are now heard by virtue of the doctrine of ex necessitate rei.[186]

Proctors, the equivalent of attorneys elsewhere, practised in the civil law-dominated admiralty and ecclesiastical courts.[187] They had much greater public exposure than advocates, and spent more time in court. Doctors of laws never practised as proctors, some proctors were bachelors, but some were non-graduates.[188] Proctors were admitted to the Court of Arches.[189] They were also admitted by the patent of a bishop, to practice in the consistory court of the dioceses.
The proctors also gradually became extinct as a separate order, as there was insufficient work for separate professions. In 1857 the Court of Probate Act[190] took away the proctors monopoly of probate work,[191] and gave them the right to be admitted as solicitors.[192] The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 allowed all attorneys and solicitors to practise in the new Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.[193] An 1859 Act enabled attorneys and solicitors to practise in the High Court of Admiralty,[194] and the Solicitors Act 1877 conferred rights on solicitors to appear in ecclesiastical courts.[195] In 1873 all solicitors, attorneys and proctors became solicitors of the Supreme Court. The term proctor is occasionally still used informally in probate and admiralty courts.

The consequence of the decline of the ecclesiastical law profession, caused by a reduction in business in civil and canon law courts, itself contributed to a further decline in understanding of the intellectual separateness of the Church courts.[196] The problems of the absence of an exclusively ecclesiastical law Bar and Bench were to influence the evolution of the Church courts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The lack of a separate profession increased the tendency for the law and practice of lay and spiritual courts to approximate more closely, and this, in turn, has tended still more to differentiate English ecclesiastical law from ecclesiastical law in other parts of Christendom, particularly Roman Catholic.

XIII. CONCLUSION

The Church courts are the Queen's courts.[197] This has become less significant as the balance of the settlement has changed, and the Church has become more independent. The role of purely secular courts in ecclesiastical causes has declined.[198] The changes made in 1963 to the judiciary of the Church of England saw a reduction in the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But while the Church may have weakened one consequence of the establishment, they have permitted- indeed encouraged, a more serious undermining of their independence.
The influence of the common law has had an increasing effect, which has accelerated since the decline of Doctors' Commons in the middle of the last century. Concentrating on the perceived misfortune of having lay courts decide Church causes obscured the more serious, insidious influence which the common law was having. The clergy and laity were as much culpable as anyone; they called for certainty, for precedents to be cited and followed. The influence of the common law has compelled the ecclesiastical courts to adopt principles of binding precedent.[199]
At times in the early nineteenth century many judges were clerics, lacking the experience and training necessary for judicial office. The ecclesiastical judges are now required to be have legal qualifications,[200] though not specifically knowledge of canon law.[201]
The loss of jurisdiction in the course of the nineteenth century was a consequence of the intellectual weakness into which the ecclesiastical law had sunk. This was encouraged by the common law. This was not, as in the sixteenth century, by directly confronting the Church courts. It was rather by working in conjunction with the Church courts. Till the Civil Wars the two systems had operated largely independently, now they were motivated by a sense of common purpose. Co-operation led to the intellectual assimilation of the jurisprudence of Church courts and common law courts. This, and the increasingly limited business conducted in such courts, was to lead to the loss of a professional Bar.[202]
The future is not at all bleak however. The ecclesiastical lawyer may once more be on the rise. The Ecclesiastical Law Society was established in 1987 with a view to the education of office bearers, practitioners in ecclesiastical courts and others; the enlargement of knowledge of ecclesiastical law among laity and clergy of the Anglican Communion; and assistance in matters of ecclesiastical law to the General Synod, Convocations, bishops, and Church dignitaries.[203]
With the revision of the canons of the Church of England, new legislative machinery, and the example of the Roman Catholic canon law, there is a need for a new profession of ecclesiastical lawyers, trained in the common law, but able to apply their skills in the Church courts. The new society seems well able to encourage the revival of ecclesiastical law in the Church of England in particular.[204]
The dis-establishment of the Church in Wales led to a reappraisal of the place of law within the Church; such a reappraisal seems possible in England without dis-establishment. For it was not the Reformation subordination of the Church courts to the authority of the Crown which weakened them, but the subsequent loss of intellectual vigour and independence. This independence was recently been re-asserted in the judgment of the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved in In re St Stephen's, Walbrook,[205] not in its being any less an element of the establishment, but in its less legalist, more theological decision-making.[206]

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*LLM(Hons) PhD, Barrister of the High Court of New Zealand, the State of South Australia, the Supreme Court of Tasmania, and of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Lecturer in Law at the Auckland University of Technology.

1 The long title of the Measure is “a Measure passed by The National Assembly of the Church of England to reform and reconstruct the system of ecclesiastical courts of the Church of England, to replace with new provisions the existing enactments relating to ecclesiastical discipline, to abolish certain obsolete jurisdictions and fees, and for purposes connected therewith”.
[2] Consistory Courts in each diocese (under Chancellors, who may serve in more than one see), and the Arches Court and the Chancery Court of York (under the Dean of the Arches and the Auditor respectively, offices which are, however, held concurrently by the one individual). The Arches Court and the Chancery Court of York have four other judicial officers, two in holy orders appointed by the prolocutor of the Lower House of Convocation of the relevant province, and two laymen appointed by the Chairman of the House of Laity after consultation with the Lord Chancellor with respect, inter alia, to their judicial experience; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 ss 3(2)(b), (c).
[3] Two of the five judges appointed by Her Majesty the Queen must be or have held high judicial office (as defined by s 25 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict c 59)) and be a communicant; three must be or have been diocesan bishops; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 45(2).
[4] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 1(3)(d). The permanent committee of the Queen’s Most Honourable Privy Council, to which appeals to the Queen are referred for hearing and judgment. This was established on permanent footing in 1833; Judicial Committee Appeals Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will IV c 41); The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 makes the theoretical nature of such appeals clear: “s 1(3)(d). Her Majesty in Council shall have such appellate jurisdiction as is conferred on Her by this Measure”.
