Geng, Joshua --- "Hannah Arendt And Karl Marx: Battle Of The Revolutions" [2021] UNSWLawJlStuS 29; (2021) UNSWLJ Student Series No 21-29

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HANNAH ARENDT AND KARL MARX: BATTLE OF THE REVOLUTIONS

JOSHUA GENG

I INTRODUCTION

Hannah Arendt’s prioritisation of political freedoms in her theory of revolution is an insufficient method for humanity to achieve natality if it is not balanced with a consideration of exploitative structures existent in modern society. This essay argues that an approach that synthesises Arendt’s ‘political freedoms’ approach with a Marxian conception of revolution is best placed to provide a method that satisfies humanity’s desire for natality.

Arendt’s conception of natality refers to humanity’s fundamental capacity to innovate and create new beginnings for the world.^[1] Her conception of human nature and the activities capable of achieving genuine innovation informs her position that solely focusing on political freedom through revolution is sufficient to achieve natality.^[2] True natality according to Arendt can only evolve where the space for revolutionary politics exists, and where that space is available to elites. Arendt’s theory argues that attempting to address anything other than political freedom dooms revolution and thus jeopardises humanity’s innovative capacity.^[3]

While Marxists agree that humanity’s ontological nature involves an ability to innovate,^[4] Arendt’s exclusive focus on political freedom in revolutions is too limited. Specifically, Arendt’s methodology fails to address ingrained forms of economic exploitation in modern societies that supresses meaningful opportunities for innovation. However, this focus on material conditions suffers from its own shortcomings in being able to deliver a genuinely innovative experience for humanity. While this shortcoming is addressed by Arendt, this essay posits that she overcorrects into an elitist conception of revolution and natality.

The need for synthesis is examined through four criticisms of Arendt’s prioritisation of ‘political freedoms’ in revolutions and its Marxian counterpart. First, Arendt’s purposeful disregard of economic factors ignores the limiting factors that modern capitalism has imposed on political action. Second, in ignoring the material and prioritising a narrow concept of ‘freedom’ Arendt’s theory can only conceive of an elitist revolution. Third, this essay partially accepts the Arendt critique of Marxian revolutionary theory as inadequate to foster natality. Finally, this essay will consider the need for synthesis and examine the Hungarian Revolution as a model.

II ARENDT: THE NARROW PATH OF ACTION

A Human Nature and Vita Activa

Arendt’s prioritisation of political freedom in revolution stems from her reverence for the “original Greek understanding of politics”.^[5] Relying on the classical Greek concept of vita activa, Arendt separates human activity into three distinct elements: labour, work and action.^[6]

At the bottom of Arendt’s hierarchy of human activity is labour. Labour refers to the “day-to-day”^[7] human activities required for biological survival.^[8] While a “vital [necessity]”,^[9] labour is cyclical, ephemeral and ultimately futile as it is negated by consumption (e.g. you eat every day). ^[10] The material necessity of repetitive labour means that it cannot be undertaken to foster genuine opportunities for achieving natality.^[11] Due to this, labour is at the bottom of Arendt’s hierarchy of activities as it lacks the innovative potential for humans to “transcend our natural, biological selves”.^[12]

Although often confused as labour,^[13] work does not refer to “repetitive toil” for survival.^[14] Instead, work involves the creation of permanent objects that enables humans to gather into a “common reality and shared objective space” (e.g. buildings, books, etc).^[15] While work creates a permanent world for humans to interact within, it requires a teleological world view.^[16] This means that work is undertaken to achieve something instead of being completed for its own sake. This exposes it to private agendas (e.g. publishers demand a particular kind of book, museums want certain kinds of art) and limits its innovative capacity.^[17]

At the top of the vita activa is action,^[18] which is “the exclusive prerogative of man”.^[19] Action refers to the experience of humans interacting with each other via “deeds (praxis) and speech (lexis)” to discuss and decide on political issues.^[20] As a social experience, action must occur in a location where others can also witness it.^[21] This social requirement draws upon Arendt’s conception of the public nature of human existence as it is “men, not man... [lives] on the earth”.^[22] Performing action to an audience allows individuals to separate themselves from humanity’s biological commonality^[23] and reveal their “unique personalities”.^[24] The spontaneity of “unconstrained deliberation”^[25] and mutual recognition through action allows individuals to channel their divergent opinions and qualities to produce “something original and unanticipated” into the world.^[26] Unlike labour’s repetition and work’s finality, political action creates a chain of boundless opportunities that are “never finished and unpredictable”.^[27] Arendt argues that humanity’s distinctive capacity for innovation/natality can only emerge through political action.^[28] As such, public political action is the only human activity that allows for a meaningful existence.

B The Polis and Oikia: Veni, dixi, fecit^[29]

The two activities most relevant to Arendt’s theory of revolution are labour and action. Under Arendt’s labour and action must occur in different locations.

Action is only possible in the public sphere (polis) where individuals are both free and equal.^[30] Arendt’s conceptions of equality and freedom are not based on a modernist understanding of natural and universal rights.^[31] Again she relies on classical Greek traditions by conceptualising freedom and equality as material conditions that must be achieved. Freedom refers to the human ability to enter the public realm and equally “participate in public affairs at public institutions”.^[32] This freedom requires the individual to be liberated from the material necessities of private labour.^[33] Arendt’s conception of freedom is “exclusively located in the [public] realm”^[34] where no one “rules or [is] being [ruled]”.^[35] This allows the public sphere to be equated with living a political life. Individuals can therefore only realise their innovative potential where they have been liberated to access the equality of the public sphere. ^[36] Arendt goes as far as to argue that a principal feature of totalitarianism is denying this public space for genuinely political action.^[37]

As a private activity,^[38] labour can only occur in the private sphere known as the household (oikia).^[39] The household is a pre-political experience of repeated labour that is strictly demarcated from the equality and freedom of politics in the public sphere.^[40] Within the household people are “[driven] by their wants and needs”^[41] and slavishly dedicated to labour’s cyclical nature for their own survival.^[42] Due to the “urgency of [humanity’s] bodily needs” the household involves a “violent struggle” for people to gain access to material conditions required for fulfilling their needs”.^[43] Only the household head (i.e. ruler) can attend to their necessities by violently subjugating other members of the household or through slavery. As a result, at the centre of the household is the “strictest inequality”.^[44] While the ruler can freely “leave the household and enter the political”, the subjugated/slaves remain “ruled over” by necessity.^[45] Freedom and equality are therefore not possible in the context of the household.

