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University of New South Wales Law Journal |
[2] In Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (‘Mabo’),[2] by a six to one majority, the High Court held that the Indigenous occupants of the Murray Islands were ‘entitled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray Islands’.[3] The reasoning that led to this finding saw the abandonment of the doctrine of terra nullius and the acknowledgment of Indigenous rights to land which had existed prior to the acquisition of sovereignty by the British Crown in the form of ‘native title’.[4] Native title was broadly defined by the Court as a recognition by the common law of the connection Indigenous people have with the land – a connection which must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to Indigenous law and custom.
[3] Following the handing down of the judgment, the Commonwealth Government set up a Committee of Ministers charged with the responsibility of formulating a response to the legal and policy issues generated by the decision. The result was the enactment of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘Native Title Act’), which has the objective of providing a framework for the recognition and protection of native title rights. The Act provides a definition of native title that draws directly on the common law position.[5]
[4] In this article I argue that, despite two recent decisions of the Federal Court that would have us believe otherwise,[6] native title law does have the scope to recognise and protect traditional knowledge. Further, I argue that, in fact, the language in Mabo and the Native Title Act demands this acknowledgment, and that anything less would make a mockery of the reasoning behind the ‘recognition’ of Indigenous law and custom that occurred in those two key legal developments. To support this conclusion, I investigate the nature of physical native title rights, and argue that they are better understood as consequential upon, or flowing from, knowledge rights. As it is traditional knowledge which informs Indigenous interactions with the land and environment, it is this knowledge which gives native title its character. I argue, therefore, that native title more closely resembles an intellectual right from which certain physical entitlements flow, and that native title should be not only broadened but reconceptualised.
[5] In the final section of this
article I refute the argument that knowledge rights cannot be recognised within
the scope of native
title because to do so would fracture a skeletal principle
of our legal system.[7] This argument,
the only one which has been presented as a serious obstacle to recognition of
Indigenous knowledge rights within native
title law, is derived from Justice
Brennan’s reasoning in Mabo and demonstrates a desire to protect
the essential doctrines of our legal system while acknowledging Indigenous law
and custom.[8] I argue that the
wrong approach has been taken by the Federal Court, particularly in Bulun
Bulun v R & T Textiles (‘Bulun
Bulun’),[9] and that in
fact, native title, when understood from an Indigenous perspective and
appropriately conceptualised, fits comfortably
within the skeleton of our legal
structure as it is implied by the principle of equality before the law –
an integral part
of our legal system, and a principle which would be
fractured if traditional knowledge rights were not to be recognised. To begin
with, however, I offer a brief introduction to the
nature and characteristics of
Indigenous knowledge systems – an essential starting point that has
arguably not been embraced
in recent Federal Court decisions.
[9] One other point is important to
make here: ‘traditional knowledge’ is an unfortunate term in some
respects because
‘traditional’ may be seen as implying something old
or outdated, or as standing in contrast to something vital and
contemporary.[15] However, the point
has been made by many Indigenous and non-Indigenous commentators alike that the
word ‘traditional’
should not imply that such knowledge remains
frozen in the past. Traditional knowledge is best understood as a system which
has developed
over thousands of years and which is based on a complex fabric of
existing practices and
understandings.[16]
[11] In 1940, Charles Mountford, an anthropologist, spent some time working and living with the Pitjantjatjara people of the Northern Territory. During his stay, ritual knowledge of deep cultural and religious significance was revealed to him. He recorded this information and later published it, without permission, in his book Nomads of the Australian Desert.[20] The Pitjantjatjara people knew that if the knowledge (intended only for the initiated) was published it would cause serious disruption to their culture and society, and so fought to prevent distribution of the information. They succeeded in establishing that the information had been given to Mountford in confidence and that publication was a breach of this confidence.[21]
[12] This case illustrates, on the one hand, a successful use of breach of confidence law to protect Indigenous cultural knowledge, as the distribution of sacred material was prevented. On the other hand, it is limited to its facts. To establish an action in breach of confidence an applicant must show: that the information was of a confidential nature; that it was imparted in circumstances where there was an obligation of confidence; and that there was an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the applicant.[22] Not all Indigenous knowledge is of a confidential nature. For example, ecological knowledge and knowledge expressed through artwork may not attract protection. Breach of confidence can therefore only provide protection for a limited part of Indigenous knowledge and only in certain circumstances. It does not provide appropriate and comprehensive protection.
