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University of New South Wales Law Journal Student Series |
RESPICE AD ASTRA: A CRITICAL NEGOTIATION PRIOR TO THE 1986 CHALLENGER SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH VIEWED THROUGH THE LENS OF PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION
LISA-MARIE RIZZO
Late on the evening of 27 January 1986, engineer Robert Ebeling wearily commented to his wife about the space shuttle due to launch the following day: ‘It’s going to blow up’.[1] Tragically, his prediction bore out. Challenger, with seven people on board, came apart some 73 seconds after lift-off. Bearing knowledge of a specific safety concern, Mr Ebeling and his colleagues had attempted to persuade their employer, Morton-Thiokol Corporation, to postpone the launch of Challenger. However, after discussing their concerns, their managers recommended the opposite.
I INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the negotiation between Morton-Thiokol (‘Thiokol’) engineers and managers on the eve of the launch of Challenger, to draw out an analysis of what happened, and why. I apply the seven elements of the principled negotiation model to the negotiation to demonstrate how the parties may have achieved a better outcome. I conclude that principled negotiation is preferable to the approach taken by the Thiokol engineers. Despite the intervening time since the Challenger tragedy, the findings of this paper are indicative of how the tools of principled negotiation remain relevant in the present day.
II A MEETING BETWEEN COLLEAGUES, OR A NEGOTIATION?
It is estimated than less than half the conversations between employees and their managers at the workplace amount to a negotiation. Porter and Roberts indicate around two-thirds of communication from managers is vertical, or top-down.[2] One-way messages directed towards employees are inherently non-negotiable.
In their seminal book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Roger Fisher and William Ury with Bruce Patton define negotiation as ‘back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.’[3] Using that as a working definition, I will briefly review each component of the definition to establish whether the discussion between Thiokol engineers and their managers on the evening of 27 January 1986 was, in fact, a negotiation.
Firstly, it was imperative that the Thiokol engineers and managers used back-and-forth communication to resolve the question as to whether it was safe for the mission to proceed. Anticipating a challenge to their recommendation not to launch, the engineers prepared fourteen charts with information for their managers to digest and critique, including photos of the damage to the shuttles on previous flights.[4] Scorch marks were a deliberate visual cue of the flammable propellant that had previously escaped and, in their opinion, would again on this launch. Their plan succeeded initially: the management team of Thiokol were persuaded that the Challenger launch should not proceed.[5]
As for an intention to communicate for the purpose of reaching an agreement, a teleconference was organised to discuss ‘concerns with the low temperatures and the potential problem with the O-rings’.[6] Their authority insufficient to postpone the launch, the Thiokol engineers were alive to the need to persuade their managers of their imperative. Senior flight engineers and shuttle program managers took part in the teleconference across three locations: the Thiokol plant in Utah, the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama (‘MSFC’) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (‘NASA’) Kennedy Space Centre (‘Kennedy’) in Cape Canaveral, Florida.[7]
As for the two sides of the negotiation, they were a) those opposed to the Challenger space shuttle launch on 28 January 1986 (Thiokol engineers and initially Thiokol management), and b) those in support of the launch (NASA managers and later, Thiokol management).
With regard to interests, we may assume both sides had a view primarily to ensure the safety of the crew and equipment.[8] However, after flagging to NASA executives at MSFC an intention not to recommend a launch, divergent interests within Thiokol later became apparent. What Argyris describes as the contrast between espoused theory, ‘what we say we do’ (protect safety), and theory-in-use, or ‘what we actually do’ (protect contract prospects)[9] became apparent. Despite being apprised of the risks and the absence of a single positive statement in favour of the launch, the four Thiokol managers, after discussion amongst themselves, reversed their decision. They endorsed the Challenger launch as safe to proceed.[10]
As each element of the definition is satisfied, it is clear that the meeting on 27 January 1986 was a negotiation.
