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Australian Federal Police - Platypus Journal/Magazine |
Peace support operations and policing
By Federal Agent Jeff Penrose, Director Management of Serious Crime Program
Military organisations are not expected to perform community policing roles in their home countries, however, when they participate in peace support operations they are expected to work and act like police.
A problem encountered during peace support operations is that the police and military are frequently criticised for not establishing a solid working relationship at the outset of a mission. Historical data supports that it is imperative for the military to establish such a relationship with the police during the planning phase, as a necessary outcome of the mission will be the re-establishment of a stable law and order environment.
Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers who have served in peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, Cambodia, Somalia, Mozambique, and East Timor have identified that working relationships with the military during these missions warranted improvement. Their experiences have highlighted the differences in the police and military cultures and operating methodologies. These differences will be examined to identify the future implications for command and team skills within both the police and military.
A military commander would be better versed in police culture and operating methodologies if a solid police and military working relationship was established at the outset of a mission. This would improve the capacity of a commander to achieve their mission objectives, because a shared police and military responsibility will be the re-establishment of stable law and order. Conversely, a police commander would benefit from working more closely with the military. Irrespective of whether this relationship is developed, the fact remains that a military commander will, at some point, work with the ‘in country' or multinational peacekeeping police service.
Both police and military commanders need to jointly consider the wider issues that impact on peace support operations. It is the military commander who frequently wears two hats; one for armed conflict and the other for peace support operations. In some countries, the police are neither trained nor equipped to resolve armed conflict other than serious breaches of the peace or criminal law. Alternatively, there are other countries where the military and the police work under one organisational structure; however there is growing pressure to separate them because of the enormous differences in their role, responsibilities, cultures and operating methodologies. Many NATO and UN countries would agree that the military do not possess the operating methodologies, culture, training or equipment to undertake a community policing role in preventing, detecting, investigating crime and bringing offenders to justice. However, law and order will be a principal military objective for peace support operations. In fact, this is a job for a fully functioning police service supported by an effective judicial and penal system.
The traditional role and function of police and a fundamental difference between the police and military can be found in The First Principle of the ‘modern police' that is based on research dating back to Saxon times. Traditionally, police are intended to be used within a community, ‘to prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to its repression by military force and severity of legal punishment' (Reith, 1954: 155). This principle is based on what Reith calls the value and uniqueness of ‘kin police' as opposed to ‘ruler appointed police'. He argues that ‘kin police' exercise authority bestowed by a consenting majority while the ‘ruler appointed police' exercise authority bestowed by a minority over the majority. These principles assist with defining the difference between the military and the police. It also provides a sound argument as to why the military and the police need to be two separate and distinct organisations.
• the use of deadly force;
• the concept of arrest and the discretion to deprive the liberty of another person;
• the prevention of crime and disorder ; and
• the disparity in operating principles and command (organisational) structures.
A constable is permitted to use deadly force only if the life of another or their own is under direct threat. The military generally recruit and train for armed conflict and use deadly force to complete an operation or achieve a political objective.
Under the unique office of constable, a police officer has considerable individual discretion when making a decision whether to arrest a person or not to deprive them of their liberty. Strict conventions and treaties bind the military when taking prisoners of war unless there is a legislative provision that gives them power of arrest to detain a suspect.
The primary role of police is the prevention of crime and disorder. On the other hand, in developed countries, generally the military used only as last resort for undertaking this responsibility.
Command structures for police organisations in countries like America, Australia, Canada and Britain are based on ‘kin police' values and the office of constable. The organisations are decentralised and designed to be proactive and orientated to the needs of both the community and government. Bayley (1995) supports this argument and concludes that a democratic police service requires a democratic police organisation that stresses participative management with input into decision making from lower ranks and encourages rank and file initiative. Military command structures are designed for armed conflict and need to be hierarchical and centralised with controlled devolution of responsibility and authority usually restricted to a component of an operation.
These stark differences become more noticeable when peace support operations begin to focus on law and order and there is an overlap of police and military mission objectives. The overlap of mission objectives is the grey area of peace support operations where police and military philosophies, culture, command structures and operating methodologies clash.
The ‘Police and Military Relationship Model' (figure 1) has two axes that show the relationship between the police and the military in peace support operations. They also act as continuums explaining the difference in police and military responsibilities and operating methodologies.
Figure 1: The ‘Police and Military Relationship Model'
The ‘x' axis represents the difference between military responsibilities for armed conflict and police responsibilities for law and order. Mission objectives on the ‘x' axis could include armed conflict, peace support operations, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping or long term community reconstruction. For example, a police and military long term mission objective could be a proactive program to rebuild effective police, judicial and penal services.
