

Regional initiative to help fight the increasing problem of transnational crime

By Janice Jarrett



John McFarlane

The fight against transnational crime is not for law enforcement alone to join. Modern organised crime has swept away traditional precepts of what distinguishes or separates national security, military and law and order threats. Organised crime now has the means to destabilise states and the problem is deepening world-wide. Yet in Australia, until now, there has been little acknowledgement outside law enforcement of the peril.

That the Australian Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has established a regional study group on transnational crime is a heartening development.

If transnational crime is not to gain ascendancy over nation-states, the combined intellectual and practical resources of nations must be brought to bear now and with unwavering determination. In Australia, the CSCAP initiative is the first clarion-call to arms.

Adrien Whiddett,
Deputy Commissioner.

"Transnational crime is not a new phenomenon, but what is new is the scale of activity and the fact that organised crime now possesses the tools once reserved for nation-states. It is that the dispersion of technology access, global mobility, expertise, skills for hire, cheap easily-acquired weapons of mass lethality, and the vast illicit capital and financial resources of modern organised crime permit it to threaten, rival and undermine the stability of nation-states, and to corrupt civil society in many parts of the world."

Peter Lupsha, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of New Mexico.

The AFP, at the invitation of the Australian Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), has taken a major initiative in establishing a regional study group on transnational crime.

Commissioner Mick Palmer has seconded former Director of Intelligence, John McFarlane, to the Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADSC) at the Australian Defence Force Academy where he is a Visiting Fellow and as part of that responsibility, convener of the study group. Mr McFarlane also will undertake policy analyses of the strategic significance of the Torres Strait,

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Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific from the Australian law enforcement perspective.

The secondment is a continuation of the close working ties between the AFP and the ADSC – earlier this year Mr Palmer launched two ADSC publications, – *Transnational Crime: A New Security Threat?*, and *Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics*, based on ADSC seminars in which the AFP also was involved.

During the past few years, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have developed multilateralised and institutionalised regional security mechanisms at both the official/ministerial (First Track) and unofficial (Second Track) levels. At the Second Track level, the most structured and ambitious initiative has been the establishment of CSCAP.

“The essential purpose of CSCAP is to provide a non-governmental process to contribute towards regional confidence building and to enhance regional security through dialogue, consultation and cooperation”, Mr McFarlane said.

Three essential themes were involved in the establishment of CSCAP. The first was that the Council should be a non-governmental institution but should involve government officials, albeit in their private capacities. This should allow for relatively free discussion of diplomatically sensitive issues which otherwise could not be raised in official forums, such as the ARF.

The second theme was to encourage regional economic cooperation, mainly through the dissemination of ideas and the resulting discussions, while the third was the acceptance of the need to build on extant arrangements in the region wherever possible rather than construct new structures and processes.

The current membership of CSCAP includes Australia, Canada, Peoples’ Republic of China, European Union (Associate Member), Indonesia, India (Associate Member), Japan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (North Korea), Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Philippines, Russia,

Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Nations (Associate Member), and the USA. “Now that Laos and Myanmar (Burma) have gained membership of ASEAN, it is likely that they will soon be admitted to CSCAP”, Mr McFarlane said. “However, at this stage the position of Cambodia remains unclear due to the recent political events in that country.”

Working Groups on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM), Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security (CCCS), Northeast Asia, and Maritime Cooperation have been established as the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity.

At the initiative of the Australian Committee of CSCAP, the Council is now considering how best to deal with the issue of transnational crime.

The draft terms of reference for a CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime were presented at the Fifth CSCAP Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1996 together with a background paper, by Mr McFarlane and Karen McLennan of the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments, titled *Transnational Crime: The New Security Paradigm*.

The proposal was formally considered at the Sixth Steering Committee Meeting of CSCAP held in Canberra in December 1996 where the following resolution was passed:

Transnational crime

Recognising the range and growth of transnational crime and its impact on the Asia Pacific region, the CSCAP Steering Committee agreed to the establishment of a study group to consider the issues involved in transnational crime and its security implications in the region. The primary objectives of any CSCAP involvement in the transnational crime issue would be –

- To gain a better understanding of and reach agreement on the major transnational crime trends affecting the region as a whole.
- To consider practical measures which might be adopted to combat transnational crime in the region.