Ultimately, however, the engineers failed to achieve what they sought from the negotiation, and the consequences were fatal.[11] Detail of what was discussed during the negotiation is available via the Rogers Commission Report, ordered after the loss of Challenger by the then-President of the United States.[12] The report supplies a unique and detailed narrative into the negotiation that evening.[13] Scholars such as Diane Vaughan have further contributed to the literature on Challenger; in her research she describes reviewing around 130,000 pages in relation to the tragedy.[14]
III HOW THE FATE OF A CITRUS CROP LED TO A STRONG PREMONITION OF MISSION FAILURE
Few people would associate a failed citrus crop, at that time the worst in Florida’s history, with the prospects of a space shuttle launch. In January 1985, the year prior to the ill-fated Challenger mission, Roger Boisjoly, a Thiokol engineer colleague to Ebeling, recalled the recording-breaking cold temperature in Orlando, Florida, on the day of another shuttle launch, Discovery. Having noticed the chill himself that day, the temperature had made the news, not least for the unprecedented impact on the state’s agriculture industry.[15]
While the flight was a success, Boisjoly noted in his post-flight inspection that, for the first time, both the primary and secondary O-ring seals had been compromised.[16] The O-ring was a long, thin piece of an elastic-like material that expanded to seal the joints of the solid rocket booster, ensuring the pressurized gases remain inside the long tank during ignition. The seal must be impervious as the gases burn at a temperature of around 3,000 degrees Celsius. The combustion heat is hot enough not only to melt, but boil steel.[17]
Creating a reflexive loop from his observations, he hypothesized there to be a connection between low ambient temperature and the performance of the seal: extreme cold appeared to reduce the elasticity of the ring, rendering it less able to instantaneously expand and seal the joints. The secondary O-ring was the failsafe but if both were compromised, the flight would be lost. The evident damage to the secondary seal during the 1985 flight raised this issue to the status of mission-critical.[18]
A Seal Erosion Task Team, of which Boisjoly was appointed head, was operational from August 1985. Despite his fervour, its pace was glacial, with forty-three different solutions to the O-ring problem being considered at one point.[19] While he worked throughout 1985 to test the performance of O-rings in low temperatures, they were missing one vital piece of information: the exact temperature below which it would be too cold to launch.
On 27 January 1986, the evening before the scheduled launch of Challenger, the temperature forecast suggested an overnight low of -8 degrees Celsius at the launch site, far lower than had been experienced on any previous launch.[20] Alarmed by the implications, Boisjoly, Ebeling and their colleagues Arnold Thompson and Allan McDonald (‘the engineers’) requested a teleconference call with Thiokol managers that evening to discuss the issue. The four Thiokol managers on the call were Jerald Mason, Senior Vice President for Wasatch Operations; Joseph Kilminster, Vice President for Booster Programs; Robert Lund, Vice President for Engineering and Calvin Wiggins, Vice President for Space Projects. Other managers on the call included senior representatives from MSFC and Kennedy.
IV ANALYSIS USING THE TOOLS OF PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION
It is tempting to adopt the 20/20 clarity of hindsight to offer a critique on what could have been done differently, or better, in a situation.[21] Some observers lauded the engineers for their attempt to stop the launch, citing it as an example of ethically brave behaviour.[22] Other argue that the engineers simply didn’t argue persuasively enough[23] and could have done more.[24] Yet others criticised the Thiokol managers of succumbing to ‘groupthink’[25] or operating within ‘bounded awareness’, failing to see how easily they had transgressed very real safety considerations.[26] Whichever the view, to critique the actions of the meeting participants without a supporting framework will provide only limited epistemological value.
The analysis to follow of the negotiation between Thiokol engineers and managers is anchored by the seven elements of the principled negotiation model as developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury with Bruce Patton.[27] Contributions by practitioners and scholars of negotiation theory and practice are further included. Each element is examined in turn, with a brief description of what occurred, and a commentary on what ought to have been considered.
A Interests: Identifying the Elephant Whilst Blindfolded
We are informed by Ury that interests are the intangible motivations that lead us to take our position: our needs, desires, concerns, fears and aspirations.[28]
The key participants in the negotiation all worked at Thiokol. One might anticipate, then, that as members of the same organisation, their interests will align. However, that was manifestly not the case in this negotiation.
Publicly available documents and testimony indicate that the overarching interests of the Thiokol engineers were to ensure the safety of the crew, cargo and shuttle on each mission. As such, they entered the negotiation with a single stance: due to the expected low temperatures, there was too much risk the O-rings would fail and the launch could not proceed. Their firm position, therefore, was that the only acceptable outcome of the negotiation would be the postponement of the launch.[29]
However, this positional stance may have contributed significantly to the failure to achieve their objective. By not realistically evaluating their secondary interests, including their job security, reputations, credibility and the desire to observe organisational hierarchy, they were unable to effectively process the impact of those interests on the negotiation.[30] When their interests were challenged, they froze, unprepared and unable to respond.[31]
Nor did they consider the interests of their managers. As Ury reminds us, negotiation is a two-way street.[32] Comprehensive engagement in a negotiation necessarily requires being mindful of the interests of the other side. The primary interest of the Thiokol managers was also to ensure the safety of the crew, cargo and shuttle. The engineers were aware of this and anticipated the alignment.
