Australian Year Book of International Law
I worked on the hacienda over there, and I would have to feed the dogs bowls of meat or bowls of milk every morning, and I could never put those on the table for my own children. When my children were ill, they died with a nod of sympathy from the landlord. But when the dogs were ill, I took them to the veterinarian in Suchitoto. You will never understand violence or nonviolence until you understand the violence to the spirit that happens from watching your children die of malnutrition.
Human rights can be violated in many ways. They can, for example, be violated by the direct actions of the State and, as the above quotation indicates, by the omissions and neglect of private people and organisations. The potential for violations of human rights by organisations, whether private or inter-governmental, has increased with globalisation. As the former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has pointed out:
[t]echnological advances are altering the nature and the expectation of life all over the globe. The revolution in communications has united the world in awareness, in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice. But progress also brings new risks for stability: ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, greater intrusion into the lives and rights of individuals.
The impact of globalisation on the international legal order offers both opportunities and dangers for international human rights.
Globalisation, although a contested term, is essentially a process in which political, economic, social and cultural relationships are not restricted to territorial boundaries and where no State or entity is unaffected by activities outside its direct control. While States have never had exclusive control over their economic, legal, political and security affairs, as seen most clearly during the colonial period, since the end of the Cold War the scale and speed of globalisation has increased. This has been primarily due to electronic telecommunication and extensive computerisation. As well, the actors involved today are not only States but include transnational corporations and inter-governmental institutions and there is a greater flow of ideas, information, ideologies and people.
Philip Cerny has defined economic globalisation, which is the focus of this paper, as follows:
What [economic globalisation] does do is to create permissive conditions for a range of distinct but intertwined structural trends — that is, it expands the playing field within which different market actors and firms interact. It transforms that international economy from one made up of holistic national economies interacting on the basis of national ‘comparative advantage’ into one in which a variety of ‘competitive advantages’ are created in ways which are not dependent on the nation-state as social, economic and/or political unit.
Cerny notes the transformative nature of globalisation in terms of a reconceptualising of political science and of State sovereignty. The establishment of globalised economic institutions has been both a symptom of and a stimulus for globalisation. Thus the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regional development banks such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, United Nations agencies like United Nations Environment Program and United Nations Development Program, and multilateral trade institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), have developed in the context of a trend away from the dominance of the State as the exclusive unit of analysis in international affairs. In addition, it is now evident that corporations are more economically powerful than many States, with States comprising just 49 of the world’s 100 biggest economies, with the majority being corporations.
International human rights law is itself globalised. It operates beyond all borders and all State mechanisms. At the same time, international human rights law is a flawed system that does not protect appropriately the rights of women. While that aspect of international human rights law is not the focus of this paper, international human rights is a valuable context in which to consider the protection of women’s rights because it sets standards and focuses attention on the oppressed. In terms of international human rights and globalisation, Richard Falk offers a bifurcated view of globalisation: “globalisation-from-above”, which reflects the “collaboration between leading states and the main agents of capital formation … [of] the New World Order” and concerns the activities of transnational corporations, international economic organisations and other similar developments; and “globalisation-from-below”, by which there is popular participation at local levels, the building of civil societies and the enhancement of non-governmental organisations as part of “the strengthening over time of the institutional forms and activities associated with global civil society”. It is within the latter branch that Falk locates human rights.
The approach taken here is to look at some of the impacts of economic globalisation on the protection of women’s human rights, particularly on some of their economic rights, as these rights are often overlooked in the literature on globalisation. The rights that will be considered are the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to development and the right of self-determination. It will be argued that economic growth fostered by globalisation is measured without appropriate recognition of women. In addition, while economic globalisation has the potential to increase the protection of human rights, at least in the long-term, this protection is rarely afforded to women. These are the secrets and lies of economic globalisation for the rights of women.