Through her breakdown of vita activa, Arendt reveals how humanity’s ontological nature for innovation can only occur through action in public spaces. However, her focus also exposes what she perceives as modern society’s dangerous blurring of the private and public and a transition away from vita activa’s traditional hierarchy.^[46] This modern process is described by Arendt as “the emergence of the social realm”.^[47]

C The Rise of the Social

Christianity’s emphasis on “the sacredness of life”,^[48] modern science^[49] and the rise of the economy,^[50] have all culminated in modern society’s inversion of the vita activa. Labour has become humanity’s highest capacity and maximising production for the “survival of... man”^[51] is life’s only priority. This inversion has caused life to become an objectified process that involves “usefulness and utility” as the “ultimate standards of life”.^[52] In these conditions, the rate of consumption is “so tremendously accelerated” that everything becomes an “object of consumption”.^[53] Traditional distinctions including the difference between work and labour to become trivialised as the former loses its status of “relative durability”.^[54]

Instead of the public sphere being used for free political action via “great deeds and speech^[55] it is co-opted by the social. In modern society, the public space is dedicated to satisfying “private needs and concerns”^[56] and the polis has transformed into the agora (i.e. exchange markets). Like the household, within the agora people are motivated by their necessity and “desire for products”.^[57] Political action in this new “public household” has become focused on “a mere means to further some end” (i.e. survival).^[58]

Due to the sharp distinction between the private and the public, a meaningful human life filled with action is not compatible with the bureaucratic management of merely sustaining existence.^[59] The result of is a “worldly alienation”^[60] in which the public realm’s ability to provide equality and freedom is replaced with inequality and coercion from the private household.^[61] To Arendt, this blurring of the two realms signifies the “end of action and speech”^[62] and the death of meaningful existence. Without action taking place “amongst men” the world “is literally dead”.^[63] People are reduced to “possessive individualism”^[64] as they come to define themselves based on their labours and products instead of unique and distinctive qualities required for innovation.^[65]

D Modern Problems Require Ancient Solutions

1 Connection between Political Revolution and Innovation

By exposing the modern world’s crisis of mass-mechanisation, Arendt emphasises a need to “purify politics of... extrapolitical interests”^[66] and revive the innovative experience of political action.^[67] Despite her philosophical foundations being rooted in classical Greek ideas, to accomplish this Arendt is not suggesting a revival of the ancient polis (i.e. City State).^[68]

To achieve this, Arendt believes that modern revolutions been inspired and radicalised by the political imaginary of classical republicanism^[69] to freely “make new beginnings”.^[70] This is because revolution themselves are a political action that involves innovatively “[opening] up [the] future”.^[71] This allows for an innovative spirit of “progressive development”^[72] that encapsulates humanity’s capacity for natality. Modern revolutionary politics thus provides a means of spontaneous rupture through insurgency and action to create new forms of government.^[73] In particular, Arendt praises direct and deliberative forms of participatory democracy (e.g. council democracy in the 1956 Hungarian revolt)^[74] that spontaneously emerge during revolutionary action. This allows for an innovative break away from the bureaucracy and party-based forms of modern political representation. Arendt emphasises the ability to experience political freedom is “at stake in revolutions”^[75] as a process of engagement, not delegation occurs.

Revolutions also revitalise humanity’s innovative capacity by creating the public spaces required for political action to occur in modern society.^[76] Re-asserting a political space revitalises humanity’s innovative experience as individuals can entering them and, through deliberation with others, engage in free and political actions.^[77] Arendt praises the US revolution for doing this. Following the liberation from British political restraint, revolutionary politics focused on formulating a new government that provided public space for action.^[78]

2 Corruptibility of Revolution

However, Arendt believed the dichotomy between tradition and modernity, of politics against the social, is manifest in modern revolutionary politics.^[79] Revolutions can be corrupted by concerns of poverty and freeing people from necessity through the social question.^[80] As the practical manifestation of the freedom of public space, revolutions are not fit to free people from necessity. The innovative potential of revolution requires a focus on freedom and should be diametrically opposed to the violent process of satisfying people’s necessities.

As discussed, Arendt believed that liberating people from their wants/necessity is a matter that must be addressed in the private household. However, Arendt’s discussion also indicated that the violence required to address people’s material concerns and liberate them from necessity extinguishes the possibility for political freedom and action.^[81] Any attempt to liberate people from want through revolution causes it to become bogged down with the “administration or management of things in the public interest”.^[82] Instead, “easing life’s labours” should be achieved through technical solutions or what Arendt calls “hundreds of gadgets”.^[83] Much like modern society and the private household, focusing on liberating people from necessity (i.e. the Social Question) is the “greatest danger” to revolution itself.^[84]

Arendt’s analysis of the French Revolution exposes the susceptibility and dangerous consequences of revolutionary politics where it has been corrupted by the concerns of the social. Unlike the purely political aspirations of the US revolution, the French revolutionaries focused on resolving the social question by satisfying people’s material necessities.^[85] Due to the biological nature of necessity and the inability to fully liberate people from it without violence, ultimately the French Revolution experienced terror which culminated in Napoleonic despotism.^[86]

To Arendt revolutions should therefore consistently focus on prioritising political issues. It ensures revolutions remain a bastion of human creativity and exercises of natality without becoming “deformed” by violent and oppressive concerns of the social.^[87]

III THE ECONOMY STRIKES BACK

A Economic Exploitation Prevents Innovative Revolution

Arendt’s analysis of revolutions demonstrates its potential for spontaneity and innovative action.^[88] However, from a Marxian perspective, Arendt’s wilful disregard of economic exploitation and the ‘social question’^[89] ignores the practical reality of modern society.^[90]