- To encourage and assist those countries which have recently become engaged in regional security cooperation, and which are concerned about the problem of transnational crime in the region, to endorse the United Nations and other protocols dealing with transnational crime, particularly in the narcotics area, and to develop laws to assist in regional and international cooperation to counter drug trafficking, money laundering, mutual assistance, extradition and the like.


The steering committee noted that CSCAP's involvement in this area was consistent with the views of ministers at the Third ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Jakarta in July 1996, when the chairman reported that "the ministers also agreed to consider at the next ARF meeting the question of drug trafficking and related transnational issues such as economic crimes, including money laundering, which could constitute threats to the security of the countries of the region. In this area, CSCAP will be solely concerned with regional crime trends and will not become involved in any way in the internal affairs of member countries".

To give effect to the resolution CSCAP Singapore hosted a meeting in March this year, co-chaired by Australia and Thailand, of CSCAP representatives interested in serving on the proposed study group. The meeting was attended

also by CSCAP members from Canada, China, India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Russia and Singapore. Their backgrounds included the areas of strategic analysis, political science, sociology, diplomacy, military service and policing.

The meeting agreed that as transnational crime involves a number of potentially sensitive issues, it was essential that its deliberations were not perceived as involving the study group in commenting on the internal affairs, or being judgemental, about the law enforcement policies of individual member countries.

It was agreed that the terms of reference for the study group should identify and consider significant transnational crime trends which affect security in the Asia Pacific region as a whole, and to offer assistance, advice and encouragement to member countries seeking legal and other practical solutions to the identified criminal threats. It was agreed also that the activities of CSCAP in the transnational crime area should be generally consistent with and support the approach taken by bodies or initiatives, such as the International Narcotics Control Board, the United Nations Drug Control Program, the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime and its Global Action Plan, the Organisation for



John McFarlane (Australia), Dr Carolina Hernandez (Philippines), and Dr Suchit Bunbongkarn (Thailand).

Economic Cooperation and Development Recommendations on Bribery in International Business Transactions and The Summit of Eight (G7 plus Russia).

The meeting considered a range of transnational crimes which members saw as significantly or potentially affecting regional security. It was agreed that research projects would be undertaken by individual member countries. Among the topics likely to be addressed are: Transnational Crime as a Security Issue (Australia); Money Laundering Methodologies and Counter-measures (Australia); The Strategic Impact of Transnational Crime (India); Background Issues Relating to Illegal Immigration in the Region (Canada/Philippines); Technology Crimes (Thailand); Factors which might lead to the Expansion or Containment of Transnational Crime within the Region (Singapore); Proliferation of the Smuggling of Small Arms within the Region (India); Drug Trafficking as a National Security Issue (Russia)

Other topics being considered include Internet crime; illegal transnational prostitution rackets, fraud, environmental security and corruption. When the group has achieved a 'critical mass' of membership and expertise, it will turn its attention to regional narcotics trafficking (including precursor chemical diversions), and terrorism.

The group will meet in Bangkok in October under three Co-Chairs – Dr Carolina Hernandez (Philippines), Dr Suchit Bunbongkarn (Thailand) and John McFarlane (Australia) and a report will be made to the Eighth Steering Committee of CSCAP in Tokyo in December, when a decision on whether to establish a formal CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime will be made.

Member countries which were unable to attend the first meeting, including the USA, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand and the Philippines, have indicated a keen interest in becoming more involved in the work of the study group.

The study group plans to publish details of the current international initiatives being taken against transnational crime for the guidance of the newer member countries of ASEAN and others in the ARF/CSCAP arrangement, to assist in the development of mutual legal assistance arrangements to facilitate requests for mutual assistance, extradition (where appropriate), witness protection, criminal intelligence exchange, assistance with forensic science support, criminal asset forfeiture, training and education programs, and language training.

The CSCAP initiatives are not meant to

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compete with existing bilateral and multilateral law enforcement liaison arrangements but should offer supporting benefits such as:

- The recognition that transnational crime (in all its various manifestations) is an issue affecting the security and stability of regional states.
- Encouraging serious communication between analysts and policy officers working on traditional national security and law enforcement issues.
- Educating the political leadership on the transnational crime issues threatening the region and countries within the region.
- Emphasising the importance of good liaison, transparency and confidence building at the appropriate levels between the countries in the region.
- Educating the newly emerging countries in the region on practical and legal measures of regional cooperation.
- Enhancing the existing relationships between law enforcement agencies in the region.

Mr McFarlane said that the ARF is one of the most important political and strategic arrangements in which Australia is involved and is represented at that level by the Foreign Minister Alexander Downer.