Demonstrating how an elephant will feel different to people touching it whilst blindfolded, the engineers were not cognisant of other interests of the Thiokol managers,[33] including the reputation of their organisation as a reliable partner for future launch missions,[34] the contract negotiations on foot with NASA for additional boosters[35] and their perception of managerial responsibility to Thiokol.
The further interests of the managers became apparent late in the negotiation when Jerald Mason told Robert Lund to ‘take off your engineer hat and put on your management hat.’[36] It wasn’t until that late stage of the negotiation that the penny finally dropped for the engineers that other considerations were also in play.[37]
After a period of offline discussion of which they were not party, the engineers heard a recommendation would be made for the launch to proceed. They were stunned.[38] Having failed to take into account other pressures on, or considerations of, the management team, they had not anticipated the Thiokol managers would recommend anything other than to postpone the launch. Despite the offer to comment on the decision, they were silent. It was not their intention to be so – they were completely blindsided by the entirely unanticipated outcome.[39]
If the engineers had been better prepared by anticipating the divergent interests of their managers, they may have been able to discuss any prospective failure in a more robust manner or simply challenge more substantially their recommendation to launch. For example, had they been aware a negotiation meeting was scheduled between NASA and Thiokol for the renewal of the solid rocket booster contract the following day, they may have been able to articulate the importance of a problem-free launch for Challenger.
If they had been mindful of the divergent interests of their managers, the engineers may have also been motivated to couch their proposal more palatably. For instance, a presentation of the historical average temperature in Cape Canaveral, which in January was 11 degrees Celsius, would indicate a launch date might be available mere days hence[40] - certainly nowhere near as long as April of that year, as had been the indignant suggestion of an MSFC manager.[41] They could also refer back to the launch criteria: O-ring failure would be catastrophic, leading to ‘loss of life or vehicle’.[42]
Failing that, they could also articulate the ethical aspect: any decision where the loss of human life was a possible consequence was to be assiduously avoided.
B A Fair Deal: Legitimacy
Exploring the legitimacy of the deal, that is, the factors that support whether or not to launch, was a complicated factor of the meeting. Despite an attempt to approach the matter as scientifically as possible, the information on which both parties relied to make decisions lacked the necessary clarity. This occurred for a number of reasons.
To start, the data sets under consideration had considerable variation, which made it difficult for the parties to rely on standardised information for their decision. For example, estimates of O-ring failure ranged from a 1 in 100 chance by the NASA safety officer to a 1 in 100,000 chance by NASA executives.[43] There was also inconsistency in key criticality aspects, such as the classification of the O-ring redundancy – opinions within Thiokol and NASA differed as to its criticality. On most reports, the secondary seal was inexplicably regarded as a perfectly invulnerable. In other documents, its reliability was much less certain.[44]
The key obstacle for the engineers, however, was that they could not categorically confirm the lowest temperature at which it would be safe to launch.[45] This was complicated by a reverse onus arising during the meeting. Ordinarily, they would be asked to prove the launch would be safe. Due to the tone and content of questioning from NASA managers, the engineers were instead challenged to prove low temperatures would make the launch unsafe. Simply asserting it was unsafe to launch at twelve degrees Celsius, the previous lowest temperature, or less, did not make sense to MSFC, because the engineers were unable to present data correlating to their hypothesis.[46] It was only during the Rogers Commission that one of the commissioners, the renowned physicist Dr Richard Feynman, demonstrated with perfect simplicity the inability of the rubber O-ring to expand at zero degrees Celsius when he put a piece of the seal into a glass of iced water. It was the exact ambient temperature at the time of the launch.[47]
Further impacting legitimacy was that in July 1985, one of the managers at MSFC placed a launch constraint on all shuttle launches, which meant that a waiver had to be signed before each flight could proceed. But neither the constraint nor the waivers were known to the director of the shuttle programme or his senior deputies.[48] Despite Mr McDonald arguing that they were breaching launch commit criteria, the executives at MSFC disagreed, instead contending the Thiokol engineers were creating new launch commit criteria.[49]
In addition, for reasons that remain unclear, there was no appetite to escalate from the level III managers in the meeting to level II and ultimately level I executives at NASA. This factor alone could have completely changed the outcome of the mission: had the issues been escalated, the launch almost certainly would not have gone ahead.[50]