The ‘y' axis represents proactive and reactive phases of both military and police peace support operations and objectives. The ‘y' axis also serves as the grey line of mission hand over from military peace support operations to police peacekeeping operations.
A circle drawn around the two axes highlights four quadrants of the model where the grey areas of responsibility and authority between military and police overlap. It is in this grey circle of police and military responsibility that future relationships, command and team skilling issues will be considered. Curves can be plotted on the model to explain how police and military operations are undertaken to overcome a problem or achieve a mission objective. The model allows for the military or the police to de-escalate a mission until peace is achieved or the restoration of law and order.
Australia's recent experience in East Timor is reflected with a curve commencing in the police proactive quadrant as a peacekeeping operation to support the United Nations (UN) electoral popular consultation. Armed conflict broke out after the election and the military were required to stabilise the situation until peace could be restored. After the restoration of peace, a UN peacekeeping police operation became involved with rebuilding the country, so that it could ultimately function independently.
The use of force is one reason for the significant cultural difference between the police and military. The use of force is depicted in the four quadrants of the ‘Police and Military Responsibility Model' (figure 1).
• one - planned lethal force
• two - use of lethal force
• three - minimal force
• four - no or low force
Confusion over the use of force is likely to occur within the grey area of responsibility where the police and military cultures clash. An identified reason is that United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) personnel will be traditionally unarmed while the military are not trained to enforce the criminal law or deal with public disorder. A recent example of where bridging the gap in the grey area of responsibility occurred was in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1997, where due to the unstable situation, a Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) was formed. The countries contributing to the MSU included the Italian Carabinieri and what is believed to be paramilitary police personnel from Argentina, Romania and Slovenia. The MSU were deployed as they were more aligned to the military in that they carried assault rifles, machine guns and were trained to revert to a light infantry role if the worsening situation warranted (Valpolini, 1999).
Recent crises in the Solomon Islands and Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) have shown that the use of para military units to resolve what were essentially law and order problems leads to community confusion, mistrust of the police and government and a further destabilisation of the situation. These units are perceived to be more aligned to military culture and their operations tend to undermine community policing strategies. In particular, when paramilitary units use lethal force, the loss of community confidence can alienate the police from the community.
The modern military commander faces a dilemma. They must be technically competent to plan and execute a military operation with exact precision. At the same time, having the diplomacy of a statesman to address sensitive political issues and community policing skills for solving new and challenging problems. As the frequency of peace support operations increases, so does the demand for these new military command skills. Perhaps the job description of a military commander has changed forever.
A military commander's job description includes, the ability to effectively lead peace support operations and manage the grey area of police and military responsibilities. Performing well in the grey area requires a willingness to develop a shared police and military vision to re-establish a functioning and effective police, judicial and penal system. This could be called the ‘Needs of Justice Triangle' (figure 2) and has been widely documented in UN missions to Somalia, Cambodia and many other countries. AFP officers who have served in these missions agree that there is a need to re-establish, as quickly as possible, this important justice administration function. Excluding humanitarian relief and national security, the ‘Needs of Justice Triangle' would be the next most important shared mission objective.
If the ‘Needs of Justice Triangle' is an important mission objective then the military commander must include it in their strategic planning even though it is clearly a police responsibility. A military mission statement including the ‘Needs of Justice Triangle' as an objective, reinforces the military commander's intent to restore law and order. Military personnel would then be aware that their responsibilities include law and order. This would be achieved by working closely with key stakeholders such as non-government organisations, and if they still exist, local authorities and the police peacekeeping units to re-establish the ‘Needs of Justice Triangle'.
According to Carpenter (1999), an identified deficiency in the military command structure in the UN Somalia mission was the exclusion of a senior police adviser. This created two significant problems. Firstly, the premature deployment of the police contingent. Secondly, the security of five to eight hundred unarmed police and UN employees that the military would not or could not accept responsibility for. UN employees were required to employ local private security organisations for protection. This placed an additional burden on the military and strained working relationships with the police and non-government organisations.
A number of command issues can be drawn from this historical event. The military commander could alleviate this situation by including police advisers in the command structure. Police advisers would need clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Their responsibilities could include the provision of specialist advice about the ‘Needs of Justice Triangle' so that the risk of replicating events in Somalia is minimised. The risk can be minimised by seeking advice on the establishment and development on the ‘Needs of Justice Triangle' and ensuring that it complements the military objectives. An experienced police officer could develop strategies for involving the police, judicial and penal system in restoring and sustaining law and order. From a policing perspective they could also provide detailed advice on:
• crowd control,
• crime trends,
• investigations management,
• negotiating and mediating disputes, and
• managing community policing strategies.