Marx’s theory of revolution believed that the economic exploitation produced by capitalism is so extreme that without first addressing it the “political equality [and innovation] that Arendt defends” is impossible.^[91] Unlike Arendt, Marx did not believe a separation between the public and private aspects of society was possible. Rather, it was only through the interaction between the two that enabled the human world to take shape.^[92]

B The Reproductive Nature of Capitalism

Marx suggests that capitalism’s dominance occurs due to its contradictory but continuous connection with constituent power. Like Arendt’s definition of natality,^[93] constituent power refers to the ability to generate new social and political configurations.^[94] Also like Arendt, Marx believed that such innovation was an ontological element of being a human.^[95] Both natality and constituent have been described as “a vehicle of human freedom and creativity”.^[96]

In terms of revolution, constituent power has an innovative focus by reshaping the society that humanity lives within by forming “alternative [formations]” of it.^[97] This allowed for capitalism to produce a system of exploitative labour relations between the bourgeoisie and proletariat and, since then, to reproduce itself.^[98] Capitalism’s constituent power has involved “two vectors”:^[99] violence and cooperation.

Violence refers to the “original sin” of primitive accumulation which innovatively overturned the unequal hierarchies of the feudal/canonical system, albeit into another hierarchical structure of capitalism.^[100] Primitive accumulation involved the bourgeoisie forcibly removing individuals from their land and turning them into wage labourers (the proletariat).^[101] Alienating the proletariat from the means of production creates an exploitative social relationship. It allows the bourgeoisie to appropriate proletariat labour for a profit which it mostly keeps for itself. The proletariat are only paid a portion that is incommensurate with the value they create.^[102] Marx’s labour theory of value equates value with the total amount of labour (measured through units of time) required for production.^[103] Although this overt violence is generally no longer required,^[104] it has transformed into the bourgeoisie use of private property rights/laws (i.e. “new violence”). New violence allows the bourgeoisie to continue enforcing its exploitative relationship with the proletariat.^[105] This creates a cycle of disempowerment and exploitation of proletariat while the bourgeoisie, through the profits, can grow richer and expand their exploitative capacities.^[106]

Capitalism also employs a perverse form of cooperation by subjecting the workers to oppression in the workplace based on capitalist intentions. Cooperation here aims at using the combined labour of the proletariat to reproduce the capitalist system. This involves bringing more workers into communication with each other within the sphere of labour and production (e.g. extended supply chains and extension of the world market).^[107] The bourgeoisie thus creates a class of disciplined and obedient workers.^[108]

This violence and cooperation centred about reproducing capitalism constructs an image of modern society that largely agrees with Arendt commentary on the dominance of the Social. These mechanisms suggest that capitalism has entrenched itself into modern society and continually recreates itself. To Marxists, failing to solve this through revolutions based only on political freedom is “illusionary and hypocritical” in providing genuine opportunities for natality.^[109] This occurs in two ways: (1) capitalism prevents revolutions from occurring and, failing that, (2) politics becomes merely devoted to reproducing capitalism

C It’s a trap! – Stifling Revolution

Only focusing on the political allows for revolutions themselves to be stifled as it may be antithetical to capitalist interests. Marx maintains that capitalism’s dominance causes all political actions in modern democracies to be influenced through the process of “democratic swindle”.^[110] Democratic swindle, a form of violence and cooperation, involves the bourgeoisie maintaining “popular opinion [to remain]... satisfactory to its class interests”.^[111] This includes providing “minimum of concessions” such as allowing different democratic forms to be applied in society (e.g. direct democracy).^[112] However ultimately these concessions fail to actually address capitalism’s exploitative and reproductive tendency. This is similar to the Gramscian conception of cultural hegemony.^[113] Both explain that proletariat remains supportive of capitalist systems because of the bourgeoisie’s manipulation of accepted cultural norms to capture their support.

This process is demonstrated throughout the various workers’ movements of the 20^th century.^[114] With the ongoing fears of a communist revolution and growing workers solidarity, many of these movements were integrated into the capitalist system through tokenistic concession (e.g. improving working conditions and corporate social responsibility).^[115] These reforms, while superficially demonstrating change, removed the revolutionary impetus of these workers’ movements and allowed for capitalism to perpetuate.^[116] The actual innovative action of taking revolt to replace capitalism is thus prevented.

D (Un)Innovative Revolutionary Politics

Marxian theories of revolution demonstrates even if a revolution along Arendt’s conception was to occur (i.e. direct and deliberative democratic are created), genuine innovation is still not possible.

Post-revolutionary political action taken without addressing capitalism’s reproductive tendency is a process of false hope. Despite the creation of genuine public spaces where individuals can gather and discuss politics, all action undertaken in these areas is not new. The ‘newness’ of human activity is inherently limited in terms of what it can create as it is confined to maintaining the reproduction of capitalism. This creates a sense of confined freedom and innovation as anything that is against capitalism’s interests is prevented from being deliberated and implemented under the new government. Political revolutions will therefore only be creating more spaces for the expansion and discussion of capitalism instead of a discussion on other political matters even after the revolution has occurred.^[117] This is fatal to Arendt’s theory as a revolution as it is wilfully blind to the lack of innovation occurring in these new governments.

Additionally, Arendt’s decision to ignore the social and exploitative capitalist structures allows modern society’s class society to remain in place.^[118] The class system suppresses individuality as anything done in a class society is not done as individuals, rather is perceived as being undertaken by members of a class.^[119] Failing to address the material conditions in society, Arendt’s focus on political freedom is not actually able to create public spaces conducive to humans achieving natality. Instead, it allows for the continued existence of a class society that homogenises the actions of its members instead of recognising individuals.^[120]

While Arendt believes the American Revolution was “so triumphantly successful” in innovatively creating a new government,^[121] Marx’s critique on capitalism’s reproductive capacity demonstrates that this is disingenuous. The American Revolution was ultimately “self-limiting” as its focus on creating stable political government “tempered” the innovative capacity of the revolutionaries.^[122] This allowed for the free growth of egotistical capitalist principles which come to dominate US society today.^[123]

E The Need for More

Marx’s historical analysis of capitalism’s mechanisms demonstrates its tendency for reproduction. Under capitalism, new forms of government and public spaces created through revolution merely promote its re-creation. As such, these new forms and spaces are never able to create anything “innovative” in the sense that Arendt believes they can. Arendt’s focus on public spaces for action must be further liberated from the effects of capitalism itself to genuinely creatives opportunities for innovation and revolution.