The right to an adequate standard of living concerns access to food, shelter, clothing and health care. This right has been criticised as not being a true human right as it is non-justiciable and there are no immediate obligations on States to protect it. However, these criticisms are premised on a colonial, capitalist, male-centred view of human rights, where only those rights that are deemed able to be exercised in the public domain are considered worthy of protection by the law. This approach sees the right to an adequate standard of living as lacking sufficient importance to warrant immediate protection or judicial enforcement and so it remains a secret. Yet to take that approach ignores the reality that this right deals with the essentials of life, such as food, shelter, clothing and health care. It is the struggle to obtain these essentials that is the core of the daily life of most women in the world. As Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen have noted:
The point is not so much that there is no law against dying of hunger. That is, of course, true and obvious. It is more that the legally guaranteed rights of ownership exchange and transaction delineate economic systems that go hand in hand with some people failing to acquire enough food for survival… In seeking a remedy to this problem of terrible vulnerability, it is natural to turn towards a reform of the legal system, so that rights of social security can be made to stand as guarantees of minimal protection and survival.
Survival and economic transactions are closely connected. An issue is whether economic globalisation makes this daily struggle to survive even harder.
Proponents of economic globalisation argue that economic growth brings with it increased access to health care, food and shelter either directly through employment and increased income, or indirectly through the improvement and extension of these facilities to be available to more people. For most States, particularly in Africa, economic growth is often fostered through large-scale external investment, which comes from globalised economic organisations, either inter-governmental institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, or transnational corporations. This investment could ensure that the right to an adequate standard of living is better protected when economic growth occurs.
The reality is somewhat different in most cases. There are at least three reasons for this: first, a great deal of the international investment is in projects such as the building of dams, roads and runways or large-scale commercial farming, with little or no investment in primary health care, safe drinking water and basic education. The World Bank itself has recognised the risks involved as it has stated that, in regard to large-scale irrigation projects:
social disruption is inevitable…. Local people often find that they have less access to water, [and] … conflicting demands on water resources and inequalities in distribution easily occur … altering the distribution of wealth.
It has also been shown that most projects arising from this type of investment “create some risks of (legally cognizable) harm to some categories of project-affected people, and some projects generate many risks of very serious harms to many people”. So the type of investment generated by globalised economic institutions tends to infringe economic rights rather than to protect them.
Second, decisions about investment by these globalised economic organisations are based almost exclusively on financial concerns external to the State concerned — often profits for private banks in developed States — rather than being focused on social welfare within the State. A classic example of this is seen in an internal World Bank memo (by a high-ranking official who is now the United States Treasury Secretary):
[S]houldn’t the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the [less-developed countries]?… The measurement of the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view, a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that… I’ve always thought that under-populated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted; their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently high compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City.
This memo makes excellent neo-classical economic logic. But this logic can have disastrous consequences for human rights protection, as the World Bank is now beginning to realise. For example, it has been shown by Rhoda Howard that “in Africa today schools are closing down as governments retrench in the face of structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund”. Because the government is the largest employer in most African States, “not only do thousands of people lose their jobs, but often all sectors are drastically cut, especially those of the already underfunded health sector”. Those who are worst affected are usually the poor, women and agricultural workers as governments are forced to change their priorities. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has reported that:
Structural adjustment programs continue to have a significant impact upon the overall realization of economic, social and cultural rights, both in terms of the ability of people to exercise them, and of the capability of governments to fulfil and implement them… Human rights concerns continue to be conspicuously underestimated in the adjustment process.
A specific example is Zimbabwe, which used to provide free education for all. Then came the imposition of an IMF structural adjustment program and free education ended. One consequence of this action was that many girls are now not being educated as parents make financial choices based on a child’s sex. This is despite the clear evidence that girls’ education is “an investment that yields the highest rate of return in a developing country”. Thus not only are women’s rights being affected but governments often lack any real sovereign power to make decisions to protect human rights or to prevent violations of human rights. These decisions are made by external, unaccountable organisations.
Third, there are different types of economic growth. The United Nations Human Development Report in 1995 cited five damaging forms of “ruthless” economic growth:
that which does not translate into jobs, that which is not matched by the spread of democracy, that which snuffs out cultural identities, that which despoils the environment, and growth where most of the benefits are seized by the rich.