In Cambodia, Kirk (1999) found law and order had completely broken down to such an extent that law text books were burnt and academics with judicial knowledge were either murdered or had fled the country. In situations like this, the police and military ought to establish, as quickly as possible, a shared vision and operational objectives to engage the local community immediately. Through consultation with the Cambodian community new laws were drafted and a very basic judicial system was established to administer justice. According to Kirk (1999), in situations where law and order and the judicial system does not exist or has completely broken down both the police and military need to quickly develop strategies for coping in such conditions.
There is almost an obligation on both the police and military to establish a shared vision for peace support operations for many reasons including:
• the global rise in incidents of ethnic conflict;
• the changing nature of military solutions to combat armed conflict; and
• the move towards a multi disciplinary approach to peace support operations.
Once a shared police and military vision is established then there will be scope for shared situational command. Shared situational command could be used to resolve tasks that fall within the grey area of the ‘Police Military Responsibility Model'. Police and other key stakeholders would need to become part of the command consultative decision making processes and be given the opportunity to accept devolved responsibility for agreed tasks. For example, the police could have devolved responsibility for:
• the application of community policing principles to crime prevention and detection;
• law and order solutions for ethnic tension through targeting the underlying crime;
• crowd control and public order;
• developing alliances and partnership with the ‘in country' police, judicial and penal systems; and
• developing the capacity of the ‘in country' police service to eventually assume responsibility for law and order.
Carpenter (1999) and Kirk (1999) agree that there should be a shared police and military vision for a peace support operation but contend that two very separate and different roles and functions are performed. Kirk (1999) experienced in Cambodia that it was often not in the interests of the police to be aligned with the military as the police could be called upon to arbitrate a problem between the military and the community. By closely aligning themselves with the military or becoming part of the problem, the police will experience a decline in operational effectiveness and find it difficult to negotiate a resolution. Carpenter (1999) found this in Cyprus where the military and the police conducted separate patrols for very different reasons. The analogy is that the military could be ordered to hold a particular piece of ground while the police can compromise or if necessary arrest an offender for breaking the law.
Peace support operations require highly mobile multi disciplinary teams who are open to and prepared to talk to and work with people at all levels in the community. Carpenter (1999) and Kirk (1999) agree that a critical peacekeeping team skill is the ability to be mobile and remain highly visible. In Somalia and Cambodia the Netherlands Royal Marines and the Australian Army conducted regular night patrols and mixed with the community. They approached the conflict weary community in a non-threatening way as people were afraid of soldiers dressed in camouflage clothes. Mobility of teams through regular patrols or ‘pounding the beat' and spending time getting to know the community resulted in the development of a greater capacity to negotiate solutions to problems.
Problem solving with the community requires both police and military teams who have devolved authority to make decision and solve problems. In situations like this a police officer may not follow the chain of command and could use their discretion to resolve a problem. Carpenter (1999) and Kirk (1999) experienced this in Somalia and Cambodia and found that it tended to frustrate the military commanders who expected the traditional chain of command to be followed.
A reason for this is the unique ‘office of constable' that is enshrined in common law. Since the commencement of modern policing a culture has been purposefully developed around this legal concept. Accordingly, police are skilled to solve problems on the spot and be prepared to argue for what they believe is right with whoever is involved. The military should be aware of this legal concept and prevailing culture because when a police officer is resolving a problem they may not be concerned with rank. Carpenter (1999) believes that some of these differences in the police and military operating methodologies and culture would be overcome by establishing police liaison points with military command as quickly as possible.
A notable team skill identified by many AFP peacekeeping commanders is self discipline. Kirk (1999) argues that individuals and teams need to be taught how to exercise self discipline as some missions are protracted and could have elements of hopelessness. Self discipline was recently tested during the events leading up to and including the 7 September 1999 evacuation of the United Nations compound in Dili, East Timor. There were many stories of traumatic incidents and a feeling of hopelessness before the evacuation order was made (Curtis, 1999).
Other team skills that the AFP look for and develop through pre-embarkation training are:
• problem solving and lateral thinking;
• high level oral communication and listening skills particularly for negotiation;
• visionary leadership;
• high stress tolerance and an ability to deal with competing demands;
• consultative decision making; and
• conflict management and conflict de-escalation.
The AFP had a very short time frame to develop team skills for peacekeeping in East Timor. Team commanders were required to find time to conduct psychological testing and undertake team training. The AFP, like most other police services, is constrained in terms of the resources that can be made available at short notice for peacekeeping missions. In many cases this places a substantial drain on finite human resources that are needed back home. Jacob (1999) contends that commanders should, if possible, slow down staff selection, psychometric testing and make time for peace support scenario based training. At the conclusion of a detachment, staff should participate in tactical and strategic debriefs to identify issues that should be addressed from an individual or organisational perspective.