IV EXCLUSIVE REVOLUTIONS

A ‘Liberated’ Revolutionaries

A crucial aspect to Arendt’s theory of revolution relates to the identity of the revolutionaries. Arendt argues that maintaining a political focus in revolutions means only the privileged few who have been freed from the constraints of necessity can engage with it.^[124] This aligns with her broader views that only a household ruler, who has been liberated from its domestic necessities, can freely access public spaces and engage in innovation. Having been liberated from the burdens of labour and necessity, this privileged group, called the “hommes de lettres”,^[125] are not concerned with their “private happiness”.^[126] Their liberated state means “politically, they are the best”^[127] as they have the capacity to be “passionate [about participating] in public affairs”. ^[128] Arendt’s elitist conceptions of revolutionaries ensures the social will not be able to invade the public space. As such, revolutions can exclusively remain focused on the domain of political action and innovation.

Unlike the “hommes de lettres”, those who “live in truly miserable [conditions]”^[129] (les malheurexu) cannot experience this passion for freedom^[130] and therefore are not capable of true revolutionary action.^[131] In Arendt’s conception of vita activa, these “miserable” people are those still bound to the necessity of labour and trapped in the household’s violence.^[132] Allowing the les malheurexu to revolt creates the risk that revolutions, instead of focusing on political freedom for innovation, will involve the violent struggle of the social question.^[133] Arendt believes that part of the reason the French Revolution turned to the social question was due to the “masses of the people” being included as revolutionaries. Despite their desperate poverty, the masses “burst into the open” and forced the new republic to focus on liberating them from “wretchedness”^[134] instead of political freedom. This ultimately led to terror and the revolution’s failure instead of innovative political action.^[135]

Arendt acknowledges her exclusive attitude when she references that resolving politics and freedom as “the province of elites”^[136] will “spell the end of general suffrage”.^[137] However, her rejection of “mass politics itself”^[138] allows revolutions to avoid the dooming effects of “terror” and protects humanity’s ability to innovate thus achieving natality.^[139]

Despite her strict vision on privileged revolutionaries, the historical realities associated with Arendt’s endorsement of direct participatory democracy/councils as the means of political revolutions^[140] undermines her elitist arguments. To Marxian revolutionary politics, this contradiction demonstrates that revolutions undertaken by labourers can also create genuine opportunities for innovation and diminishes the explanatory power of Arendt’s theory.

B Hungarian Revolution/Council System

Arendt praises the revolutionary and worker councils of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as the ideal model for the participatory democratic system that she supports.^[141] She stresses that the revolution’s appeal was based on its “political rather than social or economic” aims.^[142] As a “spontaneous uprising” it excluded the social question by having their “chief concern” focus on forming a “new government”.^[143] These councils achieved this by creating ‘free’ public spaces for individuals to take political action that demonstrated their distinctive individuality and allowed for innovation.^[144]

However, Arendt appears to ignore the fact that the 1956 revolution was driven primarily by labourers.^[145] Her characterisation pretends that it is “entirely accidental that the workers’ councils”, which spontaneously emerged in the revolution, were from “factories and offices”.^[146] Adding to her contradictions, she ignores the fact that many of their demands^[147] were related to social and economic issues including “worker or... material conditions”.^[148] She attempts to justifies her separation of the political and economic demands of the revolution by explaining the separate councils were created to address them individually.^[149] Specifically, she explains that the “Workers' Councils were supposed to handle economic life” while the “Revolutionary Councils fulfilled mainly political functions”.^[150] This characterisation is ultimately unconvincing as she ignores her own assessment that the two councils are actually the “same organisation”.^[151]

Arendt deepens her contradictions on this matter at other points in her writings. Arendt claims the animal laborans [i.e. labourers] are incapable of revealing their individuality and “hence for action and speech”.^[152] However she later concedes they have “probably [the] promising chapter of recent history”.^[153]

The contradiction between her “favourable judgement [of the] political action” undertaken by ordinary working people, and her “elitist side” is “hard to reconcile”.^[154] Ultimately her contradictory account indicates that her insistence on only “leisured aristocrats”^[155] being able to initiate revolution that focuses on political freedom is untrue. The historical analysis demonstrates that the revolutionaries were “ordinary people” who, despite not being “raised above the need for labour”,^[156] were still able to initiate revolutions focused on political freedom council democracy. This inconsistency therefore limits the explanatory power of Arendt’s theory of revolution.

C Deformed revolution under Arendt

As such, applying a Marxist lens to Arendt’s methodology of solely prioritising political freedom in revolutions demonstrates the consequences of its failure to account for material concerns. It allows capitalism’s reproductive tendency to remain in place and inhibit human innovation in public political spheres. It also leads into an elitist revolutionary theory which is inconsistent with her own examples. Consequently, the explanatory power of Arendt’s vision of revolution is unable to acheive humanity’s ontological desire for natality and instead it remains “a chimera”.^[157]

V MARX’S ADEQUATE REVOLUTION

Through this critique of Arendt’s revolutionary politics, an alternative conception of achieving humanity’s capacity for natality through revolution can be developed. This alternative methodology is based off Marxist principles of purely addressing material conditions through revolution to produce the opportunity for human innovation (i.e. natality).^[158]

However, this part will also demonstrate Arendt’s critiques are partially correct. They predict that purely focusing on the material, as Marxian revolutionary theory requires, is also unable to achieve natality. This ultimately demonstrates that political freedoms, although they cannot be the sole goal of revolutions, are still required to achieve natality.