Most of those who gain wealth and economic power through economic growth are the elite, urban males. These groups are the ones who have or seek to attain political and social power. The poor, rural women are further distanced and inequality is increased, particularly gender inequality. An example of this “ruthless growth” was the economic growth in apartheid South Africa which was achieved through the exploitation of a large unskilled, dispossessed and dependent work-force consisting of oppressed black men (and women) and displaced black women. A situation where economic “growth” is deleterious is where crops are planted for export to gain foreign exchange revenue while the people are deprived of their staple diet. Indeed,
in an adjusting economy, the systematic promotion of cash crops combined with a shrinking labor market and existing gender biases in land ownership and household division of labour and consumption works to worsen women’s economic, family and nutritional status.
In regard to health, it is clear that the action of the international community in dealing with AIDS has been one of exclusion and stigmatisation of those from developing States, particularly Africa. Instead of health becoming a central defining principle of local, national and international policies, it has become one of insularity and rejection. Indeed, the impact of AIDS on women and on African economies now and in the future cannot be under-estimated.
There have been occasions when the World Bank and other donors have stopped aid due to gross violations of human rights by governments, such as in the case of Malawi. But these situations are notable because they are exceptional. In fact, human rights issues are directly taken into account in the constitutive treaty of only a very few of the globalised economic institutions. In the last few years, some of these institutions have begun to recognise the special needs and concerns of women. For example, the World Bank has supported Women in Development projects and Gender in Development projects and in its Comprehensive Development Framework policy launched in 1999. The latter has been described by the Bank as being a process whereby there is
a holistic approach to development that recognizes the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals but gives equal weight to the institutional, structural, and social underpinnings of a robust market economy. It emphasizes strong partnerships among governments, donors, civil society, the private sector, and other development actors. Perhaps most important, the country is in the driver’s seat, both “owning” and directing the developing agenda, with the Bank and the country’s other partners each defining their support in their respective business plans.
These initiatives are to be welcomed, though institutionally women are still under-represented and the effect of these policies and projects are yet to be fully evaluated. Above all, there is a need for human rights to be taken into account by the globalised economic organisations on a systematic and regular basis. Only then is it possible that economic growth could create the conditions for the protection of the right to an adequate standard of living for women. Otherwise, the right to an adequate standard of living for women will continue to be violated and the chances of this right being exercised will be significantly diminished. The reality of the daily struggle for women will remain a secret from the economic decision-makers.
A related issue to the right to an adequate standard of living is the right to development. The right to development was first formulated as part of the New International Economic Order proposed by developing States in the 1970s by which the inequities in the international economic system were sought to be rectified by such methods as technology transfers and debt reductions. In 1986 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Right to Development, in which the right to development is defined as “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”. This right has been subsequently affirmed by the international community in Paragraph 10 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action arising from the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, though with the qualification that “while development facilitates the enjoyment of all human rights, the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgment of internationally recognized human rights”.
The problem with the right to development in international human rights law is that it is partly based on the notion that “development” means industrialisation and Westernisation and economic growth. Yet, as has been argued, economic growth does not necessarily create conditions in which the human rights for women are protected. The reference in Article 8 of the Declaration on the Right to Development to the fact that “effective measures should be undertaken to ensure that women have an active role in the development process” is a token one in this context.
This silencing of women is exacerbated by the lack of inclusion of women’s work in determining “development” and “economic growth”. This position is caused to some extent by the use of the United Nations System of National Accounts (UNSNA) as a measure of economic growth. The UNSNA excludes from national accounts as being “non-productive” matters such as reproduction, childcare, domestic work and subsistence production. In international economic terms “economic visibility depends on working in the public sphere and unpaid work in the home or community is categorised as ‘unproductive, unoccupied and economically inactive’”. Thus “housework” and subsistence communal farming are excluded from the definition of work. So despite the fact that women are responsible for as much as 80 per cent of food production in developing States as well as nearly all “domestic” work, they are not seen as “economically productive” workers. Women are generally on the margins of formal economic structures and processes. One consequence of this is that they are overlooked by international institutions and States when making decisions about the provision of aid and other financial assistance, except in their role as “mothers”. These measurements of economic globalisation are, then, a lie.