[13] In M v Indofurn (‘Indofurn’),[23] a number of Indigenous artists successfully argued that their copyright had been breached after their paintings were copied from a catalogue, reproduced onto carpets in Vietnam, and then imported into Australia for distribution. The designs used imagery derived from each artist’s traditional community knowledge.[24] The defendants relied on two main arguments: first, that the works were not ‘original’ precisely because they were based on traditional motifs; and second, that there had been no substantial reproduction of the works because they had simplified the designs for use on the carpets. Justice von Doussa rejected both these arguments, noting the intricacy of the particular works, the amount of skill involved in producing them and the obvious similarities that existed between the originals and the reproductions. His Honour made a collective award of damages to the artists in recognition of the collective custodianship of knowledge in the works.
[14] While the Indigenous claimants were also successful in this case, it is clear that the decision relied heavily on the specific works involved. If a court were to view a work as being less complex or skilled, or a reproduction as significantly altering an original design, while still relying on traditional knowledge, there would be no protection. In Indofurn, von Doussa J made a concerted effort, based on the particular facts, to recognise Indigenous knowledge systems. Another judge, in another fact scenario, may not show the same flexibility. While solutions can only be found by moulding Indigenous philosophies to fit Western legal structures (for example, the recognition of communal rights through an award of damages), no genuine[25] protection can exist.[26]
[15] In Bulun Bulun, a senior custodian of information expressed in a painting created by the plaintiff asserted that custodians of Indigenous traditional knowledge should have a right to bring an infringement action independently of the copyright owner.[27] This right would be an acknowledgment of their role in the creation of artworks. The Federal Court held that this recognition could be achieved through the construction of a fiduciary duty owed by the artist to their community, but that such a duty does not, without more, vest an equitable interest in the ownership of copyright in a community. The community’s primary right, in the event of a breach of duty by a fiduciary, is an action in personam against the artist.[28] Therefore, if an Indigenous artist successfully protects their personal copyright, their community will have no right to intervene.
[16] Once again, this decision is
problematic because it fails to recognise the unique nature of Indigenous
knowledge structures in
attempting to incorporate them into existing legal
doctrines. Instead of a real recognition of a different system of knowledge
management,
the decision distorts the Indigenous perspective by placing communal
rights second to individual
rights.[29] And because the
equitable right in the community is only a derivative of the artist’s
copyright, it is also exposed to all
the deficiencies discussed in relation to
Indofurn.[30]
[18] In these areas, the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), the only potential solution, does not provide the broad protection that Indigenous people require for their traditional knowledge. The Act reflects the economic focus of Australian intellectual property laws, and is unable to protect knowledge until it is turned into an economically viable ‘invention’ through a process of ‘manufacture’ which is novel and involves an ‘inventive step’.[35]
[19] This brief
discussion reveals a disturbing lacuna in our legal
system.[36] Indigenous knowledge
systems form the basis of Indigenous societies – societies which have
already been weakened, and in many
places destroyed, by colonisation – and
yet, no comprehensive protection for this vital knowledge exists. Breach of
confidence
may provide a solution, but only in very specific circumstances.
Senior custodians of knowledge may be able to rely on a fiduciary
duty to
protect their heritage, but only when an Indigenous artist does not pursue their
own copyright action. Copyright law may
provide some protection, but only when
its preconditions, developed to protect Western notions of creation, are met.
Patent laws
are essentially inaccessible and inappropriate for Indigenous
people. I would argue that leaving a gap in the law such as this involves
an
acceptance of unequal treatment before the law. While one section of society has
their particular intellectual or knowledge based
rights protected under
appropriate laws, another group has the same rights essentially
ignored,[37] despite the fact that a
potential solution can in fact be found within native title
law.