There was also the notable absence of NASA’s safety officer in the negotiation; the Rogers Commission describes the safety regime at the time as ‘silent’. A safety officer could be expected to provide neutral, objective advice on which both parties might rely. Having not been engaged in the issue, there was no such opportunity to survey his input.[51]
Compounding the issue of legitimacy were the 24 successful previous flights. Although the O-rings were a mission-critical component, the prior success of missions led to a false sense of security, thus leading Thiokol managers to a flawed calculation of risk. Unconvinced by tangential observations and seemingly lukewarm concerns, MSFC executives indicated to Thiokol managers that nothing appeared different from previous launches to suggest it would not be safe to proceed. What appeared as conjecture about safety concerns, unsupported by clear, objective data, led to MSFC executives becoming incredulous that such serious issues were being raised at, quite literally, five minutes to midnight the evening prior to launch.[52]
Unable to proffer a legitimate justification for delay, the Thiokol managers felt they had no choice but proceed with the launch. This was the point at which the negotiation with their engineers was abandoned.[53]
Legitimacy sounds a clarion call for those entering a difficult negotiation. The presentation of legitimate data, facts, laws, guidelines, processes or even enquiries can make a significant, sometimes life-saving, contribution to the persuasiveness of the argument.
C Mindful to the Present and the Future: The Relationship
Bazerman et al note that from the outset of scholarly study of the theory of negotiation, the relationship between the negotiating parties is an aspect of key importance.[54] One of the most significant factors that impacted the negotiation between engineers and their leaders at Thiokol was the pre-existing relationship.
On a fundamental level, the engineers and management team at Thiokol enjoyed a familiar, and by all accounts positive, working relationship. To an extent, their short- and long-term interests were aligned: success of the mission, and maintenance of their reputation as professional contract partners.
However, the tenets of the pre-existing relationship also doomed the parties to an uneven footing during the negotiation. There was an acknowledged hierarchy, which provided Thiokol management the prerogative to make decisions beyond the advice of their technical teams.[55] The hierarchy also influenced the engineers to feel they were not empowered to escalate their concerns for the launch with more senior people at Thiokol or NASA. They were there to make ‘engineering’ decisions, not ‘management’ decisions, and performed that role accordingly.[56] In his testimony at the Rogers Commission, Roger Boisjoly suggested that by late on the evening of 27 January 1986, he believed he had done all that he could to stop the mission.[57] One academic challenged the ‘polite’ approach of the engineers as fatal.[58] In retrospect, we can see alternatives were indeed still available at that time but it is evident that the engineers at the time did not realise they were within grasp.
A concession to hierarchy was, therefore, likely the undoing of the engineers. However, one outstanding question is why, even with the knowledge that to do so could have serious personal consequences, the engineers did not take their concerns further, either to more senior managers at Thiokol, NASA executives, the media, or countless other individuals or organisations. This was an issue where the consequences were of life or death. Yet they appeared not to contemplate taking it upon themselves to alert others to subvert the ill-fated launch.
To this question we look to Lewicki et al, who postulate the likelihood of the existence of a future relationship between parties will impact the negotiation itself. This perceived consequence was evident in this particular negotiation; the viability of their future relationship was a severe constraint.[59] Aware of the reporting lines both within Thiokol and across to the higher levels in NASA, the engineers perceived it was ‘not the done thing’ to escalate issues outside reporting lines. Not wanting to be seen as disrespecting authority, and accepting that the final call was ‘a management decision’, against their better judgement, they fell into line. The consequences were grave.[60]
Paradoxically, while they resisted acting that evening for what appeared to be fear of losing their jobs, being ostracized or blamed for any subsequent negative fallout, those exact outcomes did transpire for a number of the engineers. Roger Boisjoly later wrote about being sidelined within the Thiokol organisation, allegedly as a result of his testimony at the Rogers Commission.[61] Unable to tolerate the pressure, he took an early retirement and left the industry altogether. Bob Ebeling was said to be wracked with guilt for the following 30 years, finally finding forgiveness in himself just before his death.[62]
D Far more Alternatives than were Anticipated, and BATNAs
Being mindful of alternatives is crucial to an effective negotiation, as it prevents a party making an agreement they should reject. It also helps crystallise awareness of the assets to which the party has access, so any agreement made is more likely to satisfy the interests of the party.[63] Under consideration in this review are the reasonable alternatives that may have been available to the engineers at the time. To that extent, the situation is analysed as we find it, rather than adjusting it with the modern era in mind.