A The Material Revolution

As discussed, Marx applies a historical materialist lens to demonstrate that humanity’s innovative spirit can only be achieved where the revolution addresses issues that “may not take on the political form”.^[159] In particular, the struggle of revolution must “imagine a new society” that rejects capitalism’s systemic exploitation to allow humans to exercise their constituent power and innovative capacity.^[160] This requires a conception of revolution that will address forms of exploitation that Arendt neglects through her focus on political freedom.

Furthermore, as revolution must be directed towards the existing capitalist structure, it can only occur where the exploited are the revolutionaries. As such, to achieve humanity’s innovative spirit and natality, only the workers/proletariat can revolt.^[161]

B Rupture and Revolution

Marxism conceives of revolution as an inevitable process under capitalism.^[162] The process of producing and reproducing capitalism creates an antagonistic and exploitative relationship between the capitalist and proletariat. This exploitative relationship allows for inequality between the classes to increase and “progressively separate”^[163] the two.

1 Class Conscious, Struggle and Revolution

Economic contradiction between the classes and the proletariat’s increased cooperation through shared grievances creates class consciousness.^[164] Growing class consciousness allows the proletariat to recognise its identity as a class in opposition to the bourgeoisie.^[165] This involves the proletariat realising that its labour power has been constrained into reproducing the commodities and social conditions required for capitalism.^[166] As such, it prompts the proletariat to redirect its labour power away from reproducing capitalism. Antonio Negri describes this as capitalism creating the “social individual”^[167] (i.e. conscious proletariat) who is the “explosive element” that will “blow [capitalism’s] foundation sky-high”.^[168] This ‘individual’ recognises the proletariat are the foundation of the capitalist system^[169] and can take control of it to create the conditions for the “demise of capitalism”.^[170]

2 Marxian Innovation

By removing capitalism’s oppressive and “impersonal laws”, proletariat cooperation becomes a form of “social living labour”.^[171] Embracing living labour as a conception of revolution (i.e. directly addressing capitalism/the social) responds to the concerns raised about revolutions which are solely focused on political freedom (i.e. Arendt).

First, revolution as a form of innovative action is not prevented. Instead, the proletariat becomes the revolutionary “force that bursts apart [from the] pre-existing equilibrium”^[172] of the capitalist world. This allows for them to innovatively exercise their power during revolution by tearing down the existing system of capitalism. Subsequently, the labour of the proletariat is no longer dedicated to continually reproducing capitalism. This allows the proletariat to engage in action outside of reproducing conditions of capitalism. Specifically, the cooperation of workers^[173] can be channelled into transforming society including an innovative “communist redefinition of all activates and all interdependences”.^[174] The proletariat can thus dedicate themselves to creating “a new, alternative formation of society”^[175] not one focused on reproducing capitalism.

This Marxian revolution avoids becoming the elitist conception that Arendt believes is necessary. As the exploited, the proletariat are the majority who must cooperate to overcome capitalism’s oppression and achieve a state of living labour. Focusing on addressing material means through revolution thus gives the exploited proletariat the “positive power to assert their true individuality”.^[176] As part of the overthrow of capitalism, the exploitative class system is also removed.^[177] Without classes, which tends to homogenise the conduct of its members, previous acts of uniformity are replaced by genuine individual action. Despite Arendt’s contention that material revolutions are associated with the repetitive process of labour, it actually creates clear distinctions between individuals required for them to experience natality.

C Political Vacuum within Marx

Examining Marxian revolutionary politics in this light would suggest that humanity’s desire to achieve natality is exclusively possible through material revolutions. However, prioritising of material freedoms (i.e. seizing control of the means of production and freedom from bourgeois domination) to the detriment of other considerations including political freedom can have a in a dangerous implications for humanity’s ability to achieve natality.

Marx conceived of political freedom in a similar manner to Arendt as “a socially protected space” for people to pursue “particular ends that they set for themselves” without intrusion. However, his writing on revolutions paid “remarkably little attention”^[178] to it. Revealing his largely ambivalent attitude towards “political emancipation”,^[179] this attitude can be explained through his belief that it was ultimately a “bourgeoisie freedom”.^[180] Given the bourgeoisie society was going to be dissolved through the revolution, political freedom is not required to protect humanity’s innovative capacity in a communist society.^[181]

However, failing to provide clear guidance on the condition of political freedoms while prioritising material freedoms has led to damaging practical consequences for Marxist regimes.^[182] Instead of advancing humanity’s innovative capacity through economic freedom, “so-called Marxist regimes” have historically applied “instruments of repression”^[183] in the process of revolution.

As discussed in Part 1, Arendt’s warnings on a violent and oppressive method of achieving revolutions dedicated to Social Question become relevant here. Given its focus on the social question, Arendt views the Russian Revolution, perhaps the most famous Marxist revolution, in the same light as the French Revolution. Both are a “deformed revolution” that applied “violence” and “oppression” in its attempt to address material conditions. While people may be free from exploitation by capitalism, the political repression that accompanied it destroyed the capacity of innovative human conduct.^[184] Instead, individual expressions were treated as dissidence and anti-revolutionary.^[185] This allows for “techniques of domination”^[186] to be applied in promoting a singular vision of the future.^[187] Ignoring the political freedoms that Arendt discuss thus created a regime that was equally as oppressive as the very economic exploitation it sought to free people from.^[188] This demonstrates that solely focusing on material concerns in Marxian revolutions are also too narrow to achieve humanity’s capacity for natality.

VI SYNTHESIS

A Joining Giants

In summary, the critique of Arendt’s method of prioritising political freedom in revolutions demonstrates it is inadequate as a method to actualise humanity’s ability to exercise natality. The overemphasises it places on the importance of political freedom, to the detriment of material oppression, inhibits genuinely innovative outcomes. However, attempting to address those concerns through a methodology that solely focuses on material freedom, under Marxian visions of revolution, undervalues political freedoms in the interim.

While this may create a defeatist attitude towards both, this essay suggests synthesising the two methods is possible. At their core both share an uplifting dedication towards securing some form of natality for humans to exercise during the revolution and constructing the post-revolutionary world.