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the Indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact with reference to those laws and customs.[40]
[22] Subsequent native title cases have accepted this reasoning. In Ward on behalf of the Miriuwung and Gajerrong People v WA and NT (‘Ward’),[42] Lee J recognised that native title does not conform to common law concepts of property and is to be regarded as ‘sui generis’.[43] In the Hight Court case Yanner v Eaton, the joint majority judgment emphasised that ‘[n]ative title rights and interests must be understood as what has been called “a perception of socially constituted fact”’.[44] Justice Gummow referred to communal native title as ‘the collective rights, powers and other interests which may be exercised in accordance with the community’s traditional laws and customs’.[45] In The Commonwealth v Yarmirr (‘Croker Island Case’), Merkel J concluded that native title is a recognition of ‘the relationship between the community of Indigenous people and the land defined by reference to that community’s traditional laws and customs’.[46]
[23] Section
223 of the Native Title Act states:
(1) The expression ‘native title’ or ‘native title rights and interests’ means the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws(2) Without limiting subsection (1), ‘rights and interests’ in that subsection includes hunting, gathering, or fishing rights and interests.
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples
or Torres Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs,
have a connection with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.
[25] From the case law and statutory references it can be seen that native title rights are a completely unique concept and that their nature and scope has not been specifically outlined, but is left to be established in each case according to the customs and traditions of the relevant native title claimant group.[47] The definition makes no specific exclusions; the only limitations on the variety of traditional interests or rights that can be recognised are those in s 223(1) of the Native Title Act: they must be possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and observed by native title claimants, they must connect the claimants to the land, and they must be recognised by the common law.
[26] However, some specific rights have been included in the Native Title Act: the rights or interests in hunting, gathering and fishing. This inclusion, which is not intended to limit the broad definition,[48] clearly takes native title rights beyond real property rights, or land rights, and marks an intention by the Federal Parliament to recognise the unique character of native title. A body of case law which has followed the decision in Mabo further expresses this intention, and provides examples of the types of rights that have so far been recognised by the common law as sui generis native title rights.
[27] In Yanner v Eaton, the High Court found that the appellant was not directly affected by the provisions of the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld), which regulates the taking of wild animals, and could use traditional hunting methods to catch juvenile estuarine crocodiles as an exercise of his native title rights.[49] The High Court in reaching this decision noted that it was a traditional custom of the appellant’s clan to hunt juvenile crocodiles rather than adult crocodiles, because they had tribal totemic significance, drawn from spiritual belief.[50] The majority decision also drew attention to s 211 of the Native Title Act, which lists a class of activities that would normally require a permit or license but which may be carried on by native title holders without legislative permission. The class of activities interestingly includes hunting, fishing, gathering and cultural or spiritual activities.[51] This not only supports the intention expressed in s 223(2) that the specific rights mentioned are not intended to limit the broad nature of native title, but seems to broaden its scope even further.[52]
[28] In the Croker Island Case, the central issue was whether the common law could recognise native title in respect of the sea. At first instance, Olney J found that communal native title is recognisable in relation to the sea and sea bed, at least within the twelve nautical mile limit of Australia’s territorial waters.[53] The decision was upheld on appeal to the Full Federal Court, and the applicant’s rights were held to include: the right to fish, hunt and gather within the claim area for the purposes of satisfying personal, domestic and non-commercial communal needs (including the need to observe traditional cultural and spiritual laws and customs); a right of access to the sea, and sea-bed, for the purposes of visiting and protecting places within the claim area which were of cultural or spiritual importance; and, most significantly, the right to safeguard cultural and spiritual knowledge. This collection of rights confirms the unique and self-generating character of native title rights.[54]
[29] The decision of the Federal Court in Western Australia v Ward (‘Miriuwung-Gajerrong Case’)[55] is particularly interesting. Justice Lee, at first instance, listed the rights which constituted native title in the case at hand as including: ‘the right to maintain and protect places of importance under traditional laws, customs and practices in the “determination area”’ and ‘the right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse of cultural knowledge of the common law holders associated with the “determination area”’.[56] (This last right is a direct recognition of the ability of native title to encompass a general right of protection for traditional knowledge.) However, on appeal, the majority of the Federal Court held that the right to protect cultural knowledge could not be classified as a ‘right in relation to land that can be the subject of a determination’,[57] yet offered no real explanation for this finding. Justice North (in dissent) found that the anthropological evidence in the case highlighted ‘how the secular and spiritual aspects of the Aboriginal connection with land are twin elements of the rights to land’[58] and upheld Justice Lee’s decision.[59] With respect, the majority’s reversal of Justice Lee’s finding is worrying, and it is interesting to note that the Miriuwung and Gajerrong people have been granted special leave to appeal to the High Court on this point.