[5] These would comprise four diocesan bishops, and the Dean of the Arches; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 ss 35, 36(a).
[6] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 1(3)(c); Revised Canons Ecclesiastical, Canon G1 para. 4. These would comprise three Lords of Appeal (being communicants), and two Lords Spiritual sitting as Lords of Parliament; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 11(4).
[7] This opposition found expression in a succession of commissions which advocated a new joint appeal court to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; Report of the Archbishops' Commission, Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts (London: HMSO, 1883), lvi-lviii; Report of the Commission, Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline (London: HMSO, 1906), 67, 77, 78; Report of the Archbishops' Commission, Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts (London: HMSO, 1926), ss 26-46; Report of the Archbishops' Commission, Church and State (London: SPCK, 1935), 68-71; Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Canon Law of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1947).
[8] Examples include Ridsdale v Clifton (1877) 2 PD 276, PC; Liddell v Westerton (1856) 5 WR 470, PC In the former, the correctness of the decision of the Judicial Committee was challenged in light of subsequent historical research; Report of the Royal Commission, Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline (London: HMSO, 1906) (cd 3040) para. 41.
[9] The combined effect of the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion (1562, confirmed 1571); Statute of Appeals 1532 (24 Hen VIII c 12); Act of Submission of the Clergy 1533 (24 Hen VIII c 19); Appointment of Bishops Act 1533 (24 Hen VIII c 20); Ecclesiastical Licences Act 1533 (24 Hen VIII c 21); Act of Uniformity 1551 (5 & 6 Edw VI c 1); Act of Uniformity 1558 (1 Eliz I c 2); Act of Uniformity 1662 (14 Chas II c 4) and similar legislation.
[10] The combined effect of the Statute of Appeals 1532 (24 Hen VIII c 12); Ecclesiastical Licences Act 1533 (24 Hen VIII c 21); Act of Supremacy 1534 (26 Hen VIII c 1) and later legislation. Once appointed, an ecclesiastical judge derives his or her authority not from their bishop, but from the law, and is charged, like in all manner to all the Queen’s judges, with hearing and determining impartially causes in which the bishop or the Crown may have an interest; Bishop of Lincoln v Smith [1726] EngR 473; (1668) 1 Vent 3; 86 ER 3; ex parte Medwin [1853] EngR 183; (1853) 1 E & B 609; 118 ER 566.
[11] Which is of predominantly canon and civil law origin, though not uninfluenced even in the earliest times by the developing common law in the king’s courts; Caudrey’s Case [1572] EngR 75; (1591) 5 Co Rep 1a; 77 ER 1; Ecclesiastical Licences Act 1533 (24 Hen VIII c 21), preamble (now mainly repealed); Attorney-General v Dean and Chapter of Ripon Cathedral [1945] Ch 239; [1945] 1 All ER 479.
[12] Alfred Denning, “The meaning of ‘Ecclesiastical Law’” (1944) 60 LQR 236. The end of the temporal law is to punish the outward man; that of the ecclesiastical law, being spiritual, is to reform the inward man; Caudrey’s Case [1572] EngR 75; (1591) 5 Co Rep 1a, 6; 77 ER 1.
[13] The Consistory Courts, the Arches Court, and the Chancery Court of York may be classified as the former. The Chancellor of a diocese is appointed by letters patent of the bishop (who may himself sit if he so wishes), although the Lord Chancellor must be consulted before any appointment is made; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 2(1), (2). The Dean of the Arches is appointed by the archbishops of Canterbury and York acting jointly, with the Queen’s approval signified by warrant under the sign manual; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 3(2)(a); Revised Canons Ecclesiastical, Canon G3 para. 2a.
[14] The strict injunction issued by Henry VIII in October 1535 forbad the study of canon law in the universities; See DR Leader, The History of the University of Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), i, 332-333; P Hughes, The Reformation in England (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 239; RH Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 152-153. As a consequence even the civil law faculties suffered a decline; JL Barton, “The Faculty of Law” in James McConica (ed), The History of the University of Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), iii, 271-272; Thomas Fuller, The History of the University of Cambridge Marmaduke Prickett and Thomas Wright (eds) (Cambridge: J & JJ Deighton, 1840), 225.
[15] It could also be said that the civil and canon laws were so interdependent by 1600 that they could scarcely be pulled apart: “Ius canonicum et civile sunt adeo connexa, ut unum sine altero vix intelligi possit” -Petrus Rebuffus, “Tractatus de nominationibus”, Quaest 5, no.15, in Tractatus univeri iuris (1584-1600), xv, part 2, fols 301-339.
[16] In the early nineteenth century many judges were clerics, lacking the experience and training necessary for judicial office- indeed until the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 they simply had to be “learned in the civil and ecclesiastical laws and at least a master of arts or bachelor of law, and reasonably well practised in the course thereof”; Canons Ecclesiastical (1603) 127 (revoked); See Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Ecclesiastical Courts (London: SPCK, 1954), 9-13. There is no requirement that an ecclesiastical judge be a cleric, though they sometimes are. The prohibition on men in holy orders being barristers largely prevented clergymen from assuming the judicial office; nor did the effective ban on them being admitted as advocates of the ecclesiastical Bar help; see R v Archbishop of Canterbury [1807] EngR 141; (1807) 8 East 213; 10 ER 323.
[17] Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England E Christian (ed) (New York: Garland Publishing, 1978), iii, 64, 65.
[18] Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Ecclesiastical Courts (London: SPCK, 1954), 1.
[19] Felix Makower, Constitutional History and Constitution of the Church of England (London: S Sonnenschein & Co, 1895), 384; Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Ecclesiastical Courts (London: SPCK, 1954), 1-22.