Had the engineers approached the meeting as a negotiation, they would have been mindful of the numerous alternatives available to them. As the negotiation progressed, they could refer to these alternatives to provide a counterpoint to the track in which the discussion was progressing.[64]
Available alternatives to them included escalation within Thiokol and/or NASA management, at least through to Levels II and I, a structure with which they were familiar. Or, they could stall for time, asking for urgent technical support to define the O-ring issue one way, or another. The prompt demonstration by Dr Feynman at the Rogers Commission immediately illuminated the issue with the O-rings; a collaboration with people of his calibre may have achieved a prompt resolution to the O-ring issue. They could also suggest greater engagement with the NASA safety officer, who at that point had not been apprised of concerns with the O-rings.
Unbeknownst to them, the safety officer had been alerted to other safety-critical issue for the launch: the amount of ice that had accumulated on the shuttle booster and launch pad. Had the additional information about the O-rings been provided to him, a significant correlation could be drawn upon, indicating the overall picture of risk to be much more serious than the Thiokol managers were aware.[65]
Other more emboldened alternatives may have included their resignation in protest on the morning of 28 January 1986, with a communication to the media or the NASA public relations team. Local politicians or business leaders may have also been engaged to elevate the issues.
Perhaps most curious when viewed retrospectively was the complete absence of consultation about safety concerns with the crew, whose very fate rested on the decision made that evening.[66] It may have been possible for the engineers to approach one or more members of the crew on the morning of the launch in a bid to alert them to the anomalies, then be led by them as to the next steps.
Of these options, the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (‘BATNA’) for the engineers was direct escalation to NASA management.
What was apparent was that the engineers simply did not approach the negotiation in a proactive manner. In doing so, they severely restricted themselves from engaging fully in the negotiation and prevented the Thiokol managers from considering viable alternatives.
That said, the Thiokol Managers also had numerous options available to them. They, too, could bring in other experts, escalate the situation via the agreed dispute resolution plan, seek further clarification on the technical issues, or do nothing and proceed with the launch.
While their BATNA would have also been to escalate the issue to higher levels of NASA management, they appeared to prefer to operate from the known position of staying the present course. Unconvinced there was a new issue that might jeopardise the flight, they signed off on the launch, recommending it proceed.
Putting the entire negotiation into perspective, more than one commentator has observed that a single phone call that evening or the following morning to either Jesse Moore, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Space Flight, or Gene Thomas, the Launch Director, would have seen the launch immediately postponed.[67] A manifestation of the BATNA of both parties, this would have effectively taken the decision out of the hands of Thiokol engineers and managers and led to a reasonable outcome, without either side appearing to have backed down. Mr Thomas confirms this in his testimony at the Rogers Commission after being asked whether he was happy he had not received information before the launch about the relationship between the seals and the ambient temperature. His reply: ‘No, sir. I can assure you that if we had had that information, we wouldn’t have launched if it hadn’t been 53 degrees [Fahrenheit, equivalent to 12 degrees Celsius].’[68]
E More than One Route: Exploring options
Simply put, an option is a possible agreement or part of an agreement.[69] During a negotiation, options refer to the gamut of available choices for the parties. They need not be mutually exclusive: if comprehensively explored, options will not just divide up the pie as it exists, but enlarge it so everyone receives a bigger share.[70] The Rogers Commission report indicates, however, that the parties did not attempt to brainstorm the available options. Throughout the negotiation, each remained firmly in their corner, wearing their relegated hat of engineer or manager.[71]
Given the difficulties interpreting the data, brainstorming ways to resolve the issue would have been a non-judgemental way to explore options.[72] It may have also brought the two sides together to resolve the issue in a collaborative way: “We suspect the O-rings will fail if Challenger launches tomorrow. We can’t accept that outcome. What options do we have at this point in time?”.