The AFP takes two personality measures and one trauma scale before deployment and after returning from a peacekeeping operation. The pre-embarkation personality and trauma scale testing is designed to assist with the identification and development of both individual and team skills. An equally important outcome is obtaining a general measure of people skills, team skills and psychological well being. According to Jacob (1999) personnel should then be deployed to duties and responsibilities in accordance with identified skills, values and attitudes.
The results of the psychological testing ought to be made available to and discussed with team leaders at middle and executive management level. When the results reveal that a person has an identified problem then it must be dealt with during pre-embarkation training or taken into consideration for deployment. The test results are an essential component of a team leaders capability to effectively assess, lead and manage their people. Recent experiences in East Timor and Cyprus have shown that people who are rigid, inflexible, perfectionists or over controlling will experience some difficulty performing a peacekeeping role (Jacob, 1999). Peace support operations require people who have the skills to work in a chaotic and complex environment. This will require a broad police and military skill base while demonstrating a well-developed ability to show flexibility in all situations.
There is no doubt that peace support operations are both complex and challenging. The complexities and challenges will emerge as the mission moves along the police and military continuum. There will be challenges as to the appropriateness of the military command structure, culture, skill base and operating methodologies when the mission enters into different phases. At the same time, this will place pressure on the commander to establish complex relationships with the police and many other organisations. Chappel and Evans (1995: 37) report that a peace support operation will move through at least three stages on the police and military continuum, they include:
• conflict resolution;
• implementation phase of a peace agreement; and
• building and maintenance of institutions.
As the mission moves along the police and military continuum the military commander will be confronted with many competing demands. The competing demands could be dealt with through the establishment of robust strategic alliances and networks with the key partners. One key partner is the community and according to Morrison (1995) they also include:
• politicians,
• diplomats,
• civilian police;
• humanitarian and human rights organisations; and
• the media.
The military commander will be responsible for coordinating the key partners involved in peace support operations. This could be achieved by the establishment of a multi disciplinary approach to the mission using an organisational structure that identifies the roles, responsibilities and relationships of the key partners. The command structure should acknowledge the complex operating environment and contain a clear understanding of the authority that will be devolved to complete agreed objectives. The structure will need to be extremely flexible as both the police and military require considerable discretion to resolve problems with the community and other key partners.
Future successes in peace support operations will be attributed to the ability of the military commander to construct effective working relationships with the police and other key partners. The objectives of the mission will need to be linked to a shared vision that must be built on strategic alliances and networks with key partners. An agreed mission outcome must include the restoration of law and order and the re-establishment of police, judicial and penal services. This will only be achieved by including the police and key partners in the planning of peace support operations. An experienced police officer can provide advice to the military command planning team on the:
• potential problems in the grey area of responsibility;
• police culture, operating methodologies and team skills that military personnel could apply;
• scaled involvement of police liaison officers during the planning and conflict phase of the mission;
• timing of the hand over and deployment of CIVPOL and other personnel; and
• continued use of the military when a peace support operation enters into a peacekeeping mission.
The police have the right culture and operating methodologies for meeting the mission objectives in the grey area of responsibility. The military could be trained to undertake some police roles during peace support operations but they should not act as police. Military personnel acting as police combined with the use of paramilitary police will only blur and undermine the community-related objectives of future CIVPOL and the ‘in country' policing strategies.
Police are extremely experienced in working with the community. Their inclusion in the command structure would complement the military planning team. It would also ensure that law and order strategies supplement the military mission so that both military and police mission objectives are aligned with community needs. Future peace support operations will be measured against the skill of the military commander who can lead and manage parallel operations with the police and other key partners.
Bayle, D.B., 1995, 'A Foreign Policy for Democratic Policing', Policing and Society, vol, no 5, pp 79 – 93.
Carpenter, B. 1999, Interview between Jeff Penrose and retired Superintendent Barry Carpenter, conducted in Canberra on 1 December 1999.
Chappel, D. & Evans, J., 1997, 'The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', p 37.
Curtis, A. 1999, Interview between Jeff Penrose and retired Superintendent Anthony Curtis, conducted in Canberra on 25 November 1999.
Eyre, K.C., 1999, 'An Overview of the Military Role in Peacekeeping', part 2G1-6, in The Changing Face of Peacekeeping: Modern Peace and Security Operations, The Lester Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Japan.
Jacob, S. 1999, Interview between Jeff Penrose and AFP Clinical Psychologist Sonja Jacob conducted in Canberra on 6 December 1999.
Kirk, W. 1999, Interview between Jeff Penrose and Superintendent William Kirk, conducted in Canberra on 6 December 1999.
Reith, C.1952, The Blind Eye of History, Patterson Smith, New Jersey pp. 25-33.
Valpolini, P. 1999, 'The Role of Police-Military Units in Peace-Keeping', International Police Review, Issue 14, pp 22 –24.
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