[20] Gillian Evans, “Lanfranc, Anselm and a New Consciousness of Canon Law in England” in Norman Doe, Mark Hill & Robert Ombres (eds), English Canon Law (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998), 11.
[21] C Morris, “William I and the Church Courts” (1967) 324 English Historical Review 449-463, 451.
[22] See William Holdsworth, History of English Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), i, 614ff.
[23] Until the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict c 85). In Ireland, ecclesiastical courts lost their matrimonial jurisdiction only under the Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict c 110), and the jurisdiction survived until 1884 in the Isle of Man, the diocese of the bishop of Sodor and Man.
[24] Until the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict c 85).
[25] Until the Court of Probate Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict c 77). The Poor (Burials) Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 79) had the same effect in Ireland.
[26] This leads to the civil law, and to some extent the canon law also, having a continuing influence upon the development of the common law (and even statute law) in these areas of law; Thomas Scrutton, The influence of the Roman Law on the Law of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1885), 163-169.
[27] The pope’s powers as a temporal sovereign are recognised in the Roman Catholic Code of Canon Law 1983. In practice matters of education are dealt with though the administrative hierarchy of the Church, rather than through that of Vatican City State, the residual part of the Papal States.
[28] Bologna began as a law school but widened its scope to become a true universitas litterarum. The University of Bologna remains, probably the oldest still extant.
[29] R v Chancellor of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese, ex parte White [1947] KB 263, [1946] 2 All ER 604, affirmed [1948] 1 KB 195, [1947] 2 All ER 170 (CA).
[30] William Holdsworth, History of English Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), 9. Cf Richard Burn, Ecclesiastical Law (London: T Cadell, 1781), i, 57, in which he claims there was appeal for failure of justice to the king in his court of nobles. It is instructive that the hierarchical system was copied by the king’s courts from the ecclesiastical courts; Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (London: Butterworth, 1956), 387-388.
[31] Richard Burn, Ecclesiastical Law (London: T Cadell, 1781), 58. These were at the instigation of Henri de Blois, bishop of Winchester and papal legate; GIO Duncan, The High Court of Delegates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 2.
[32] Felix Makower, Constitutional History and Constitution of the Church of England (London: S Sonnenschein & Co, 1895), 225-227.
[33] Such as that of King Henry VIII and Queen Catherine of Aragon.
[34] Felix Makower, Constitutional History and Constitution of the Church of England (London: S Sonnenschein & Co, 1895), 225-227.
[35] Indeed, until the Reformation, the Church and State were essentially indivisible, or, rather, each was an aspect of the whole; see e.g. Thomas Glyn Watkin, “Vestiges of Establishment: The Ecclesiastical and Canon Law of the Church in Wales” (1990) 2 Ecclesiastical LJ 110.
[36] For example, legislation of Edward III and Richard II; Suing in foreign courts Act 1352 (27 Edw III st 1 c1); Suits in spiritual courts Act 1377 (1 Ric II c 13).
[37] Constitution VIII, William Stubbs, Select Charters and other illustrations of English constitutional history (London: Clarendon Press, 1913), 133.
[38] Precepto.
[39] See the Report of the Archbishops' Commission, Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts (London: HMSO, 1883), i, 'Hist App', i.
[40] A situation today covered by the writ of mandamus, available from the Queen’s Bench Division; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 83(2)(c).
[41] The precise nature of the legal relationship between pre-Reformation canon and common law is disputed. It is not certain, in particular, whether the canon law was binding in England ipso facto, or only if admitted by domestic councils or similar means; See JW Gray, "Canon Law in England: some Reflections on the Stubbs-Maitland Controversy" in Studies in Church History (Leiden: Brill, 1964), iii, 48.
[42] 24 Hen VIII c 12; Parham v Templar (1821) 3 Philllim 223, 241 et seq; 161 ER 1307.
[43] 24 Hen VIII c 12.
[44] 25 Hen VIII c 19.
[45] Petitions for default of justice originally lay to the king. But, being unable to hear all causes in person, he usually left the Council to hear and determine the matter and advise him. The Chancellor, as the principal officer, and one originally versed in the laws spiritual and temporal, later undertook this delegated task alone. See William Holdsworth, History of English Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), i, 395-476; v, 215-338; ix, 335-408; xii, 178-330, 583-605.
[46] Re Gorham, Bishop of Exeter, ex parte Bishop of Exeter [1850] EngR 18; (1850) 10 CB 102; 138 ER 41.
[47] Act of Supremacy 1534 (26 Hen VIII c 1); repealed by the See of Rome Act 1554 (1-2 Phil & Mar c 8); confirmed by the Act of Supremacy 1558 (1 Eliz I c 1).
[48] Trained in the civil law, as well as the ecclesiastical or canon law, they were normally recruited from the Advocates of Doctors’ Commons; George Squibb, Doctors' Commons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 31.
[49] RH Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 38.
[50] The archdeacons' courts were only finally abolished in 1963, and remained active to the late eighteenth century; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 ss 82(2)(a), 83.
[51] This was, of course, an ironic twist given that papal authority had been extended and reinforced throughout Western Christendom through the work of the great lawyer-popes and the canonists and civilians.
[52] For a modern edition see The Reformation of the Ecclesiastical Laws as attempted in the reigns of King Henry VIII, King Edward VI, and Queen Elizabeth E Cardwell (ed) (London: Miscellaneous Public Documents, 1850).
[53] Act of Submission of the Clergy 1533 (25 Hen VIII c 19).
[54] “Ecclesiastical law is part of the law of the land: Mackonochie v Lord Penzance (1881) 6 App Cas P 424, 446. The law is one, but jurisdiction as to its enforcement is divided between the ecclesiastical courts and the temporal courts. When a matter of general law arises incidentally for consideration in a case before an ecclesiastical court, that court is bound to ascertain the general law and order itself accordingly; and where a matter depending on ecclesiastical law finds a place in a cause properly before the temporal courts those courts similarly will ascertain for themselves the ecclesiastical law and apply it as part of the law they administer”.