[30] With the
exception of the majority’s decision in the Miriuwung-Gajerrong
Case, the case law discussed here suggests that the right to protect
traditional knowledge from misuse or exploitation can fit comfortably
within the
scope of native title. While it is not expressly included, neither are a whole
series of other rights which have been
recognised as part of native title both
under the Native Title Act and within the case law. If the courts were to
recognise some rights and not others in an apparently random manner, this would
seem
to undermine Justice Brennan’s conclusion that native title rights
are sui generis and are given their content by the traditional
laws and customs
of Indigenous claimants.
[34] Secondly, it must be established that, by those laws and customs, the
group has a connection with the land or waters over which
title is claimed.
Across Indigenous communities in Australia a link clearly exists between law,
custom and knowledge, and the land.
According to Ronald Berndt:
Life came from and through the land, and was manifested in the land. The land was not an inanimate ‘thing’, it was and is alive ... the precious essence we call life came out of the Dreaming, mediated through spirit beings and sustained in its material form by what the land had to offer ... Aboriginal religion is essentially land-minded and land-centred ... mythic beings are specifically linked with particular places and sites. Their adventures as told in song and myth, and danced out in ritual, covered all aspects of the land over which they travelled, shaping and naming and humanising what there is within that land today.[62]
[36] The picture that emerges on examination of the relationship between law and custom, traditional knowledge and the land, is one of a body of information which is focused on the land and is expressed through ritual and ceremony, such as song, dance and art. Let us imagine that the group of claimants seeks to have their traditional knowledge, as expressed in their artwork, protected. Stephen Gray has examined the relationship between art and land in Aboriginal law based on the analysis of Yolngu art undertaken by anthropologist Howard Morphy.[64] Gray found that the connection between art and the land in Yolngu culture is so strong that one could assert with some justification that art and land are the same, or at least, as Morphy puts it, that they are ‘two sides of the same coin’.[65] Gray goes on to relate how particular designs are specific to certain clans and certain locations within their territory. The knowledge contained within them is divulged only at certain times to certain individuals as a form of control by clan members over their land. The knowledge is power over the land, and the knowledge is held within the design.[66] Thus the relevant knowledge is possessed as part of traditional law and custom and connects the holders of the knowledge to the land.
[37] The final requirement, that native title rights or interests must also be recognised by the common law, may initially appear to be only a small hurdle as the reasoning in Mabo seems to suggest that any number of rights or types of rights can be recognised: according to Brennan J, native title must be simply ascertained as a matter of fact with reference to traditional laws and customs. In Mabo, the Court also took the view, following the authority of Privy Council cases,[67] that the traditional interests of Indigenous Australians were to be respected even though those interests were of a kind as yet unknown to the common law. In other words, the High Court held that all native title rights were sui generis in character, could not be equated with previously existing common law doctrines, and yet could be recognised by the common law.[68] This reasoning (supporting the recognition of novel rights) was not specifically confined to novel land rights, and thus there appears little reason why it cannot be applied to the recognition of knowledge rights, which are in fact integral to Indigenous relationships with the land.
