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Lamb, Matthew --- "Book Review - This Country: A Reconciled Republic?" [2004] IndigLawB 47; (2004) 6(4) Indigenous Law Bulletin 20


Book Review

This Country: A Reconciled Republic?

By Mark McKenna

University of New South Wales Press, 2004.

review by Matthew Lamb

There is a form of historical thinking in our country which looks at past events in terms of missed opportunities. Yet one way to miss an opportunity when it presents itself is by focusing, not on the present or future – where such opportunities arise – but by replaying in our mind previously missed opportunities; diverting present energies towards arguing ‘what should have happened’ and ‘what could have been’ as a result.

One such missed opportunity was the 1999 republic referendum. Accompanying the referendum was a question of the inclusion in the preamble to the Constitution of recognition of the prior claim of Indigenous Australians to the land. That this would have been an important and necessary step towards the reconciliation process in Australia is clear. But to concentrate solely on this event and to attempt to recreate the circumstances that surrounded it, in the hopes that it may finally come to pass, is perhaps not the only way forward for either the reconciliation or the republican process.

Such a form of historical thinking seems to creep into the conclusions drawn by Mark McKenna in his latest book, This Country: A Reconciled Republic? This is especially the case when he seems to imply that the proposed, or preferably a revised, preamble to the Constitution from the 1999 referendum, is the only instrument by which the union between the republic and reconciliation can come into being. In short, the preamble (what should have happened) is the cause, and a reconciled republic (what could have been) is the effect. The further implication made is that both outcomes – an Australian Head of State and recognition of Indigenous rights – must necessarily be achieved in the same instance.

I don’t think this view is incorrect; but I do think such a set of events is only one of many possibilities. When so much is at stake, it is important that other possibilities are fully explored. McKenna does not, for example, broaden his conclusions to include the consequences of introducing a bill of rights. In fact, he clearly states that the content of his proposed preamble should not be confused with a bill of rights. It is interesting to note, however, that the notion of a bill of rights was first suggested during the original constitutional conventions of the 1890s. One of the reasons it didn’t survive then was because such a declaration of fundamental human rights was inconsistent with certain racial clauses in the constitution; clauses which later became the foundation for the White Australia Policy. It makes sense, therefore, that in the absence of the White Australia Policy, such a bill of rights could find a place. It could be used to both reinvigorate the reconciliation process, and to ensure that no such discriminatory policies ever surface again.

Another possibility which needs to be examined is that the two states of affair – a republic and reconciliation – do not necessarily need to come into being at the same time, or as a direct consequence of the same public event. If anything, I think it would be more historically significant for reconciliation to occur prior to the onset of a republic. This makes sense because the Indigenous peoples were here first, and the formation of a constitutional monarchy – based on disregarding this prior claim – came second. So to recognise the first is to both invalidate the second and to necessitate the formation of a republic.

However, I don’t think this implies a simple or direct causal relation. There would instead be a long and as yet largely unexplored chain of events that would lead from reconciliation toward Australia finally becoming a republic. This long process is necessary if we are substantially, rather than only formally, to exist as a republic. Some milestones on the way could include legal and constitutional recognition of the function and limits power of the prime minister, the cabinet, and the rights of citizens – all of which are conspicuously absent from our current Constitution and are arguably more substantial to the effective running of a republic than the formal changing of the head of state.

But I repeat: this is only another possibility, and it in no way invalidates the core argument of McKenna’s book – that the two issues of reconciliation and the republic are bound together – which is, in my opinion, irrefutable. Moreover, McKenna’s historical overview, which makes up most of his work and which explains how these two issues were considered separately during public debate[1] of the 1990s is interesting and revealing. McKenna’s conclusions only appear narrow in scope when viewed in relation to these much broader analyses which precede them. But it is in such analysis where McKenna’s real strength lies.

So where can McKenna go from here? At one point in the book, he makes the following claim:

If we imagine the petitions from Aboriginal people over two centuries assembled in one place – the petitions of the Kulin to Queen Victoria in the 1860s, those of William Cooper to King George V in the 1930s, the Yirrkala Bark petition of 1963, the Gurindji petition of 1967, the Barunga statement handed to Prime Minister Hawke in 1988, and the final document of reconciliation handed to Prime Minister John Howard at Corroboree 2000 – perhaps then the sight of so many calls gone unanswered might convey the historical depth of Aboriginal demands for justice. And perhaps then the silence of Australian governments would become obvious.

Such a collection of texts is a good idea, and I hope this becomes McKenna’s next project. It would be a worthy companion to his current publication.

Matthew Lamb is a freelance writer, living and working in Brisbane, Queensland.


[1] For example, that the motivation for the republic was more anti-British than pro-Aboriginal or that the ‘minimalist’ model was only concerned with superficial changes to the constitution, such as the Head of State, and not so much concerned with solving deep seated grievances brought about by the inception of a constitutional monarchy.


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