-Attorney-General v Dean and Chapter of Ripon Cathedral [1945] Ch 239, 245 per Uthwatt J.
[55] The ecclesiastical law of England consists of the general principles of the ius commune ecclesiasticum (Ever v Owen Godbolt’s Report 432, per Whitlock J); foreign particular constitutions received by English councils or so recognised by English courts (secular or spiritual) as to become part of the ecclesiastical custom of the realm; and the constitutions and canons of English synods. The Submission of the Clergy Act 1533 (25 Hen VIII c 19) provided that only the canon law as it then stood was to bind the clergy and laity, and only so far as it was not contrary to common and statute law, excepting only the papal authority to alter the canon law, a power which ended in later in 1533, when it was enacted that England was “an Empire governed by one supreme head and king” (Appointment of Bishops Act 1533 (25 Hen VIII c 20)). New canon law could only be created by Act of Parliament, and now by Measure, under the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919 (9 & 10 Geo V c 76).
[56] The influence of Erastianism thought was less pronounced than the belief of the common lawyers in their own correctness and ability to settle all matters spiritual and lay. See JH Baker, Introduction to English Legal History (London: Butterworth, 1979), 92-95.
[57] RG Usher, The Rise and Fall of the High Commission (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913). Usher is now known to be wrong on the origins, history and functions of the High Commission, but remains a useful reference source.
[58] 26 Hen VIII c 1.
[59] “From Edmund Bonner’s commission as bishop of London, 1538”, reprinted in Sir Geoffrey Elton, The Tudor Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 367-368.
[60] Act of Supremacy 1534 (26 Hen VIII c 1).
[61] GIO Duncan, The High Court of Delegates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
[62] 1 Eliz c 1.
[63] Article 37, “Of the Civil Magistrate”: The King’s Majesty hath the chief power in this Realm of England, and other his Dominions, unto whom the chief Government of all Estates of this Realm, whether they be Ecclesiastical or civil, in all causes doth appertain, and is not, nor ought to be, subject to any foreign Jurisdiction ...”.
[64] This is shown in the change of style of the tribunal from “High Commission” by 1570, to “Court” by 1580.
[65] Including 15 clergy, 5 Ministers of the Crown, 3 civilians, and a common lawyer; RG Usher, The Rise and Fall of the High Commission (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 90.
[66] Including 46 clergy, 37 Privy Counsellors and dignitaries, 10 civilians, and 15 common lawyers; RG Usher, The Rise and Fall of the High Commission (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 255.
[67] RG Usher, The Rise and Fall of the High Commission (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 90.
[68] RG Usher, The Rise and Fall of the High Commission (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 255.
[69] The ending of the teaching of canon law in the universities did not of course end the study of this system of law, as the members of Doctors' Commons preserved the ancient learning.
[70] Though its jurisdiction was limited; the Elizabethan Act establishing the Court had provided that it was to regard as heresy nothing that was not expressly denounced as such in the plain words of Scripture, by the first four general councils, and by Parliament with the concurrence of the two convocations; Act of Supremacy 1558 (1 Eliz I c 1) s 36; Case of Heresy [1572] EngR 395; (1601) 12 Co Rep 56; 77 ER 1335; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Act 1677 (29 Chas II c 9); Sir Robert Phillimore, The Ecclesiastical Law of the Church of England eds Sir William Phillimore and CF Jemmett (London: 2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1895), i, 842.
[71] Abolition of High Commission Court Act 1640 (16 Chas I c 11) and the Clergy Act 1640 (16 Chas I c 27), confirmed by ss 3, 4 of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Act 1661 (13 Chas II st 1 c 12). It was revived briefly 1686-88, and finally suppressed by s 1 the Bill of Rights 1688 (1 Will & Mar sess 2 c 2), which declared King James II’s Court of Commissioners (under which title the Court of High Commission was revived) was illegal and pernicious.
[72] The Restoration ecclesiastical judiciary was marked by an intellectual rapproachment between church and State; Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 13; For the politics of the Restoration see Robert Bosher, The Making of the Restoration Church Settlement (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1951) 143-217 and A Whiteman, "The Reestablishment of the Church of England, 1660-1663" (1955) Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (5th series), v, 111.
[73] See Rt Revd Edward Stillingfleet, Irenicum- A Weapon-Salve for the Church's Wounds or the Divine Right of Particular Forms of Church Government (London: 1659, 2nd ed 1662) in Works (London: 1709), ii.
[74] Book of Common Prayer (1662), backed by the Act of Uniformity 1662 (14 Chas II c 4).
[75] The good inherent in uniformity, in distinction to the good in any liturgical or doctrinal uniformity, was stressed in Hugh Davis, De Jure Uniformitatis Ecclesisticae (London: 1669).
[76] Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 5.
[77] Rt Revd Edward Stillingfleet, Ecclesiastical Cases, Part II in Works (London: 1709); Discourse I in Works (London: 1709), iii, 742.
[78] Judges and counsel were at pains to adjust their various precedents to this end, see, for example, Slater v Smalebrooke [1714] EngR 651; (1665) 1 Sid 27; 82 ER 1066.
[79] Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 10-14.
[80] By 1753 the Court of Arches could recognise it as res judicata; Pattern v Castleman [1753] EngR 86; (1753) 1 Lee 387; 161 ER 143. The Court also decided that ecclesiastical courts would try customs according to common law rules.