In this way the engineers, in collaboration with their managers, might have conducted a more objective exploration of the current situation. Considerations may have canvassed some of the following: What contingencies are available? Must we launch tomorrow? Why? Must we decide tonight about launching tomorrow? May we collect more information and meet in the morning? Are we genuinely under a time constraint? What evidence was there for that? Should we escalate the issue beyond MSFC to other personnel in NASA? Shall we engage the NASA safety team? Is there an independent third party with whom we can consult about this issue? What is the worst-case scenario if the O-rings fail? What would happen to the crew? What about the shuttle and payload? Can we live with those outcomes? Are we the right people to make this decision? From where, or whom, can we get additional information? Can someone assist to assimilate this information more objectively? What about the shuttle crew – should we discuss our concerns with them?
Where parties are unable to develop additional options, another option is to engage a ‘Circle Chart’ to step through the four stages of thinking:[73] from 1) defining the reality of the problem (faulty O-rings exacerbated by low temperatures), to 2) analysing the problem (identifying the cause; what might be missing; if there are any barriers to resolving the issue: most of these might revolve around the cold weather), 3) set out possible approaches (postpone the launch (until when?); escalate the issue further up the management hierarchy; revisit safety imperatives; obtain more information about launch conditions), and finally 4) set out actions (what will be done; what are our next steps? Recommend the launch is postponed; delay our decision about the launch until we have collected further information; or escalate our concerns beyond this meeting).
Brainstorming ideas in a safe, constructive manner to review the available options would likely have led to a significantly different outcome to the negotiation that evening.
F Making a Commitment
A commitment in a negotiation will involve a spoken or written statement about what will, or won’t, be done. Such commitments may be formal or informal, but ideally will come about by agreement between the parties.[74]
For the engineers, this aspect is least affected with the application of principled negotiation: the negotiation was terminated by the Thiokol managers prior to an agreement being reached so no commitment from them was documented.[75] Excluded from the final part of the negotiation; the input of the engineers was no longer required: ‘it was clearly a management decision from that point’.[76] Indicative of their desire to document the opposite - fierce opposition to the eventual decision - a number of the engineers made contemporaneous notes about the negotiation and its outcome.[77]
As for Thiokol management, Mr Lund refused to sign off on the flight readiness documentation that NASA had requested. Mr Kilminster signed instead.[78]
G The Importance of Communicating Clearly, and Well
One of the most alarming aspects of the negotiation of 27 January 1986 was the sub-optimal nature of communication, on all sides. The discussion was not collaborative or involve of a free exchange of ideas. It was stilted, repressed by the reporting hierarchies of both employees and managers, and clients and suppliers.
There are three key aspects to the communication of the negotiation: the style of communication used by the engineers; the exclusionary behaviour of the Thiokol managers; and the line and tone of questioning by NASA executives. All three contributed to the poor outcome of the negotiation.
As to the content the engineers sought to communicate, while they were unequivocal about the message wanted to deliver, launch postponement, they were unable to articulate it with clarity and conviction.[79] They were trying to provide an explanation for a phenomenon they couldn’t quantify.[80] As the O-rings sometimes worked perfectly, the issue was intermittent. They were unable to prove unequivocally the O-rings would fail on this particular occasion.[81]
Furthermore, Mr Boisjoly was said to have a ‘microscopic’ communication style.[82] This was apparent in his testimony at the Rogers Commission. He started an explanation, broke off, resumed at different point, and used metaphors rather than direct, concise language. The breathless statement below – a single sentence – was his articulation of concern about a launch at low temperature:
I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were continuing to fly.[83]
Meanwhile, the Thiokol managers remained strongly persuaded by the track record of 24 successful prior launches.[84] Unaware their argument needed to be sharply honed so as to strongly persuade their managers, the engineers had no inkling of the competing interests vying for the attention of the minds of the Thiokol managers. Without the requisite information to conclusively back up their observations and correlations, their data, only tenuous, was unable to stand alone. The managers remained unconvinced by their arguments.[85]
Boisjoly later testified at the Rogers Commission that he and Arnold Thompson sensed at the last minute what was coming; he and Thompson pleaded, ‘screamed’, to try to make the managers see the information they were attempting to convey. Observing glazed eyes, with chagrin they realised defeat: ‘I also stopped when it was apparent that I couldn't get anybody to listen.’[86] Entrenched in their singular position - to stop the launch - they had fallen far short of the anticipated outcome. Essentially in shock, they withdrew from the negotiation.[87]