[38] Consider the novel nature of the native title rights already recognised by the courts which, although they do not depend on Crown grant, are rights to land visible to the common law. The decision in the Croker Island Case in particular demonstrates the incredible flexibility of the common law. The finding in that case, that native title rights to the sea and sea-bed will be recognised to at least the twelve mile territorial limit, was arrived at despite the fact that the common law does not, of itself, apply beyond the low tide watermark. Justice Olney, at first instance, specifically based the recognition of native title in the case on the expansion of the sphere of visibility of the common law resulting from the operation of the Native Title Act.[69]
[39] This reasoning offers an interesting foundation upon which to build an argument for the recognition of traditional knowledge rights. Even if it could be argued that the common law does not directly recognise Indigenous knowledge rights because they are somehow more novel than Indigenous land rights, and so beyond the visibility of the law, the counter-argument could be made that the operation of the Native Title Act in fact extends the operation of the common law by its implicit acknowledgment of the sui generis nature of native title, enabling it to recognise and embrace new rights.[70]
[40] However, in the recent decision in the Miriuwung-Gajerrong Case, Beaumont and von Doussa JJ appeared to reject such an argument by overturning Justice Lee’s finding that the right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse of cultural knowledge could be considered a native title right.[71] Their Honours referred to the High Court decision in Fejo v Northern Territory (‘Fejo’) where the majority stated that ‘the rights of native title are rights and interests that relate to the use of the land by the holders of native title’. [72] Justices Beaumont and von Doussa concluded that the common law can only ‘protect the physical enjoyment of rights and interests that are of a kind that can be exercised on the land, and does not protect purely religious or spiritual relationships with the land’.[73] Their Honours stated that a right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse of cultural knowledge is not a burden on the radical title of the Crown, but rather a personal right residing in the custodians of cultural knowledge.
[41] This decision lies in stark contrast with the determination in the Croker Island Case which, in addition to its flexible approach to common law recognition, granted the specific right to ‘safeguard’ cultural knowledge. This protection was recognised by Olney J at first instance,[74] and upheld on appeal to the Full Federal Court where it was said that the right to access the sea and sea-bed within the claimed area, for the purpose of safeguarding the cultural and spiritual knowledge of the native title holders, was to be considered a native title right. While this right is based on access, it reveals the capacity of the common law to acknowledge a right of protection of Indigenous knowledge.
[42] The decision in the Miriuwung-Gajerrong Case in comparison appears, with respect, unpersuasive. Justices Beaumont and von Doussa did not advert to their earlier decision in the Croker Island Case, and did not discuss the inseparable nature of physical native title rights and traditional knowledge, choosing instead to rely on the High Court reasoning in Fejo. They also offered no explanation for labelling communal knowledge rights as ‘personal’. The conclusion, it is submitted, is that the approach taken in the Miriuwung-Gajerrong Case is arbitrary in its view of the development of Indigenous rights. I would argue that the common law clearly has the capacity to recognise and protect knowledge rights, and it is unclear why the Court appears to have chosen not to in this case.
[43] The conditions
required to prove a native title right can clearly be met by Indigenous
claimants seeking to protect their traditional
knowledge. Where the knowledge
still exists and is used, it unquestionably connects Indigenous communities to
the land, and in fact
is the link between Indigenous people and the land.
The common law has the capacity to recognise the sui generis nature of
Indigenous
knowledge systems just as it has recognised the sui generis nature of
the physical relationship Indigenous people have with the land.
The only real,
express limitation on recognition is Justice Brennan’s insistence that the
recognition of a novel interest be
restricted by the need to protect the
integrity of the skeleton of principle that holds the Australian legal system
together (a limitation
discussed
below),[75] although this limitation
was not employed as the basis of the decision of the majority in the
Miriuwung-Gajerrong Case.