“CSCAP is now recognised as a major ‘think tank’ supporting the ARF, through which various policy initiatives and other problem-solving measures, including transparency and confidence building, are developed,” he said.

“The fact that CSCAP has now taken up the issue of transnational crime allows regional law enforcement agencies, including the AFP, a direct involvement in defining the problems we face and to contribute towards the development of policies which will encourage greater cooperation and mutual efforts against the threat of transnational crime.”

Legislative planning plays essential role in smooth operation of Olympics

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The installation of video telephones in potential danger areas in the Sydney city area, to be linked to the Sydney Police Centre, has already been reported as having been approved by the City Safety Task Force, including the Sydney District Police Commander, Chief Superintendent Darcy Cluff.⁹ The availability of this video phone system at locations such as Central Railway Station, Hyde Park, The Rocks area, Woolloomooloo and perhaps Circular Quay, would encourage participation in security by members of the public and allow more effective reporting to police of events which appear appropriate to bring to their attention. This could be combined with full video surveillance in selected areas, as at Darling Harbour and perhaps at the Olympic Village and other related sites at the Sydney Olympic Park and elsewhere. Increased lighting at potential danger spots is another precaution which no doubt will also be receiving attention.

Increased security at Sydney Airport will require additional resources of equipment and personnel and upgraded security procedures. Searches of passengers and luggage will require more sophisticated screening equipment to detect various kinds of explosives or other dangerous substances, to be effective. At times it may be advisable to restrict entry to terminals of persons who cannot identify themselves as passengers or as having an official or other approved

identification, as airline or airport staff or in connection with the Olympics. Searches may be conducted at times of persons entering a terminal and not merely those about to board a plane. This may be appropriate when passengers regarded as at high risk are landing or about to board a plane, e.g. an Israeli sports team, or a Prime Minister or Head of State considered to be subject to a high level of threat, whether from the Middle East, or Europe or elsewhere, depending on the threat assessment at the time.

Teams of bomb sniffer dogs and their handlers, and bomb disposal experts from police, the Defence Force and other Government agencies such as Customs, could be made available for airport security, as well as for Olympic venues and elsewhere, as required. Appropriate funding will be required from the Commonwealth, to aid funding for improved bomb-detection equipment, additional security personnel, dog teams for searches and other like resources as above suggested.

Checks on airport employees, including private security personnel may have to be increased, and security checks on all luggage including air cargo and mail, as well as hand luggage upgraded, as part of the overall security plan. Reference may be made to recent United States initiatives to improve security at airports following the crash of TWA Flight 800 in July, 1996 and the Atlanta Olympic Park bombing some 10 days later.¹⁰

Upgraded security measures and facilities will also have to be considered at other airports in Australia, when they are used to supplement Sydney airport for purposes of Olympic travel and in any event when used by visiting VIPs while travelling around Australia. This is likely to occur before, during and after the Games on the part of many official visitors to the Games, including internationally protected persons, in far greater numbers than usual. The advisability of seeking public assistance, including from general airline and airport staff, as well as the travelling public, in reporting suspicious unattended items, applies at air terminals and car parks, at least as much as at the other venues mentioned above.

Special Olympic security legislation

It may be advisable to prepare and enact special security legislation covering in particular the Olympic Village and the various Olympic competition venues for the period of the Games and perhaps for a short period before their commencement.

Athletes checking through a security gate at the Atlanta Olympics. "It may be advisable to prepare and enact special security legislation covering in particular the Olympic Village and the various Olympic competition venues for the period of the Games and perhaps for a short period before their commencement."



Such legislation could provide for security of persons and property during the Games, while present at the above sites during or immediately prior to the Games, as well as for the orderly conduct of persons thereat, and related matters.

The legislation could regulate or authorise the regulation of entry to appropriate areas, prohibit entry to designated areas other than through specified entry points and provide for accreditation for entering or being in restricted areas. Provision could also be made in the legislation for notification of restricted areas and entry points in the Government Gazette and elsewhere, as by means of signs outside and around such areas, as well as by notices in daily newspapers circulating in and around Sydney.

The legislative scheme contemplated herein would involve conferring powers on members of the police force and other authorised persons to require production of accreditation for entry into or presence inside a restricted area, refusing entry to such an area, or directing persons to leave such areas.