[81] See, for illustration, the writings of ecclesiastical lawyers of the post-Restoration period (the term canonists is probably a misnomer); Rt Revd Edmund Gibson, Codex Juris Ecclesiasticici Anglicani (London: 1713); John Aylliffe, Parergon Juris Canonici Anglicani, or, a commentary, by way of supplement to the Canons and Constitutions of the Church of England, etc (London: privately published, 1727); Richard Burn, Ecclesiastical Law (London: A Millar, 1763). Within the courts themselves, a similar broad-minded approach was also clear; DaCosta v Villareal (1753) 2 Strange 961; 93 ER 968; Phillips v Crawley (1673) 1 Freeman 83; [1826] EngR 449; 89 ER 61.
[82] Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 14.
[83] The combined effect of the Statute of Appeals 1532 (24 Hen VIII c 12); Ecclesiastical Licences Act 1533 (24 Hen VIII c 21); Act of Supremacy 1534 (26 Hen VIII c 1) and later legislation.
[84] Act of Supremacy 1534 (26 Hen VIII c 1).
[85] Judices delegati.
[86] Submission of the Clergy Act 1533 (25 Hen VIII c 19). For the history of the Court of Delegates see Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England E Christian (ed) (New York: Garland Publishing, 1978), iii, 66; William Holdsworth, History of English Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), i, 603-605; GIO Duncan, The High Court of Delegates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
[87] GIO Duncan, The High Court of Delegates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
[88] Henry Stephen, New Commentaries on the Laws of England (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), iii, 432-433.
[89] The Sovereign has been held to be a canon or prebendary of St David’s Cathedral, Pembrokeshire, Wales. This is clearly however the result of confusion between ownership of the temporality and personal spiritual authority. In some respects however the Sovereign may be seen as a quasi-religious person. This is seen in the ceremonial of the coronation- particularly the anointing, and in the royal robes and vestments; Percy Schramm, The History of the English Coronation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937).
[90] Some formal shape was given to the court by the Submission of the Clergy Act 1533 (25 Hen VIII c 19) and the Act of Supremacy 1558 (1 Eliz I c 1).
[91] GIO Duncan, The High Court of Delegates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 173; Countess of Essex v Earl of Essex (1613) 2 St Tr 786, 828.
[92] Nor was it a court of record, a court whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony; Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England E Christian (ed) (New York: Garland Publishing, 1978), iii, 24. No court can fine or imprison which is not a court of record; Godfrey’s Case [1572] EngR 310; (1614) 11 Co Rep 42a, 43b; [1572] EngR 310; 77 ER 1199.
[93] For the procedure of the court see GIO Duncan, The High Court of Delegates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 81-177.
[94] Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Practice and Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts of England and Wales (London: HMSO, 1831-32) (cmd 199), part xxiv, p1.
[95] Judicial Committee Appeals Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will IV c 41).
[96] The rule that precedents set by earlier court decisions must be followed where applicable.
[97] WL Mathieson, English Church Reform, 1815-1840 (London: 1928), 156.
[98] Though some judgments, such as Gorham, were a blow to the High and Low Churches alike; Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 274.
[99] 3 & 4 Vict c 86.
[100] 39 & 40 Vict c 59.
[101] Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict c 59); Order in Council dated 11 December 1865, Rules for Appeals in Ecclesiastical and Maritime Causes, r 3.
[102] Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 259.
[103] Gorham v Bishop of Exeter [1849] EngR 892; (1849) 2 Rob Ecc 1; 163 ER 1221 (Arches Ct); George Brodrick and Revd WH Fremantle, A Collection of the Judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ecclesiastical Cases Relating to Doctrine and Discipline (London: 1865), 64 (PC 1850); JCS Nias, Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter (London: SPCK, 1951).
[104] Bishop of Salisbury v Williams (1862) 1 New Rep 196 (Arches Ct); Fendall v Wilson (1862) 1 New Rep 213 (Arches Ct); Williams v Bishop of Salisbury (1863) 2 Moo (NS) 375; [1863] EngR 748; 15 ER 943; George Brodrick and Revd WH Fremantle, A Collection of the Judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ecclesiastical Cases Relating to Doctrine and Discipline (London: 1865), 247 (PC).
[105] 37 & 38 Vict c 85.
[106] See PTM Marsh, The Victorian Church in Decline: Archbishop Tait and the Church of England (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 158-192.
[107] Though in Pattern v Castleman [1753] EngR 86; (1753) 1 Lee 387; 161 ER 143 the Arches Court held that ecclesiastical courts were to try custom according to common law rules.
[108] Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 257; PTM Marsh, The Victorian Church in Decline: Archbishop Tait and the Church of England (London: McGill University Press, 1969), 229.
[109] W Finlayson, History, Constitution and Character of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (London: 1878) gives a good statement of the objection to this tribunal. Sir Lewis Dibdin, Church Courts (London: Hatchards, 1881) contains a defence.
[110] Rodes refutes Bowen's contention that the objectionable decisions of the Judicial Committee were attributable to the lack of canonical learning among the common judges who sat. Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 286, 449n; Desmond Bowen, The Idea of the Victorian Church (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1968), 90-96.
[111] See EG Wood, "Ecclesiastical Suits" in Orby Shipley (ed), Ecclesiastical Reform (London: 1873), ch 6; Malcolm MacColl, Lawlessness, Sacerdotalism, and Ritualism (London: 1875); Alexander Mackonochie, First Principles versus Erastianism (London: 1876); Charles Lindley Wood, An Address delivered at the annual meeting of the English Church Union held in the Freemasons' Tavern, June 18, 1878 (London: English Church Union Office, 1878); W Finlayson, History, Constitution and Character of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (London: 1878); Charles Lindley Wood, The Just Limits of Comprehension in the National Church (London: 1878); Richard Enragh, My Ordination Oath (Birmingham: Cornish Bros, 1880); Coker Adams, The Church and the Law (Rugby: Tait & Hopewell, 1881); Edward Pusey, Unlaw in Judgements of the Judicial Committee, and its remedies (Oxford: Palmer & Co, 1881).