[45] David
Bennett has suggested that it is Indigenous intellectual property that
distinguishes a native title right to hunt, fish
or gather from another form of
right to do the same:
Traditional or customary hunting, fishing or gathering are specific processes ... [I]t is conducting these activities in accordance with traditional practices that separates them from other forms of the same activities. Or to put this another way, it is the intellectual property of a group in terms of their traditional knowledge which divides a native title right to hunt, fish or gather from other forms of the same activity.[76]
[47] Bennett explains that the kind of knowledge that generates a native title right to hunt or fish may include what and what not to hunt, when and when not to hunt, and where and where not to hunt.[80] In response to this, it could be argued that this type of knowledge is not an expression of Indigenous law but simply knowledge acquired through time spent living in a certain area and environment, that is, knowledge that does not rely on Indigenous law or custom but which arises out of a relationship with a place acquired over time. It could be said that fishermen exercising their public common law right to fish have their own knowledge of what, when and where to hunt. Such an argument would be valid in its identification of the relationship Indigenous people have developed with place over time, but would ignore the integrated nature of Indigenous knowledge, which links the legal and physical to the spiritual. It would ignore the rituals which may be involved in learning and expressing the knowledge of when and where to fish and the totemic relationship to animals such as was recognised in Yanner v Eaton. It is difficult to imagine a traditional physical right to hunt or fish existing without the knowledge which gives it its content. It can therefore be argued that physical native title rights derive their legitimacy from traditional knowledge rather than vice versa.[81]
[48] This conclusion has several implications. The first is that, in a sense, Indigenous knowledge rights are already implicitly protected through the recognition and protection of their physical expression. This is true in so far as claimants are given the right to express the knowledge by, for example, hunting and fishing, and to pass the knowledge on to others who can maintain the tradition. However, it ignores the fact that other cultural expressions of the knowledge, such as paintings, dance, ritual and the protection of sacred sites, remain unprotected but still play a fundamental role in maintaining the knowledge which feeds the right.
[49] The second implication is that native title rights are better understood as knowledge rights from which flow certain physical rights. Consider Western copyright law. Copyright is an intellectual right from which flows certain physical rights such as the right to exclusively reproduce a work, perform it in public or make an adaptation.[82] It is an intellectual or knowledge right, but creates certain physical rights, which derive their legitimacy from the intellectual input involved in creating works.
[50] Consider also the rights conferred under patent laws and the way these have been engaged. Generally speaking, patent law constructs an intellectual, personal property right, from which flows physical rights such as the right to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of patented products, or a product generated by a patented method or process.[83] In the United States, these laws have been used to register a pesticide derived from the seeds of a neem tree, a plant native to India (the pesticidal qualities of which have been known and relied upon for centuries by the Indigenous people of the area).[84] In Australia, the example of Amrad’s development of an anti-AIDS drug from the smokebush has already been mentioned.[85] These examples reveal that the law recognises certain physical rights as being consequential upon a knowledge right in the context of patent law, but does not recognise a similar right for the traditional knowledge held by Indigenous people, who are often the source of the information which provides the basis for patented products. Constructing native title as a bundle of disparate physical rights allows for this type of exploitation.
[51] Just as copyright and patent rights draw their legitimacy from the intellectual input involved in creating works or products, physical native title rights draw their legitimacy from Indigenous knowledge. One cannot acquire the right to exclusively reproduce a work under copyright law unless a special relationship can be established with the work based on knowledge and intellectual processes. Similarly, a native title right to fish will not be recognised unless a claimant can prove they have a special relationship with the place where they fish: a special relationship which is based on traditional knowledge. The failure of the courts to recognise this similarity has resulted in the uneasy emergence of a bundle of physical rights which seem to derive their legitimacy from an uncomfortable analogy with rights already present in our legal matrix rather than through a recognition of their sui generis, knowledge based character.[86]
[52] This current
approach is potentially damaging both to Indigenous rights and to the integrity
of our legal system. It is damaging
to Indigenous rights because it limits the
types of interests that can be claimed to those which can be made analogous to
Western
concepts (despite the broad provisions of the Native Title Act).
It is damaging to the integrity of the legal system because, as native title law
develops, it is increasingly harder to justify
why the law is apparently capable
of recognising some rights and not others. Just as it would be very difficult to
properly justify
the recognition of a right to reproduce a work under copyright
law when it was not sourced in the intellectual nature of the right,
it is very
difficult to justify physical native title rights which have been disconnected
from their foundation: Indigenous knowledge.