Failure to comply with such directions given pursuant to the legislation, or entering or being present within a restricted area in an unauthorised manner contrary to the legislation, or regulations made thereunder, without reasonable excuse, would be an offence against the Act. Some useful precedents for such legislation may be found in the Queensland Commonwealth Games Act 1982, entitled an Act to facilitate the holding of the XIIth Commonwealth Games and to provide for the orderly conduct of persons and for the security of persons and property during those Games.¹¹

Commonwealth Games Act 1982 (Qld)

Thus under the Commonwealth Games Act 1982 (hereafter referred to as the Act), a person was prohibited from entering a notified area otherwise than at an entry point with respect to which notification was issued under the Act.¹² A person who entered such a notified area other than a notified restricted zone, otherwise than at a notified entry point was deemed to be a trespasser for the purposes of the Act.¹³ An authorised person at an entry point to a notified restricted zone could at any time demand production of any accreditation issued to a person and inspect the accreditation before allowing the person entry to the notified restricted zone.¹⁴ A person who failed or refused to produce accreditation for such a notified restricted zone or who produced accreditation which the authorised person suspected on reasonable grounds to be false could be refused entry to such a restricted zone.¹⁵ A person who entered a notified restricted zone

other than at a notified entry point committed an offence against the Act.¹⁶

Likewise an authorised person in a notified restricted zone could at any time demand production of and inspect any accreditation issued to any person in that restricted zone.¹⁷ A person who failed to produce accreditation for that restricted zone, or refused to do so, or produced accreditation which the authorised person suspected on reasonable grounds was false, could be ordered to leave that restricted zone.¹⁸ A person who had been ordered to leave a restricted zone in accordance with the above provisions and remained within that zone, refused to leave that zone or having left subsequently returned to the zone without accreditation, committed an offence against the Act.¹⁹ The requirements as to accreditation were declared not to apply to a member of the police force acting in the execution of his duty.²⁰

Further, a member of the police force in a notified area was empowered at any time to order a known or reputed criminal whom he suspected on reasonable grounds to be in the notified area for unlawful purpose, or a known or reputed pick pocket or illegal bookmaker or a person deemed to be a trespasser pursuant to certain provisions of the Act,²¹ to leave the notified area.²² A person specified under the above provisions who had been ordered to leave a notified area, remained thereon, refused to leave that area, or having left in accordance with such order subsequently returned thereto on the same day, committed an offence against the Act.²³

A notified area was defined in the Act to mean any notified site or notified restricted zone or any portion thereof or any combination thereof.²⁴ A notified restricted zone was defined to mean any part of a notified site to which relates a notification as a restricted zone pursuant to the Act. The term also included a notified site which was not open to the public.²⁵ A notified site was defined to mean a site to which relates a notification issued pursuant to the Act and any building, erection, structure, dwelling or other thing erected in or upon that site.²⁶ An entry point was defined to mean an entry point to which related a notification issued pursuant to the Act.²⁷

The Governor in Council was authorised by Order in Council from time to time to issue notifications (inter alia) of the areas, sites, restricted zones and entry points in relation to which the powers and authorities of the Act may be exercised. Such notifications could also be issued as to the names, designations and status of notified persons, the form of identity card issued to an authorised person and the whereabouts of entry points on the boundaries of notified areas.²⁸

Sydney International Aquatic Centre - venue for swimming, diving, water polo and synchronised swimming at the 2000 Olympics. Security considerations for the Games will involve the Olympic venues as well as the surrounding area. Photo courtesy the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games.



The Act also provided that every notified area, notified site, notified restricted zone and entry point shall be advertised in a daily newspaper published and circulated in Brisbane and in such other manner as is prescribed by the regulations.²⁹

An authorised person was defined to mean any member of the police force and any person appointed pursuant to the Act by the Commissioner of Police.³⁰ It should be noted that a member of the police force was defined to include both members of the Queensland police force and of the Australian Federal Police, as well as special constables appointed under the Police Act 1937-1980.³¹

Police were authorised by the Act to search notified areas and certain routes and other places for anything which has been, is being, or is about to be used to endanger, obstruct, hinder, or otherwise interfere with any person, or to destroy, damage or otherwise interfere with any property, or to disrupt the peaceable and orderly conduct of any event, entertainment or gathering, or any training, preparation or rehearsal therefore. Upon suspicion on reasonable grounds that there was any such object in any place, building, structure or vehicle within or near any notified area, or on or near any route being used or about to be used by a notified person, or any place, building structure or vehicle to be visited by a notified person, the member of the police force having that suspicion could enter and search that place,

building, structure or vehicle.³² The term notified person was defined to mean a person who was a member of a Royal Family, a Head of State, or a diplomatic agent, to whom related a notification issued pursuant to the Act by Order in Council.³³

