

parallelism between what the last generation of political pluralists have been doing and what the newest jurisprudentialists are trying to do. For both, the great cloudy generalisations about group-personality, legal or otherwise, are suspect. The Professors of Jurisprudence are trying to analyse them away. The Professors of Political Science and Sociology are investigating the practical workings of group-life in society, and showing how much more complex they are than was assumed by earlier pluralists. Particular emphasis has been laid on the existence of overlapping group memberships, and some have seen in them the true basis of the relative stability of political and social systems, the so-called "consolidating influence of multiplicity" that stops any one group from taking its members all the way with it. Some modern pluralists, such as David Truman in his *The Governmental Process*, still retain traces of a monistic view in which "rules of the game" or "systems of belief" or "a general ideological consensus" are also believed to be important in explaining the cohesion of States and societies.

Professor Webb concludes by sketching an interesting view of his own about the role of the State and of law, based on the proposition of many modern pluralists that "problems of social order are residual problems left over from the action and interaction of social groups". It is a pity that he had no space to develop this view sufficiently to leave a wholly clear impression with the reader.

R. N. SPANN.*

The Advocate's Devil, by C. P. Harvey, Q.C., London, Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1958, Sydney, Law Book Co. of Australia Pty. Ltd., xi and 166 pp. (17/9 in Australia).

Mr. Harvey's work is on of a novel *genre*, a happy farrago of reminiscences, criticism and suggestions for reform. The Devil here incarnate is of a malignant kind with insidious habits and as many aspects as the hydra. For the burden of Mr. Harvey's book is that advocates are inevitably devoted to making the worse appear the better cause. To this end they have as their masters or servants the lesser devils Low Cunning, Suppression of Evidence, Histrionics, Browbeating, Sycophancy and Wooing of Solicitors' Clerks.

Now all these more worldly aspects of the advocate's calling are examined with relish, reminiscence, *raconte* and regret by the author, who is obviously unhappy at being unable to defend the profession against the reputation which it has "enjoyed" among the admiring public of many centuries. Indeed as a result of the author's five-finger exercises even the common law is seen to be a klavier less well-tempered than one had previously assumed.

Yet it may be suggested that heart-searchings of this kind, though well-meaning, are not likely to arouse much in the way of vehemence or emotion. The author himself is, if he will pardon the allusion, Draconian in only a preparatory sense. For, granted his main theme be true, granted that advocates often give the impression of arrogant wielders of power and that in the minds of the public a clever lawyer is a surer asset than a sound case, to what is our attention to be directed? Should we claim, or rather be able to claim, that a man becomes classified *homo sapiens et iustus* as soon as he is at the Bar? Or does a man shuffle off his mortal coil when he dons a robe or coif and become a perfect justice-machine? The answers, of course, are 'no' in each case and, to the present writer at least, the miracle is that there are rules of conduct for advocates at all, especially when the character of the client is automatically outside their terms of reference. We may put the case more strongly than this

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by asking whether litigants really expect justice or whether they do not rather hope for victory? Whether the world of business and commerce, which provides many disputes for the courts, is organised on a higher or lower moral plane than the legal profession?

It is submitted, rather, that to get hot under the collar about the failure of the lawyers to measure up continuously to an entirely academic standard of good conduct and justice is to beat the air in vain. Indeed, society owes a debt to the legal profession on that very score, for it so easily and readily can make the profession the scapegoat for its own incompletely developed yet potent desires to be both cunning and clever, and yet remain within the circle of the law. For it should never be forgotten that in the final analysis it is the public that makes law, whether by legislation or custom or, in individual cases, by insisting on its rights. Again, at least in theory, law is entirely capable of existence by human effort alone, with no assistance from natural science, philosophy or religion. It is this factor that often causes a call for reform in the law to be preceded by the assertion that the existing state of affairs is a goldmine for lawyers, whereas one feels that an assertion in similar terms, persuasive and weighty as it might seem when dealing with common employment, might come very low on the list of grievances against the common cold.

In conclusion, then, it may be said that here is a lively newcomer to the lawyer's bookshelf which will provoke, amuse, irritate and annoy in turn. If it makes him uncomfortable, the author will be satisfied. If it does not disturb him at all, then the author will be surprised and disappointed: and if one may hazard a guess, the cup of surprise and disappointment he may expect to drink under the Southern Cross will be deeper than that of sweet satisfaction under the Plough.

J. A. ILIFFE.*

The Development of the Treasury (1660-1702) by Stephen Baxter, London, Longmans Green & Co., 1957. viii and 301 pp. (£2/16/3 in Australia).

Scholarship in depth would perhaps be a fitting description for the remarkably thorough work of Dr. Stephen Baxter in his book *The Development of the Treasury (1660-1702)*, which gives a very full account of the growth of this most important government department in response to the forces and needs of a crucial period in British history. As the author himself points out in his preface,¹ there are many gaps in our knowledge of the Restoration, but none more obvious than that relating to the history of day-to-day administration. Hitherto, constitutional principle has been fully treated, administrative practice often largely ignored. Dr. Baxter's own book goes a long way towards filling this gap.

The theme of the book is that during the years under review, the Treasury office grew from something approaching the personal retinue of a magnate² into a professional body of civil servants. This central theme is brought out by a consideration of the relations between the Treasury, the King and Council,³ and the other departments of State,⁴ and by a very full treatment of the expansion of the business and organisation of the Exchequer and Treasury. The author

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¹ At vii.

² No further appointments to the office of Lord High Treasurer were made after the accession of the House of Brunswick in 1714. Its place was taken by the Treasury Board consisting of a First Lord and a number of Junior Lords of the Treasury. Further, for nearly half of the period between 1660-1714 there was no Treasurer, and during the vacancy the office had been performed by a Treasury Board.

³ Of the Treasurer's relations with the Crown it is said: "If the King wished to go bankrupt the Treasurer could not stop him". (78).

⁴ The department with which the Treasury had the most trouble was the Navy. For an interesting account of this see 71-74.