Pursuing such an approach to native
title is likely to eventually leave native title law looking like an artificial
and unsupported
construct of the common law, rather than a justifiable
recognition of sui generis Indigenous
rights.[87] To avoid such a result,
I believe that native title rights must be recognised and reconceptualised as
knowledge rights from which
flow physical
rights.[88]
In discharging its duty to declare the common law of Australia, this Court is not free to adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human rights if their adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its shape and internal consistency.[90]
It is not possible, a priori, to distinguish cases that express a skeletal principle and those which do not, but no case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it expresses seriously offends the values of justice and human rights (especially equality before the law) which are aspirations of the contemporary Australian legal system. If a postulated rule of the common law expressed in earlier cases offends those contemporary values, the question arises whether the rule should be maintained and applied. Whenever such a question arises, it is necessary to assess whether the particular rule is an essential doctrine of our legal system and whether, if the rule were to be overturned, the disturbance to be apprehended would be disproportionate to the benefit flowing from the overturning.[91]
recognition by our common law of the rights and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony would be precluded if the recognition were to fracture a skeletal principle of our legal system.[92]
[i]n order to be successful, the applicants’ foreshadowed argument that a right of ownership arises in artistic works and copyright attaching to them as an aspect of native title would appear to require that the Court accept that the inseparable nature of ownership in land and ownership in artistic works by Aboriginal people is recognised by the common law. The principle that ownership of land and ownership of artistic works are separate statutory and common law institutions is a fundamental principle of the Australian legal system which may well be characterised as ‘skeletal’ and stand in the road of acceptance to the foreshadowed argument.[93]
[60] Native title entails a recognition of Indigenous relations to land which is sui generis, and cannot therefore be equated with common law ‘ownership’ of land. Further, Indigenous knowledge attracts no specific statutory protection. It is a unique system of information management that currently lacks any general protection under Australian law. While native title rights do not involve common law ‘ownership’ of land and Indigenous knowledge attracts no specific protection (statutory or otherwise), it is hard to see how a conflict may arise between a common law and statutory right.[95] The question that should be asked is whether the sui generis and unprotected entity of Indigenous traditional knowledge can be recognised and protected as a native title right.
[61] But second, and more importantly, I would question the narrow
reference to Justice Brennan’s skeleton of principle rule,
which takes no
account of the balancing test which is integral to its application and which can
be used to determine whether a principle
of our legal system, despite the fact
that it is a skeletal principle, can be held to be inapplicable and effectively
overruled.
I will return to this criticism in Part VII(D) below.
A power to exclude members of the public as now claimed would, in our opinion, contradict these common law principles [to fish and navigate] which, along with the right of innocent passage, are, we think, of sufficient importance to warrant their characterisation as ‘skeletal’ in the sense meant by Brennan J.[97]
[64] His Honour began
by proposing that it was not principles but ‘policies’ which lay at
the core of Justice Brennan’s
reasoning:
When Brennan J referred to recognition not being accorded in circumstances that would ‘fracture a skeletal principle’ of the legal system, his Honour was not referring to a principle of the common law but rather, to the underlying policies (ie the skeleton) of the common law that have given rise to certain of its rules and therefore to its ‘shape and consistency’.[99]
[66] Justice Merkel’s judgment indicates the potential flexibility of the application of the skeleton of principle rule. Employing his Honour’s reasoning, even if recognition of Indigenous knowledge rights within native title somehow interfered with, for example, the need for a division between statutory intellectual property laws and common law property rights,[104] it could be argued that the ‘policy’ underlying this division would not be fractured by recognition. If this argument did not succeed, it would still be possible to propose that, in a specific case, a right to protect traditional knowledge could be recognised if in practice it would not fracture the skeleton of the legal system.