The Act also contained a general power which permitted an authorised person at any time to refuse permission for any person, animal or vehicle to enter or prevent any person, animal or vehicle from entering a notified area.³⁴

Members of the police force were further empowered by the Act to remove vehicles or other items on reasonable suspicion. If a member of the police force suspected on reasonable grounds that it was necessary for the security of any person or property that a vehicle or other thing of any kind whatsoever placed or erected within or near a notified area should be removed, he could remove that vehicle or thing.³⁵ Thus a vehicle suspected on reasonable grounds of containing a dangerous substance, whether they be explosives or inflammable substances or other dangerous items, could be removed by police, pursuant to this legislative authority whether on a Games site or other notified area, or in the vicinity thereof, in the interests of security of persons or property. Such provisions would be well worth consideration for enactment, for security at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

NSW emergency legislation

It should be noted that some special legislative

powers which could be useful to police in emergency situations already exist in NSW to be found in the the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989, as amended. However, it should also be noted that these powers as mentioned below are expressed to apply to actual or imminent emergencies and within danger areas as defined hereunder. Accordingly, they would not be sufficient by themselves to meet the requirement of security throughout the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. However, they could be useful on appropriate occasions and thus would be of interest to police and security planners generally. The most relevant powers conferred by the above legislation are described hereunder.

Thus, special power to take various safety measures in emergencies were conferred on NSW police by the State Emergency Legislation Amendment Act 1995, by way of amendments to the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989. A new section 61, inserted in the principal Act by the 1995 Amendment Act abovementioned, authorises a senior police officer, if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so for the purpose of protecting persons from injury or death or protecting property threatened by an actual or imminent emergency to direct, or authorise another police officer to direct, the doing of any one or more of the measures set out in the section. These include (inter alia) the closure to traffic to any street, road, lane, thoroughfare or footpath or place open to or used by the public in a danger area or any part of a danger area; the closure of any other public or private place in a danger area or any part of a danger area; the pulling down, destruction or shoring up of any wall or premises that have been damaged or rendered insecure in a danger area; the shutting down of disconnection of the supply of gas, electricity or certain other substances in a danger area; and the taking possession of and removal or destruction of any material or thing in a danger area that may be dangerous to life or property or may interfere with the response of emergency services to the emergency.³⁶

A senior police officer is defined to mean a police officer of or above the rank of sergeant or a police officer of a class prescribed as being within the definition by the regulations.³⁷ A danger area is defined to mean the area specified by a senior police officer as the area in which an emergency is causing or threatening to cause injury or death.³⁸ Premises are widely defined as including land, place, building, vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or any part of premises.³⁹

Further to the new powers to take safety measures abovementioned under section 61 of the

principal Act, a police officer is authorised to enter any premises for the purposes of complying with a direction under section 61(1).⁴⁰ A police officer who is authorised to enter premises may enter without giving notice if entry is made with the consent of the owner or occupier, or if entry is made to a part of the premises that is open to the public, or if entry is required urgently and the case is one in which the senior police officer giving the direction has authorised in writing, either generally or in a particular case, entry without notice. In any other case, the police officer is required to give the owner or occupier of the premises reasonable written notice of the intention to enter the premises.⁴¹ The Act also provides that a police officer authorised to enter premises, in the exercise of a function under section 61, must do as little damage as possible.⁴²

Reasonable force may be used for the purpose of gaining entry to premises to comply with a

“Additional powers, including new powers of search and seizure, could be conferred on police in emergency situations, at the direction of a senior officer.”

direction under section 61. However, the use of force is subject to certain conditions set out in the Act. Thus a senior police officer must have authorised in writing the use of force in the particular case or has specified in writing the circumstances that are required to exist before force may be used and the particular case falls within those circumstances. If a police officer authorised to enter premises uses force to do so, the officer is required as soon as practicable to inform the senior police officer who gave the direction under section 61 of the Act. In turn, the senior police officer who has been informed of the use of force, is required to give notice of this to the Commissioner of Police.⁴³

Additional powers, including new powers of search and seizure, could be conferred on police in emergency situations, at the direction of a senior officer. Thus the power to enter premises could be accompanied by a specific power to search or cause to be searched such premises in a danger area for any material or thing that may be dangerous to life or property or may interfere with the response of emergency services to the emergency. A power to take possession of and to remove or destroy any such material or thing in a

danger area is already contained in the new section 61 of the Act.