A synthesised approach to revolution involves combining key aspects of Arendt and Marxian revolution theory. This essay recommends that revolutions involve a process of creating of politically free public spaces that are dedicated to overcoming exploitative material conditions in society. This combination accommodates Arendt’s requirement for a separated public space where political action can freely occur. It also addresses any material conditions that may restrict the actions and capacities revolutionaries which Marxian conceptions warn is required to achieve human innovation/natality through revolution.

B Blurring the Private/Public – the Hungarian Counterattack

While Arendt suggests that public spaces cannot be genuinely free where they consider material issues,^[189] the Hungarian Revolution suggests this synthesis is possible. In particular. the collaboration of workers’ and revolutionary councils in support of the 1956 revolution demonstrates this.^[190] Although they appeared separate, as discussed above, these councils were actually often the “same organisations” (e.g. Transdanubian National Council (TNC)). Together these councils worked to address both material and political conditions. While Hungary was not a capitalist country in 1956, the workers’ council focused on addressing the economic exploitation and coercion of workers at the hands of the Rákosian “factory triangles”.^[191] The factory triangles referred to the exploitation of workers from factory directors, party secretaries and trade union representatives.^[192] Concurrently, the revolutionary councils focused on creating public spaces that allowed for politically free actions via deeds and speech.^[193]

The council democracy of the Hungarian revolution thus addressed both material and political freedoms to change the “the cold war status quo”^[194] for the people of Hungarian. As such, the dual focus of the revolutionaries in 1956 demonstrates that synthesis is possible and effective to ensure revolutions allow individuals to achieve natality.^[195] Admittedly, while the Hungarian Revolution ultimately failed this was due to external intervention by the Soviet Union and not from internal collapses as Arendt argues will occur.

VII CONCLUSION

Overall, Arendt’s prioritisation of political freedoms in revolutionary theory is insufficient in achieving humanity desire for natality. However, totally embracing its opposite form of Marxian revolutionary theory focused on resolving material conditions results in an equally as oppressive experience that fails to achieve natality. Instead, they can and must be balanced into a synthesised methodology that overcomes the shortcomings of the other and creates genuine opportunities for humanity to achieve natality.

VIII BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Books/Articles

A Matthias, ‘Hannah Arendt on work and being human. Labour, work and action’ Daily Philosophy (2020) <https://daily-philosophy.com/arendt-on-work-and-being-human/>.

Alan Bullock, Stephen Trombley, The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (HarperCollins, 3^rd ed 1999)

Andrea Veltman, ‘Simone de Beauvoir and Hannah Arendt on Labor’ (2010) 25(1) Hypatia 55

Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State (University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

Avonlea Fisher, ‘Arendt on the Role of the Social Question in the Modern Revolutionary Tradition’ (Working Paper, Bard College at Simon’s Rock, 24 February 2017) 2

Charles Barbour, 'The Republican and the Communist: Arendt Reading Marx (Reading Arendt)’ in Jernej Habjan and Jessica Whyte (ed), (Mis)readings of Marx in Continental Philosophy (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

Dmitriy Gershenson and Herschel I.Grossman, ‘Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union’ (Working Paper No 17, Independent Institute, 1999)

Frederick Neuhouser, Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy (Routledge, 2018)

Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, Marx-Engels Collected Works (Progress Publishers)

Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, The German Ideology (International Publishers, 1970)

Gerald Dworkin, ‘Marx and Mill: A Dialogue’ (1966) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26(3) 403-414

Hal Draper, ‘Marx on Democratic Forms of Government’ (1974) The Socialist Register 11 101-124

Hannah Arendt, 'The Cold War and the West', (1962) Partisan Review 19

Hannah Arendt, ‘Thoughts on Poverty, Misery, and the Great Revolutions of History’ (2017) 14(2) The New England Review 1

Hannah Arendt, ‘Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution’ (1958) 20(1) The Journal of Politics 5-43

Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (The Viking Press, 1965)

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, The University of Chicago, 1998)

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Schocken Books, 1951)

Ian T. King, ‘Political Economy and the "Laws of Beauty": Aesthetics, Economics, and Materialism in Marx’ (1991) 55(3) Science & Society 323

Irving Louis Horowitz, ‘On Revolution. by Hannah Arendt’ (1964) 69(4) American Journal of Sociology 419-421

James Garratt, Music and Politics: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2019)

James Miller, History and human existence (University of California Press, 1982)

Jeffrey C. Isaac, ‘Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on Democratic Politics’ (1994) The American Political Science Review 88(1) 156-168

Joseph V. Femia, Marxism and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1993)

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Progress Publishers 2^nd ed, 1977)

Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1, (Progress Publishers, 1887)

Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 3, (Progress Publishers, 1887)

Karl Marx, Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959)

Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Penguin Books Limited, 2005)

Margaret Canovan, ‘The Contradictions of Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought’ (1978) Political Theory 6(1) 5-26

Mark Neocleous, ‘International Law as Primitive Accumulation; Or, the Secret of Systematic Colonization’ (2012) 23(4) The European Journal of International Law 941-962

Maurizio Passerin d'entrèves, ‘Freedom, plurality, solidarity: Hannah Arendt's theory of action’ (1989) 15(4) Philosophy & Social Criticism 317-350

Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (Routledge, 1993)

Nakjung Kim, ‘Marx’s Concept of Freedom as a Normative Foundation of Dialectic in Capital (2004) Political Science at York University 14

Paul Voice, ‘Labour, work and action’ in Patrick Hayden (ed), Hannah Arendt Key Concepts (London: Routledge, 2014)

Sidney Hook, ‘Myth and Fact in the Marxist Theory of Revolution and Violence’ (1973) Journal of the History of Ideas 34(2) 271-280

St James Press, St. James Encyclopedia of Labor History Worldwide (as at 18 August 2003) Hungarian Revolution and Workers Councils 443

Stefan Auer, ‘The revolutions of 1989 revisited’ Eurozone (Article 20034) <https://www.eurozine.com/the-revolutions-of-1989-revisited/#anchor-footnote-23>

Thomas Sowell, ‘Karl Marx and the Freedom of the Individual’ (1963) Ethics 73(2) 119-125

Trevor Norris, ‘Hannah Arendt & Jean Baudrillard: Pedagogy in the Consumer Society’ (2006) 25 Studies in Philosophy and Education 457

B Other

Arendt, Arendt and the Human Condition’ (1, UNSW Law, Dr Daniel McLoughlin, 2021)

Negri, Constituent Power in the later Marx (1, UNSW Law, Dr Daniel McLoughlin, 2021).

UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, A/3592, Official Records, 11th sess, Supp No. 18 (A/3592) p. 69.

---

^[1] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, The University of Chicago, 1998) 8-9, 247.

^[2] Paul Voice, ‘Labour, work and action’ in Patrick Hayden (ed), Hannah Arendt Key Concepts (London: Routledge, 2014) 36, 41.

^[3] Hannah Arendt, ‘Thoughts on Poverty, Misery, and the Great Revolutions of History’ (2017) 14(2) The New England Review 1, 2.

^[4] ‘Arendt’, Arendt and the Human Condition’ (1, UNSW Law, Dr Daniel McLoughlin, 2021).

^[5] Arendt (n 1) 23.

^[6] Voice (n 2) 41.

^[7] Charles Barbour, 'The Republican and the Communist: Arendt Reading Marx (Reading Arendt)’ in Jernej Habjan and Jessica Whyte (ed), (Mis)readings of Marx in Continental Philosophy (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 51, 56.

^[8] Arendt (n 1) 7.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Andrea Veltman, ‘Simone de Beauvoir and Hannah Arendt on Labor’ (2010) 25(1) Hypatia 55, 61.

^[11] Voice (n 2) 37-41.

^[12] Ibid 37.

^[13] Arendt (n 1) 103-4

^[14] Barbour (n 7) 56.

^[15] Voice (n 2) 40.

^[16] Ibid.

^[17] A Matthias, ‘Hannah Arendt on work and being human. Labour, work and action’ Daily Philosophy (2020) <https://daily-philosophy.com/arendt-on-work-and-being-human/>.

^[18] Voice (n 2) 47.

^[19] Arendt (n 1) 22.

^[20] Ibid 25; Barbour (n 7) 56.

^[21] Arendt (n 1) 26.

^[22] Ibid 77.

^[23] Voice (n 2) 44.

^[24] Arendt (n 1) 179.

^[25] Ibid 7, 26; Voice (n 2(47).

^[26] Voice (n 2) 46; Avonlea Fisher, ‘Arendt on the Role of the Social Question in the Modern Revolutionary Tradition’ (Working Paper, Bard College at Simon’s Rock, 24 February 2017) 2, 6.

^[27] Arendt (n 1) 200; Voice (n 2) 46; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Schocken Books, 1951) 190.

^[28] Voice (n 2) 41.

^[29] Loosely translates to: I Came, I Spoke, I Performed.

^[30] Arendt (n 1) 32; Fisher (n 26) 4.

^[31] Arendt (n 1) 32-33.

^[32] Arendt (n 3) 5.

^[33] Arendt (n 1) 13; Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (Routledge, 1993) 45.

^[34] Arendt (n 1) 31.

^[35] Ibid 5.

^[36] Ibid.

^[37] Voice (n 2)45; Arendt (n 27) 204.

^[38] Trevor Norris, ‘Hannah Arendt & Jean Baudrillard: Pedagogy in the Consumer Society’ (2006) 25 Studies in Philosophy and Education 457.

^[39] Arendt (n 1) 24, 28, 30.

^[40] Arendt (n 1) 32; Norris (n 38) 462.

^[41] Arendt (n 1) 30.

^[42] Voice (n 2) 37.

^[43] Fisher (n 26) 1.

^[44] Arendt (n 1) 32.

^[45] Ibid.

^[46] Voice (n 2) 41.

^[47] Arendt (n 1) 28.

^[48] Arendt (n 1) 316.

^[49] d'Entreves (n 33) 45.

^[50] Ibid 8, 45.

^[51] Arendt (n 1) 321.

^[52] Ibid 157.

^[53] Ibid 89.

^[54] Arendt (n 1) 125-126.

^[55] Ibid 25.

^[56] d'Entreves (n 45) 8.

^[57] Arendt (n 1) 209.

^[58] Voice (n 2) 42

^[59] Fisher (n 26) 1.

^[60] Norris (n 38).

^[61] Irving Louis Horowitz, ‘On Revolution. by Hannah Arendt’ (1964) 69(4) American Journal of Sociology 419-421.

^[62] Voice (n 2) 42

^[63] Arendt (n 1) 76; McLoughlin (n 4).

^[64] Norris (n 38) 464.

^[65] Arendt (n 1) 126, 209, Fisher (n 26) 6.

^[66] Barbour (n 7) 57.

^[67] McLoughlin (n 4).

^[68] McLoughlin (n 4); Maurizio Passerin d'entrèves, ‘Freedom, plurality, solidarity: Hannah Arendt's theory of action’ (1989) 15(4) Philosophy & Social Criticism 317-350, 317.

^[69] McLoughlin (n 4).

^[70] Ardent (n 3) 15.

^[71] Ibid 5.

^[72] Ibid.

^[73] Ibid.

^[74] Hannah Arendt, ‘Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution’ (1958) 20(1) The Journal of Politics 5-43, 28-30.

^[75] McLoughlin (n 4).

^[76] Arendt (n 3) 12.

^[77] Voice (n 2) 46

^[78] Arendt (n 3) 12.

^[79] Ibid.

^[80] Arendt (n 3) 1-12; Fisher (n 26) 1-2

^[81] Ardent (n 3) 12.

^[82] Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (The Viking Press, 1965) 277.

^[83] Arendt (n 1) 122.

^[84] Arendt (n 3) 12.

^[85] Ibid.

^[86] Ibid.

^[87] Ibid 16.

^[88] Arendt (n 3) 3-5, Arendt (n 82) 246.

^[89] Arendt (n 82) 59-115.

^[90] McLoughlin (n 4).