The right to development offers women little, despite its claim that women are to have an “active role” in development. The use of the term “inalienable human right” to apply to development and the expression in Article 2.1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development that the “human person is the central subject of development”, are inaccurate. The right to development is really about State’s interests in development not about the rights of humans to development. The right is not aimed at protecting the right to an adequate standard of living or the provision of food. Instead, it is geared towards the servicing of transnational corporations and international economic institutions as well as the elites of developing States. Women and human rights do not feature to any great extent in these parameters. They remain a secret.
Article 1(2) of the Declaration on the Right to Development provides that “the human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination”. The right of self-determination is defined in Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. It provides that
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
The extent and application of the right of self-determination is contentious, particularly as to whether the right applies outside the colonial context. While a discussion of that issue goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that the right is no longer limited to the colonial context, as the right protects peoples from being subject to oppression by subjugation, domination or exploitation because, as the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights makes clear, “nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another”. After all, the purpose of the protection of this right is to enable “peoples” or communities, as communities, to prosper and transmit their culture as well as to participate fully in the political, economic and social process, thus allowing the distinct character of a community “to have this character reflected in the institutions of government under which it lives”.
Most of the focus of debate about the right of self-determination has been in terms of political self-determination or territorial division. In this debate and in the demands by groups for political self-determination, rarely are the voices of women heard above the male demands for more power, as these male elites seek to restrict the exercise of self-determination to “independence” alone. Accordingly, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright call for a different definition of “peoples” or “self” where “food, shelter, clean water, a healthy environment, peace and a stable existence must be the first priorities in how we define or ‘determine’ the ‘self’ of both individuals and groups, instead of the present definitions, which are based on masculinist goals of political and economic aggrandizement and aggressive territoriality”.
This call is useful, though the existing definition of the right of self-determination does include some of these elements. The last sentence of Article 1.2 of the two International Covenants provides: “In no case may a people be deprived of its means of subsistence”. Yet this remains a secret as so often the reality is that communities have no say in the economic processes that can affect their very survival and are deprived of their means of subsistence. For example, world food distribution has become internationalised and food is stockpiled in developed States, which benefit the large-scale agricultural corporations but can have dire effects on the small-scale farmer. It is also argued that the development of the WTO and regional trade organisations act to the detriment of developing States, in terms of limiting the control of States over their own development and the protection of their own intellectual property and cultural heritage, and reducing the ability of peoples to make free choices. Thus, if the aim of the right of self-determination is to ensure that there is participation by communities in economic processes and to prevent them being deprived of their means of subsistence by oppressive action, then the right of self-determination is being constantly breached by the effects of globalisation.
The potential impact of economic globalisation on women, particularly those in developing countries, cannot be ignored. As Michael Chege has noted:
In the new global order unleased by the collapse of communism, Africans will have little choice but to pull their own weight by meeting the most exacting standards in domestic governance and economic competitiveness.
This process of globalisation of human rights could have advantages for women, for example, as global communications can enable cross-fertilisation of ideas that can nurture and support groups working in apparent isolation in their own State. Yet there are also dangers in this process. So far, globalisation has not generally had a positive impact on the protection of human rights, or at least not an immediate positive impact, and certainly has ignored the position of women.
International economic organisations, such as the World Bank, offer the potential for being major forces to assist in the protection of human rights. To do this they must expressly take the human rights consequences of their actions into account and make fundamental institutional, informational and widespread, coherent policy changes. This is slowly happening for reasons of economic self-interest and by a process of consciousness-raising. But the primary concern of these organisations remains economic, in which women and human rights are still hidden or absent in the calculations, and so any improvement in the protection of women’s human rights is largely incidental and secondary.