[67] I would argue that the skeleton of principle need not
stand in the way of a characterisation of native title as an essential
knowledge
right. The discussion above suggests that such a characterisation would see
native title developed as a unique style of
intellectual right one which, like
copyright or patent rights, generates certain physical rights. Indigenous rights
have already
been recognised in Mabo, and such a style of right is
already present in our legal
matrix.[105] It is hard to see how
such a progression in the law could be seen as interfering with the integrity of
our legal structure, or policies
underpinning this structure, to such an extent
that the obvious and vital benefits flowing from it for Indigenous people could
be
outweighed by any ‘disturbance’ caused by recognising such
rights.
[69] The principle of equality before the law
is clearly a fundamental element of the Australian legal system. The rationale
behind
Mabo was clearly that of equality before the law:
The preferable rule equates the Indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony with the inhabitants of a conquered colony in respect of their rights and interests in land ... Indigenous people’s rights are to be recognised and fully respected.[106]
By extinguishing the traditional rights characteristically vested in the Meriam people, the 1985 Act abrogated the immunity of the Meriam people from arbitrary deprivation of their legal rights in and over the Murray Islands. The Act thus impaired their human rights while leaving unimpaired the corresponding human rights of those whose rights in and over the Murray Islands did not take their origin from the laws and customs of the Meriam people.[108]
[72] More generally, the attainment of equality before the law has been the subject and recommendation of numerous influential reports.[113] It is also the subject of a rich collection of anti-discrimination legislation.[114] The doctrine of equality is also considered a fundamental principle of the common law.[115] In Leeth v The Commonwealth,[116] the doctrine was recognised by the High Court. Justices Deane and Toohey referred to the ‘essential or underlying theoretical equality of all persons under the law’, which ‘is and has been a fundamental and generally beneficial doctrine of the common law and a basic precept of the administration of justice under our system of government’.[117]
[73] The right to equality of treatment before the law is also guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[118] to which Australia is a signatory. More generally, Australia has ratified a number of instruments which expressly guarantee the right to cultural integrity for Indigenous people.[119] The terms of these instruments do not directly form part of our skeleton of principle but various High Court decisions suggest that they may be used as a legitimate guide in developing the common law.[120] The reasoning in the Croker Island Case also provides direct evidence of the ability of the courts to draw upon international obligations in determining what constitutes the skeleton of principle.[121]
[74] In summary, it is clear that equality before the law is a fundamental principle of the Australian legal system. It forms an integral part of native title reasoning, is a primary goal of law reform efforts, finds expression in legislation, and is a crucial part of Australia’s international obligations. The fracturing of such a principle would undeniably have a far-reaching and destructive impact. It must therefore be accorded considerable weight in Justice Brennan’s balancing test. Thus protecting a rule that requires the separation of intellectual property and real property rights at the expense of ensuring equality before the law would result in a disturbance to the structural integrity of our legal system which would be disproportionate to the benefit gained from protecting the rule requiring separation.
[75] I believe
that continued non-recognition of Indigenous knowledge rights within native
title law would itself fracture the principle
of equality before the law. When
the skeletal principle rule is considered in its entirety, and the principle of
equality before
the law accorded its due weight, the scale begins to tip
unmistakably in favour of the principle of equality. So far, in fact, to
suggest
that non-recognition would do more harm to the integrity of the legal system, by
fracturing the principle of equality before
the law, than could ever occur as a
result of recognition.
[77] Two
solutions present themselves. First, a right to protect traditional knowledge
could be recognised as a distinct interest
and added to the bundle of rights
that is native title. Alternatively, and more appropriately I believe, native
title rights could
be recognised for what they are: fundamentally knowledge
rights. Just as intellectual property rights are constructed as knowledge
rights
from which flow certain physical entitlements, native title rights could be
conceptualised in a similar way. This latter solution
is preferable because it
legitimises recognition – a legitimacy that has, thus far, been missing
from native
title reasoning. The legitimacy of this solution, however,
ultimately depends on the fact that it involves a characterisation of Indigenous
rights which is actually informed by the Indigenous laws and customs that it
aims to acknowledge and protect.
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