[112] Sir Lewis Dibdin, Church Courts (London: Hatchards, 1881), Establishment in England (London: Macmillan, 1932).
[113] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963.
[114] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 82(1).
[115] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 ss 1(3)(b); 8(1); Revised Canons Ecclesiastical, Canon G1, para. 5. The Judicial Committee has yet to hear any such appeal.
[116] Pastoral Measure 1968 s 8(2).
[117] Cathedrals Measure 1963 s 3(8), (9).
[118] Order in Council 11 December 1865.
[119] For the reasons for this exclusion, see the Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Ecclesiastical Courts (London: SPCK, 1954), 23-24.
[120] Examples of such cases include Hebbert v Purchas (1872) LR 4 CP 301 and Ridsdale v Clifton (1877) 2 PD 276, 331, PC, citing Westerton v Liddell, Horne etc (1855) Moores Special Report, which held that only the cope (for cathedral and collegiate Church dignitaries) and the surplice were legal vestments, with a hood for deans and prebendaries. For a number of reasons these judgments were never enforced. In Re Robinson, Wright v Tugwell [1897] Ch 85, the Court of Appeal held that a post-Reformation usage may be lawful if no objection to its legality can be found, so that a warrant for the use of a black gown for preaching was found in its user for several centuries.
[121] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 5.
[122] The Dean of the Arches must be a barrister of ten years' standing, or high judicial office; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 3(3); Revised Canons Ecclesiastical, Canon G3, para. 3.
[123] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 45(2).
[124] Re St Michael and All Angels, Great Torrington [1985] Fam 81.
[125] Re St Edburga’s, Abberton [1962] P10. The judges were Sir Hugh Forbes (Queen’s Bench judge, and a former diocesan chancellor), Rt Hon Sir Anthony Lloyd (Court of Appeal judge), the Bishop of Rochester (Rt Revd Richard Say), the Bishop of Chichester (Rt Revd Eric Kemp, a celebrated canonist), and Rt Revd Kenneth Woollcombe (former bishop of Oxford, and a leading theologian). The judgment, which followed a single hearing day, was read by Mr Justice Forbes, who presided; Re St Michael and All Angels, Great Torrington [1985] Fam 81.
[126] As required by the Holy Table Measure 1964; canon F2 and Church of England (Worship and Doctrine) Measure 1974; Re St Stephen’s, Walbrook [1987] Fam 146.
[127] The judges were Rt Hon Sir Anthony Lloyd, the Bishop of Rochester, the Bishop of Chichester, and Rt Revd Kenneth Woollcombe, and the Rt Hon Sir Ralph Gibson (a Court of Appeal judge who replaced Sir Hugh Forbes, who had died in the interval); In re St Stephen's, Walbrook [1987] Fam 146 (Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved); Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991) 278.
[128] The judgment was contained in speeches of three of the five judges, including the Bishop of Chichester, with the Bishop of Rochester and the Rt Revd Kenneth Woollcombe agreeing with the reasons given by Lord Justices Lloyd and Gibson, and Bishop Kemp. In the House of Lords all peers have the right to vote though the last to do so was Lord Denman in Bradlaugh v Clarke (1883) 8 App Cas 354, HL. All members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have the right to give a judgment, though prelates have not been members since the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict c 59).
[129] Parallels may be drawn with the famous Lincoln Judgment, when the Archbishop of Canterbury, personally hearing a cause, made greater use of historical evidence than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was wont to do; Ex parte Read (1888) 12 PD 221; [1892] AC 644 (PC); Read v Bishop of Lincoln (1889) 14 PD 88, 148; [1891] P9 (Archbishop); George Russell, Edward King, Bishop of London (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1912), 132-210.
[130] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 9(2); Revised Canons Ecclesiastical, Canon G1, para. 2 b.
[131] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 9(1); Revised Canons Ecclesiastical, Canon G1, para. 3 b.
[132] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 35.
[133] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 36(a).
[134] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 11(1), (2).
[135] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 1(3)(c); Revised Canons Ecclesiastical, Canon G1 para. 4.
[136] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 11(4). This requirement has not been affected by the reforms to the House of Lords, as the bishops have retained their seats. However, further reforms are likely, and the prelates may follow the hereditary peers out of the House.
[137] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 48(5), (6).
[138] Section 1 (3)(c) makes the ad hoc nature of the Commissions of Review quite unoquivocal: “there may, in accordance with the provisions in that behalf of this Measure, be appointed by Her Majesty commissioners who shall have such jurisdiction as is conferred on them by this measure with respect to the review of findings of any commission of Convocation appointed under paragraph (b) of the last foregoing subsection and paragraph (a) of this subsection, and also of the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved”.
[139] Circumspecte Agatis 1285 (13 Edw I stat Circ Agatis). This is an order to forbid an inferior court from proceeding in a cause there pending, suggesting that the cognisance of it does not belong to that court.
[140] Though not certiorari, as the courts are unfettered within their jurisdiction; R v Chancellor of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese, ex parte White [1948] 1 KB 195, [1947] 2 All ER 170 (CA). The order commanded that proceedings be removed from an inferior court into a superior court for review. In this respect the ecclesiastical courts were not inferior to the High Court.
[141] This indirect control of the ecclesiastical courts was expressly preserved by the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 83(2)(c).
[142] Mayor of London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239, 280 per Willes J.
[143] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 81(2); R v Daily Herald ex parte Bishop of Norwich [1932] 2 KB 402.
[144] This was lost in 1855; Ecclesiastical Courts Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 41) s 1. In Ireland the same effect was achieved by the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 (23 & 24 Vict c 32).