Such powers of search and seizure could be extended to cover a material or thing in a danger area that, in the opinion of a senior police officer, could assist police or other emergency services in dealing with the emergency. The proposed additional powers should only be applicable for the purpose of protecting persons from injury or death.

I note that the Act already contains a provision for such compensation as may be determined by the Minister for Police, where a person's property is damaged by the exercise of a right of entry. It is expressly stated that there is no entitlement to receive compensation.⁴⁴ Consideration might be given to extending the compensation provision to cover specifically loss or damage arising from the removal of items pursuant to the statutory powers mentioned above and to providing for a right of review to a Judge or Magistrate, instead of the Premier, from the Minister's decision on a claim for compensation. It would be helpful if some criteria or guidelines were laid down in the Act with respect to the determination of compensation claims. A person convicted of a criminal act in relation to the particular emergency could be excluded from the benefit of the compensation provisions.

The definition of emergency in section 4 of the principal Act, includes an emergency due to an actual or imminent occurrence such as fire, flood, storm, earthquake, explosion, accident, epidemic or warlike action, which endangers or threatens to endanger the safety or health of persons in the State or destroys or damages or threatens to destroy or damage property in the State. The section refers to an emergency which requires a significant and coordinated response.⁴⁵

Consideration should be given to extending the definition of emergency so as to specifically include acts of violence or any incident involving a firearm or other weapon, bomb or other explosive device or substance, that endangers or threatens to endanger persons or otherwise meets or complies with the definition of emergency in the Act.

Precedents for a more extensive definition of emergency or an emergency situation may be found in other State emergency legislation, including in particular the Queensland Public Safety Preservation Act 1986.⁴⁶

This article seeks to raise only some of the matters and issues relating to security for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The author continues to research and write about relevant Commonwealth powers and other issues and sources which could be relevant to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

Endnotes:

1. *President Clinton, President's Saturday Radio Address to Americans, 10 August, 1996.*
2. *Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games Act 1993, Section 3.*
3. *E.g. see the New York Times National, July 28, 1996 and The Washington Post, July 28, 1996.*
4. *E.g. see US News and World Report, June 24, 1996; the New York Times, July 12, 1996. See also US Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, June 11, 1996, Subject: Terrorism and the 1996 Olympics.*
5. *See Commonwealth Gazette No.S30, February 14, 1978. See also A. Hiller, Public Order and the Law (1983) pp.218-220 (Law Book Co. Ltd).*
6. *E.g. see A. Hiller, Protection of Diplomats and Visiting VIPs (1987) 41 APJ 153. See also Duff v. The Queen (1979) 39 FLR 315.*
7. *See n.6 supra.*
8. *See R. v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425.*
9. *E.g. see The Australian, July 30, 1996.*
10. *E.g. see White House Fact Sheet issued August 5, 1996, headed Comprehensive Strategy to Fight Terrorism, with note, Fighting Terrorism in our airports and airplanes.*
11. *No. 27 of 1982.*
12. *Section 24(1).*
13. *Section 24(2). See also Section 27.*
14. *Section 25(1).*
15. *Section 25 (2).*
16. *Section 24(3).*
17. *Section 26(1).*
18. *Section 26(2).*
19. *Section 26(3).*
20. *Section 23.*
21. *Section 24(2) or Section 15.*
22. *Section 27(1).*
23. *Section 27(2).*
24. *Section 6.*
25. *Section 6. See also Section 43.*
26. *Section 6. See also Section 43.*
27. *Section 6. See also Section 43.*
28. *Section 43.*
29. *Section 45*
30. *Section 6.*
31. *Section 6.*
32. *Section 20.*
33. *Section 6. See also Section 43.*
34. *Section 28.*
35. *Section 21.*
36. *Section 61(1). For some earlier emergency powers, see the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989, Section 60L.*
37. *Section 60KA.*
38. *Section 60KA.*
39. *Section 60KA.*
40. *Section 61A.*
41. *Section 61B.*
42. *Section 61C.*
43. *Section 61D, (1), (2), (3).*
44. *Section 61D(4).*
45. *State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989, Section 4.*
46. *Section 4.*