The communication style of the Thiokol managers is next to be examined. They did not create an atmosphere conducive to open discussion about options, possibilities and risks. The uncharacteristic reversal of the onus to prove the launch was unsafe[88] created an environment of ‘groupthink’, where mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgement had deteriorated.[89] Perhaps more insidiously, the atmosphere led to a mindset of ‘collective responsibility’ rather than individual accountability. Without an imperative of individual agency, no single person felt they should take it upon themselves to ensure the ‘right’ outcome should prevail.[90]
The third element of communication was the highly influential NASA contingent on the call. Upon hearing the preliminary recommendation from Thiokol was not to launch, NASA executives were heresthetic. One exclaimed in surprise that he was ‘appalled’ by the recommendation not to launch. Another challenged acerbically, ‘My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?’[91]
The incredulity of the NASA executives was to strong effect: it was the only encouragement the Thiokol managers needed to set aside the concerns of the engineers. Falling back on a false sense of security that the launch would be safe,[92] after a thirty-minute recess, with no invitation issued to the engineers to participate in the discussion, the Thiokol managers announced a reversal of their earlier position: the Challenger shuttle was flight ready.[93]
Despite there being no conditions of forced choice, the decision was made ‘under all of the conditions of a forced choice.’[94] It was conformity, not deviance, which led to the fatal decision to launch.[95]
Best practice communication in a negotiation would see this transpire in a very different way, with no such intimidation or downplaying of legitimate views. When challenged at the Rogers Commission to justify their approach, a number of participants struggled to define how it had occurred. They had created tangible, unmistakeable pressure that evening to launch - apropos of nothing.[96]
V THE NEGOTIATION IN A PRESENT-DAY CONTEXT
It is hard to imagine in the current era that the decision of whether or not to send a space shuttle and its’ payload, worth billions of dollars and carrying seven precious human lives, might be made via a teleconference call by a handful of people who did not, ultimately, have accountability for the launch. The very idea that a small group within a highly complex organisation could assess launch viability without engaging other stakeholders, the knowledge analytic, does not align with modern methods of accountability.[97]
Also absent from the negotiation was the dense but necessary raft of documentation and analysis to support a critical decision, including legal advice, clear safety parameters, policy statements, environmental reports, briefings, government approvals and an unambiguous path for decision-making and risk.[98]
The space shuttle program was put on hiatus following the Challenger incident. During that time NASA implemented numerous protocols in relation to safety and launch management, as a direct result of post-accident reviews.[99] For these reasons, inter alia, the circumstances of the decision to proceed with the Challenger launch are unlikely to be replicated in the present day.
VI LOOK TO THE STARS: LESSONS
Numerous lessons have been bestowed on us by Challenger. While NASA experienced a subsequent loss of craft and her crew, the space shuttle Columbia, in 2003,[100] NASA shuttle launches henceforth were otherwise unremarkable until the program was retired in 2011.[101] Allan McDonald remained with Thiokol, convinced that the lessons from Challenger were responsible for the 110 subsequent NASA shuttle launches under his watch that returned with boosters intact.[102]
As we raise our gaze heavenward for a new era of space travel, the year 2021 saw the launch of Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic space tourism craft, VSS Unity. The craft, with Mr Branson and five other passengers on board, reached eighty-five kilometres above the Earth, a height recognised by some authorities as sufficient to be in ‘space’, before returning.[103] By the time it came to fruition, the flight was twelve years behind schedule, sadly having incurred the loss of a technician in 2007 and a pilot in 2014.[104] The hurdles to overcome before VSS Unity launched were said to be Herculean, but despite pressure to launch, the program was stayed until Branson himself was assured of flight safety.[105]
Closer to home, the Challenger tragedy has yielded myriad insights for millions of people. Regularly used as a case study to examine poor organisation culture,[106] it is instructive for disciplines well beyond aeronautical engineering. These include psychology,[107] conflict,[108] ethics,[109] system design,[110] leadership,[111] communication,[112] risk management,[113] law,[114] organisational management[115] and decision making.[116] Instituting a process as simple as the mechanism for an employee to anonymously report a concern to management is a direct result of the Challenger disaster.[117]
My examination of the negotiation the evening before the launch of Challenger indicates that the choice of negotiation strategy can have a significant bearing on the outcome of the negotiation itself. Principled negotiation is an effective approach: while there may be a temptation to rely on a ‘win-lose’ or ‘winner takes all’ mentality in a negotiation,[118] when the stakes are high, the crushing loss of one side may yield a cost higher to all parties than ever envisaged.[119]
Having observed the negotiation by the engineers prior to the Challenger launch illustrates a final crucial lesson: it is axiomatic that participants remain fully engaged during any negotiation. To withdraw prior to the conclusion in anticipation of defeat will just about guarantee one thing: defeat.