[145] Witchcraft Act 1562 (5 Eliz I c 16); Sodomy Act 1562 (5 Eliz I c 17); Fraudulent Conveyances Act 1571 (13 Eliz I c 5); Bankruptcy Act 1571 (13 Eliz I c 7); Poor Act 1575 (18 Eliz I c 3); Bigamy Act 1603 (1 Jac I c 11); Plays Act 1605 (3 Jac I c 21).
[146] The very term ecclesiastical law has been used to describe the laws of the Church, including those enacted by the secular State, in contrast to the canon law, which is purely ecclesiastical in nature. See Thomas Glyn Watkin, “Vestiges of Establishment” (1990) 2 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 110.
[147] Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 (23 & 24 Vict c 32) s 1.
[148] Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963.
[149] The principal activity of the Church courts is in the faculty jurisdiction; GH Newsom, Faculty Jurisdiction of the Church of England (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 1993).
[150] Though dissatisfaction with ecclesiastical courts appears to have been fairly general at that time; Knight v Jones (1821) Records of the Court of Delegates 8/79 (for a letter of complaint contained within the cause papers).
[151] Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Practice and Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts of England and Wales (London: HMSO, 1831-32), xxiv, 1. For the question of adjusting common law and ecclesiastical precedents see Burgoyne v Free (1825) 2 Add 405; 162 ER 343 (Arches Ct); Burgoyne v Free [1830] EngR 396; (1830) 2 Hag Ecc 663; 162 ER 991 (Delegates), and Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 11-12.
[152] If there is a conflict between ecclesiastical common law and secular common law, ecclesiastical courts are not strictly bound by the latter; Re St Mary’s, Banbury [1985] 2 All ER 611, 615 per Boydell, Ch (Oxford Consistory Court); R v Chancellor of St Edmundsbury & Ipswich Diocese ex parte White [1948] 1 KB 195, 204 per Wrottesley LJ However, ecclesiastical courts were citing common law cases from the seventeenth century; RH Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 188-195.
[153] Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict c 47).
[154] Noble v Ahier (1886) 11 PD 158 (Ch York); but see Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 463, fn81.
[155] The writ de contumace capiendo was obsolete; Robert Rodes, Law and Modernization in the Church of England (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 360. Imprisonment for contumacy by repealing the Ecclesiastical Courts Act 1813 (53 Geo III c 127).
[156] Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Canon Law of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1947), 58; Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Ecclesiastical Courts (London: SPCK, 1954), 13, 27, 28. This was due, in no small part, to the influence of Sir William Scott (later Lord Stowell), as well as to the growing influence of the common lawyers.
[157] ss 45(3), 48(5), (6).
[158] Re Lapford (Devon) Parish Church [1955] 3 All ER 484; Stephenson v Langston [1804] EngR 125; (1804) 1 Hag Con 379, 387 (Sir William Scott); Re St Mary, Tyne Dock (No 2) [1958] P 156, 159; [1958] 1 All ER 1, 8, 9 (Deputy Chancellor Wigglesworth).
[159] Rector & Churchwardens of Bishopwearmouth v Adey [1958] 3 All ER 441.
[160] Re Rector & Churchwardens of St Nicholas, Plumstead [1961] 1 All ER 298.
[161] Statutes, Decrees and Regulations of the University of Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), tit. IV s xiii, 4.
[162] Doctor of Civil Law.
[163] Doctor of Laws (i.e. civil and canon).
[164] Prior to 1535 they required a degree in canon law or canon and civil law. In the sixteenth century foreign degrees sufficed, though advocates invariable also sought incorporation at Oxford or Cambridge. The last advocate with a foreign degree in civil law was Dr Julius Caesar, DCL Paris 1586; George Squibb, Doctors' Commons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 31. After 1535 the degree was taught at English universities solely in civil law.
[165] Details of the method are given in R v Archbishop of Canterbury [1807] EngR 141; (1807) 8 East 213; 10 ER 323.
[166] John Aylliffe, Parergon Juris Canonici Anglicani, or, a commentary, by way of supplement to the Canons and Constitutions of the Church of England, etc (London: privately published, 1726), 53 et seq; Richard Burn, Ecclesiastical Law (London: T Cadell, 1781), i, 2-4. This was later was reduced to at least four, and latterly only three years. It was not unusual for would-be practitioners to study civil law at the University of Paris for two years, followed by a similar period studying canon law at the University of Bologna; The Laws of England (London: Butterworth, 1910), xi, 503n.
[167] IJ Churchill, Canterbury Administration (London: Church Historical Society, 1933), i, 451. The so-called “year of silence”.
[168] After the incorporation of Doctors' Commons they had to be doctors of civil law of Oxford or Cambridge. Some earlier members had lacked this latter qualification, such as Richard Zouche, 1618, who held only the BCL; George Squibb, Doctors' Commons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 30.
[169] George Squibb, Doctors' Commons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
[170] In the period 1500-1750 some 460 lawyers practised or received permission to practice in the Court of Arches. At their height there were twelve to twenty-four in practice, and a total of up to seventy; Brian Levach, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750” in Wilfred Prest (ed), Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 108. In 1684 there were 38 advocates “exercent” (of whom 19 were judges), in 1714 there were 35 (15 judges); Edward Chamberlayne, Angliae Notitia, or the Second Part of the Present State of England (London: J Martin, 1679), 289-290.
[171] There was no real break in continuity due to the Reformation, though laymen who were doctors only of civil law were now appointed judges in the ecclesiastical courts; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Act 1545 (37 Hen VIII c 17).
[172] Brian Levach, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750” in Wilfred Prest (ed), Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 109; Proctors were originally members, but were gradually excluded. The last proctor was admitted 1569, and their membership was officially ended 1570; George Squibb, Doctors' Commons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 24-25.
[173] Only laymen could be members of the society. Membership was only made compulsory in 1570, though most advocates had been members before this. Advocates in the northern province were not required to be members of Doctors' Commons, and their qualifications were also less strict. Whereas all southern advocates were doctors, advocates in York were usually merely bachelors of law. Unlike the doctors, who tended to be based in London, the northern advocates served in the consistory courts of English and Welch diocese; Brian Levach, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750” in Wilfred Prest (ed), Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 110.