At the same time, international human rights law needs to be re-focused so that its obligations are not solely placed on States but extend to all actors in the international community, including transnational corporations. While international human rights law may not assist each woman directly, it can offer a way to understand her situation and, by its contribution to “globalisation from below”, it can connect her to the international community. Thus international human rights law, through globalisation, is capable of fundamental change to protect the rights of women in a systemic and substantial way. It can uncover the lies and reveal the secrets about the lack of protection of women’s rights.
[*] Associate Professor in International and Human Rights Law, Faculty of Law, The Australian National University. Parts of this paper will appear in “Women, development and corporate responsibility” in S Rees and S Wright (eds), Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility: A Dialogue (2000).
 Words of an El Salvador woman in Witness to War, reprinted in J Larson and M Micheels-Cyrus, Seeds of Peace (1987) 128.
 B Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace (1992), UN Doc A/47/277-S/241 11, para. 12.
 C Sjolander, “The rhetoric of globalization: what’s in a wor(l)d?” (1996) 51 International Journal 603 at 603-4 suggests that “globalization” could mean whatever the user wants it to mean.
 T Luke, “New world order or neo-world orders: power politics and ideology in informationalizing glocalities” in M Featherstone, S Lash and R Robertson (eds), Global Modernities (1995) 99-100.
 P Cerny, “Globalization and other stories: the search for a new paradigm of international relations” (1996) 51 International Journal 617 at 624.
 See, for example, H Charlesworth, “The sex of the State in international law” in N Naffine and R Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (1997) 251; C Schreuer, “The waning of the sovereign State: towards a new paradigm for international law?” (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 447; M Koskenniemi, “The future of statehood” (1991) 32 Harvard Journal of International Law 397; N MacCormick, “Beyond the sovereign State” (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 1.
 R Longworth, “Large companies now economically bigger than some countries” Chicago Tribune (15 October 1996).
 See A Gallagher, “Ending the marginalization: strategies for incorporating women into the United Nations human rights system” (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 283 at 290-293. For a survey of the rich material in this area, see the references in K Engle, “International human rights and feminism: when discourses meet” (1992) 13 Michigan Journal of International Law 517 at 518; J Jindy Pettman, Worlding Women (1996).
 R Falk, “The making of global citizenship” in J Brecher, J Brown Childs and J Cutler (eds), Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order (1993) 39.
 The right to an adequate standard of living is set out in Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966.
 M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A perspective on its Development (1995) sets out the main criticisms of this right.
 See D Otto, “Rethinking universals: opening transformative possibilities in international human rights law”  AUYrBkIntLaw 1; (1997) 18 Aust YBIL 1.
 J Drèze and A Sen, Hunger and Public Action (1989) 20. See also P Bailey, “The right to an adequate standard of living: new issues for Australian law”  AUJlHRights 14; (1997) 4 Australian Journal of Human Rights 25.
 See commentary in R McCorquodale with R Fairbrother, “Globalization and human rights” (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 735 at 742-3.
 T Shaw and C Adibe, “Africa and global developments in the twenty-first century” (1996) 51 International Journal 1 at 12.
 World Bank, (1991) 2 Environmental Assessment Sourcebook, 94-96.
 J Paul, “The human right to development: its meaning and importance” (1992) 25 John Marshall Law Review (1992) 235 at 238.
 Quoted in “Let them eat pollution,” The Economist (8 February 1992) 66.
 See generally P Ormerod, The Death of Economics (1995).
 R Howard, “Civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa: internally generated causes” (1996) 51 International Journal 26 at 32.
 F Hoskin, quoted in M Monshipouri, Democratization, Liberalization and Human Rights in the Third World (1995) 54.
 The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final Report by D Turk, United Nations Special Rapporteur, UN Doc EICNA/Sub.2/1992/16 (1992) at 16.
 M Nzomo, “The political economy of the African crisis: gender impacts and responses” (1996) 51 International Journal 78.
 J Murphy, Gender Issues in World Bank Lending (1995), quoted in B Sadasivam, “The impact of structural adjustment on women: a governance and human rights agenda” (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 630 at 649.