^[91] Fisher (n 26) 7- 8.

^[92] Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State (University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 266.

^[93] Ian T. King, ‘Political Economy and the "Laws of Beauty": Aesthetics, Economics, and Materialism in Marx’ (1991) 55(3) Science & Society 323, 327.

^[94] Negri (n 92) 334, Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, The German Ideology (International Publishers, 1970) 154.

^[95] Gerald Dworkin, ‘Marx and Mill: A Dialogue’ (1966) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26(3) 403-414, 405; Karl Marx, Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959) 101.

^[96] Ibid.

^[97] Negri (n 92) 334.

^[98] Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1, (Progress Publishers, 1887) 724.

^[99] Negri (n 92) 251.

^[100] Marx (n 98) 895.

^[101] Marx (n 98) 513, 533–534; Mark Neocleous, ‘International Law as Primitive Accumulation; Or, the Secret of Systematic Colonization’ (2012) 23(4) The European Journal of International Law 941-962, 951.

^[102] Marx (n 98) 508.

^[103] Ibid 507-508

^[104] Negri (n 92) 254-256; Marx (n 98) 729-30, 929-30; Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 3, (Progress Publishers, 1887) 569.

^[105] Negri (n 92) 254-256.

^[106] Marx (n 98) 716.

^[107] Negri (n 92) 258-263.

^[108] Ibid.

^[109] Marx (n 98) 416.

^[110] Hal Draper, ‘Marx on Democratic Forms of Government’ (1974) The Socialist Register 11 101-124, 116-117.

^[111] Ibid.

^[112] Ibid.

^[113] Alan Bullock, Stephen Trombley, The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (HarperCollins, 3^rd ed 1999) 387–88.

^[114] Negri, Constituent Power in the later Marx (1, UNSW Law, Dr Daniel McLoughlin, 2021).

^[115] Ibid.

^[116] Draper (n 110) 116-117.

^[117] Ibid.

^[118] Ibid.

^[119] Thomas Sowell, ‘Karl Marx and the Freedom of the Individual’ (1963) Ethics 73(2) 119-125, 120.

^[120] Engels & Marx (n 94) 75.

^[121] Hannah Arendt (n 82) 49.

^[122] Stefan Auer, ‘The revolutions of 1989 revisited’ Eurozone (Article 20034) <https://www.eurozine.com/the-revolutions-of-1989-revisited/#anchor-footnote-23>.

^[123] McLoughlin (n 4).

^[124] Arendt (n 3) 12.

^[125] Translates to: Men of letters

^[126] Horowitz (n 61); Arendt (n 82) 13, 279.

^[127] Arendt (n 82) 279.

^[128] Horowitz (n 61); Arendt (n 82) 13, 279.

^[129] Arendt (n 3) 6-10.

^[130] Ibid.

^[131] Ibid.

^[132] Ibid.

^[133] Ibid.

^[134] Ibid.

^[135] Ibid.

^[136] Jeffrey C. Isaac, ‘Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on Democratic Politics’ (1994) The American Political Science Review 88(1) 156-168, 157.

^[137] Arendt (n 82) 279.

^[138] Isaac (n 136) 157.

^[139] Arendt (n 82) 280.

^[140] Margaret Canovan, ‘The Contradictions of Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought’ (1978) Political Theory 6(1) 5-26.

^[141] Arendt (n 82) 296; Hannah Arendt, 'The Cold War and the West', (1962) Partisan Review 19 cited in Canovan (n 140) 12.

^[142] Ibid.

^[143] Ibid.

^[144] Ibid.

^[145] Barbour (n 7) 59.

^[146] Ibid.

^[147] UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, A/3592, Official Records, 11th sess, Supp No. 18 (A/3592) p. 69.

^[148] Barbour (n 7) 59.

^[149] Arendt (n 74) 28-29

^[150] Ibid.

^[151] Ibid.

^[152] Arendt (n 1) 193.

^[153] Arendt (n 1) 193

^[154] Canovan (n 140) 7

^[155] Ibid. 16

^[156] Ibid. 7

^[157] Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, Marx-Engels Collected Works (Progress Publishers) 489.

^[158] Negri (n 92) 260-263.

^[159] Barbour (n 7) 63.

^[160] James Garratt, Music and Politics: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 62.

^[161] Sidney Hook, ‘Myth and Fact in the Marxist Theory of Revolution and Violence’ (1973) Journal of the History of Ideas 34(2) 271-280.

^[162] Negri (n92) 262.

^[163] Ibid.

^[164] Dworkin (n 95).

^[165] Ibid.

^[166] Marx (n 98) 724; Nakjung Kim, ‘Marx’s Concept of Freedom as a Normative Foundation of Dialectic in Capital (2004) Political Science at York University 14.

^[167] Negri (n 92) 264.

^[168] Negri (n 92) 264; Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Penguin Books Limited, 2005) 705-706.

^[169] Marx (n 168) 706

^[170] James Miller, History and human existence (University of California Press, 1982) 2.

^[171] Negri (n 92).

^[172] Ibid 10-11.

^[173] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Progress Publishers 2^nd ed, 1977)

^[174] Negri (n 92) 334.

^[175] Ibid.

^[176] Sowell (n 119) 119-120.

^[177] Ibid.

^[178] Ibid.

^[179] Frederick Neuhouser, Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy (Routledge, 2018) 158.

^[180] Ibid.

^[181] Ibid 160.

^[182] Joseph V. Femia, Marxism and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1993) 1-2.

^[183] Ibid.

^[184] Dmitriy Gershenson and Herschel I.Grossman, ‘Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union’ (Working Paper No 17, Independent Institute, 1999).

^[185] Ibid.

^[186] Arendt (n 74) 11.

^[187] Gershenson & Grossman (n 184).

^[188] Ibid.

^[189] Arendt (n 74).

^[190] St James Press, St. James Encyclopedia of Labor History Worldwide (as at 18 August 2003) Hungarian Revolution and Workers Councils 443.

^[191] Ibid.

^[192] Ibid.

^[193] Ibid.

^[194] Ibid.

^[195] Ibid.