[174] 20 & 21 Vict c 77.
[175] s 40.
[176] s 41.
[177] 20 & 21 Vict c 85.
[178] s 15.
[179] 22 & 23 Vict c 6.
[180] This is now obsolescent, having sat only once in 250 years; Blount’s Case [1737] EngR 141; (1737) 1 Atk 295; 26 ER 189; Manchester Corp v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd [1955] 2 WLR 440; [1955] 1 All ER 387; [1955] P 133.
[181] 22 & 23 Vict c 6.
[182] s 116.
[183] s 117.
[184] R v Hughes [1828] EngR 400; (1828) 7 B. & C. 708, 717; [1828] EngR 400; 108 ER 888.
[185] The corporation ceased to be collegiate on the death in 1904 of Dr Jenner-Fust, admitted 1835; Who Was Who, 1897-1916 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1953), 378.
[186] Mouncey v Robinson (1867) 37 LJ Ecc 8; cf Marson v Unmack [1923] P 163, 165; Manchester Corporation v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd [1955] WLR 440, 449 per Lord Goddard (Court of Chivalry).
[187] Like the attorneys, they were domini litis rather than merely spokesmen; Obicini v Bligh [1832] EngR 543; (1832) 8 Bing 335, 352 per Tindal, CJ. They were ultimately housed in Doctors' Commons. Prior to 1570, when membership of Doctors' Commons was made compulsory for advocates, some proctors had been members; JH Baker, “The English Legal Profession 1450-1550”, in Wilfred Prest (ed), Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America, London: Croom Helm, 1981), 24.
[188] Brian Levach, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750” in Wilfred Prest (ed), Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 110. The period of articles required was seven years; Harry Kirk, Portrait of a Profession. A History of the Solicitor’s Profession, 1100 to the Present Day (London: Oyez Publishing, 1976), 20.
[189] The procedure is explained in R v Archbishop of Canterbury [1807] EngR 141; (1807) 8 East 213; 10 ER 323.
[190] They were never very numerous, there being some ten in practise in the Court of Arches, another eight in York, and smaller numbers at other consistory courts. The number was limited in 1696 to 34, with additional supernumeraries; Harry Kirk, Portrait of a Profession. A History of the Solicitor’s Profession, 1100 to the Present Day (London: Oyez Publishing, 1976), 20. In 1707 there were 24 proctors, of whom only 7 practised in the Court of Chivalry. In 1737 there were only 14 proctors, and only 4 by 1756; Edward Chamberlayne, Angliae Notitia, or the Second Part of the Present State of England (London: J Martin, 1679), 168, 183; George Squibb, The High Court of Chivalry: A Study of the Civil Law in England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 118, from John Chamberlayne, Magnae Britanniae Notitia (London: D Midwinter, 1718, 1727, 1728, 1741, 1745).
[191] s 42.
[192] s 43.
[193] s 15.
[194] 22 & 23 Vict c 6.
[195] s 17; Now the Solicitors Act 1957 s 2(1)(d).
[196] The valuable library of Doctors' Commons was sold 1861.
[197] In Erastian terminological understanding, dominant since the Revolution of 1688, this supremacy was of the monarch as head of State, rather than personally. The idea that it was a personal supremacy of the monarch was not even mooted again till the time of Victoria; Sir Lewis Dibdin, Church Courts (London: Hatchards, 1881), Establishment in England (London: Macmillan, 1932), 51-52. This position has been much misunderstood since, particular in the Church overseas.
[198] Strictly speaking, no secular court was part of the hierarchy at any stage, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council being merely advisers to the Queen in Counsel; See now the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 1(3)(d).
[199] Both provincial courts are bound by decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, though the Court for Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved and Commissions of Review are not bound by decisions of the Judicial Committee on matters of doctrine, ritual, and ceremonial; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 48(6).
[200] The Chancellor is appointed by letters patent of the Bishop, to be the Official Principal and Vicar-General of the bishop, who may himself sit if he so wishes. The Chancellor must be over 30 years of age, a lawyer of seven years' standing or who has held high judicial office, and a communicant of the Church. Appointment is only after consultation with the Lord Chancellor, and the Dean of the Arches and Auditor; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 2(1), (2). The Chancellor is oculus episcopi and has second rank in the diocese, save the precedence of the Dean within his cathedral; See John Godolphin, Repertorium Canonicum, or an abridgement of the ecclesiastical law of the Realm, consistent with the Temporal, etc (London: privately published, 1678), 85.
[201] Ecclesiastical judges were required to have a degree in canon law until 1545 (Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Act 1545 (37 Hen VIII c 17)), thereafter they only had the doctorate in civil law; Report of the Archbishops' Commission, The Canon Law of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1947), 52.
[202] In the Roman Catholic Church, priests study canon law for a year, as part of their training. The canon law (and the wider ecclesiastical law) in the Church of England has a narrower scope and coverage. But, even allowing for this, there was, until quite recently, little effort taken to produce a body of trained canonists or ecclesiastical lawyers since the demise of Doctors' Commons.
[203] The University of Wales at Cardiff has offered for some years a LLM degree in canon law. This is designed for legal practitioners but also for others such as clergy who may have cause to resort to the ecclesiastical law. Despite the title, the degree is not confined to the canon law per se, but covers ecclesiastical law in its wider definition.
[204] There has been much recent work towards a systematic jurisprudence, notably including Norman Doe's Canon Law in the Anglican Communion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
[205] [1987] Fam 146.
[206] That canon law and theology are distinct though interrelated is important; Teodoro Jiménez Urresti, "Canon Law and Theology: Two Different Sciences" (1967) 8 (3) Concilium 10.