 See A Orford, “Locating the international: military and monetary interventions after the Cold War” (1997) 38 Harvard Journal of International Law 443.
 L Elliott, “Bridging the north-south divide”, The Guardian Weekly (11 August 1996) 14 (describing the conclusions of the United Nations Development Program Report).
 See H Im, “Globalization and democratisation: boon companions or strange bedfellows?” (1996) 50 Australian Journal of International Affairs 279. See also Y Tandon, “Reclaiming Africa’s agenda: good governance and the role of the NGOs in the African context” (1996) 50 Australian Journal of International Affairs 293.
 H Adam, “Cohesion and coercion” in H Giliomee and J Gagiano (eds), The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland (1990) 227.
 This has happened in Zimbabwe and Brazil — see Sadasivam, n 24 above, at 641.
 Ibid. Recent assessments of the impact of the Asian economic crisis by the International Labour Organization have shown that women have been affected more seriously by the crisis than men — The Australian (6 October 1999) 11.
 J Mann, “A societal approach to health” (1996) 312 British Medical Journal 7036; M Kirby, “Human rights and the HIV paradox” (1996) 348 The Lancet 1217.
 See S Berkeley, “AIDS in the developing world: an epidemiologic overview” (1993) 17 (supp. 2) Clinical Infectious Diseases s329; C Gilks, “The clinical challenge of the HIV epidemic in the developing world” (1993) 342 7he Lancet 1037.
 See D Forsythe, “The United Nations, human rights, and development” (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 334 at 346.
 The treaty creating the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development provides that it must advance democratic development, Ibid. at 342.
 Sadasivam, n 24 above, at 647-8.
 World Bank web site: http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/overview.htm.
 See, for example, P Alston, “Making space for human rights: the case of the right to development” (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Yearbook 3; Paul, n 17 above, 235.
 GA Res 41/128, Article 1(1).
 (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 1661 at para. 10.
 H Charlesworth, “The public/private distinction and the right to development in international law”  AUYrBkIntLaw 9; (1988-89) 12 Aust YBIL 190 at 196-7.
 M Waring, “Gender and the right to development”  AUYrBkIntLaw 8; (1988-89) 12 Aust YBIL 177 at 182-3.
 Charlesworth, n 40 above, at 199.
 S Charlton, Women in Third World Development (1984) 61.
 G Moon, Free Trade: What’s in it for Women (1995) at 42-3.
 Charlesworth, n 40 above, at 201.
 For some critiques of the right to development see, eg J Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples (1988).
 C Chinkin and S Wright, “Hunger trap: women, food and self-determination” (1993) 14 Michigan Journal of International Law 262 at 306.
 See the discussion in R McCorquodale, “Self-determination: a human rights approach” (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 857.
 Article 19.
 I Brownlie, “The rights of peoples in modern international law” in J Crawford n 46 above, 1 at 5.
 See the criticism of this focus in McCorquodale, n 48 above.
 Chinkin and Wright, n 47 above, at 294.
 Ibid. at 307.
 See, for example, P van Dijck and G Faber (eds), Challenges to the New Trade Organization (1996); S Croley and J Jackson, “WTO dispute procedures, standard of review and deference to national governments” (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 193; P Drahos, “Global property rights in information: the story of TRIPS at the GATT” (1995) 13 Prometheus 6; Note, “Developing countries and multilateral trade agreements: law and the promise of development” (1994) 108 Harvard Law Review 1715.
 See, eg Orford, n 25 above, 443 at 473; Moon, n 44 above, at 42-3.
 M Chege, “Remembering Africa” (1992) 71 Foreign Affairs 146 at 149.
 For example, the Woman and Law in Southern Africa research project in which communications have assisted in uncovering common problems such as patriarchal interpretation of laws and customs: see, eg J Stewart and A Armstrong (eds), The Legal Situation of Women in Southern Africa (1990).
 See, eg, the development of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework, n 36 above.
 Falk, n 9 above.