VII CONCLUSION
The negotiation of the evening of 27 January 1986 pertaining to the launch of the Challenger space shuttle is an example of a failed negotiation. After hours of debate, managers at Thiokol excluded their engineers and made a unilateral decision to recommend that the launch proceed. The consequences were deadly.
Analysis of the situation through the lens of the principled negotiation highlighted various shortcomings in the way the engineers approached the negotiation. A notable impediment to the engineers was their position-based approach. This would be cured by an examination of the interests of both sides. The engineers also offered little by way of options for resolution or alternative measures that might be considered outside of the negotiation itself. Other aspects such as poor communication, exacerbated by the constraints of relationship hierarchy, meant that ideas did not flow generously and freely. Instead, the discussion was stunted, confined to issues that were not possible to resolve with certainty. Yet other concerns, such as the implications of a failed launch on the viability of the space shuttle program and considerations of the crew, appeared to receive almost no contemplation at all.
Rather than become pressured into the fatal decision of recommending a launch, utilising the seven elements of principled negotiation would have secured a more pragmatic resolution that satisfied the interests of both parties. In this way, the burden of difficult aspects of the decision would be shared with others, likely providing a better immediate and long-term result overall.
Despite the decades that have since passed, the lessons from the negotiation of the evening prior to the Challenger launch remain relevant for each of us to the present day.
[1] Howard Berkes, ‘30 Years After Explosion, Challenger Engineer Still
Blames Himself’, NPR (Web Page, 28 January 2016) <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/28/464744781/30-years-after-disaster-challenger-engineer-still-blames-himself>.
[2] Lyman Porter and Karlene Roberts, ‘Communication in Organisations’ in Marvin D Dunnette (ed) Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (Rand McNally, 1976).
[3] Roger Fisher and William Ury with Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In (Random House, 3rd ed, 2012) xxv.
[4] Presidential Commission, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Report, 1986) Vol 1, Chapter V, 99. <https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm> (‘Presidential Commission Report’).
[5] Ibid 91.
[6] Ibid 86.
[7] Presidential Commission Report (n 4), Vol 1, Chapter V, 111.
[8] Ibid 104.
[9] Chris Argyris, Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning (Allyn and Bacon, 1990).
[10] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 108.
[11] Norbert Elliot, Eric Katz and Robert Lynch, ‘The Challenger Tragedy: A Case Study in Organizational Communication and Professional Ethics’ (1993) 12(2) Business & Professional Ethics Journal 104.
[12] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1.
[13] Further meticulous examination of the decisions of 27 January 1986 is delivered par excellence by Diane Vaughan, Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (University of Chicago Press, 2009).
[14] Diane Vaughan, ‘Theorizing Disaster: Analogy, Historical Ethnography, and the Challenger Accident’ (2004) 5(3) Ethnography 321-322.
[15] Jon Nordheimer, ‘’Freeze of the Century’ Damages 90% of the Citrus Crop in Florida’, The New York Times (Late Edition, New York, 23 January 1985) A1.
[16] Russell P Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis and Eugene Mellican, ‘Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions’ (1989) 8(4) Journal of Business Ethics 219.
[17] Texas A&M University, Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering, ‘Engineering Ethics: The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster’ (Online Training Resource, DIR-9012252) <http://ethics.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/04/Shuttle.pdf> Mark Rossow, ‘Engineering Ethics Case Study: The Challenger Disaster’, Continuing Education Development, Inc, (Online Course, No: LE3-00) <https://www.cedengineering.com/userfiles/Engineering%20Ethics%20Case%20Study%20The%20Challenger%20Disaster%20R1.pdf>.
[18] Boisjoly et al (n 16) 221.
[19] Ed Magnuson, ‘A Serious Deficiency’ (10 March 1986) Time 34-6.
[20] Jay Hamburg, ‘Freeze May Punch Below Citrus Belt’ (27 January 1986) Orlando Sentinel.
[22] Boisjoly et al (n 16) 221.
[24] Anon., ‘Remembering Challenger and Looking Forward’ (2015) 111(2) Chemical Engineering Progress 31-32.
[25] David Dryden Henningsen, Mary Lynn Miller Henningsen, Jennifer Eden, and Michael G Cruz, ‘Examining the Symptoms of Groupthink and Retrospective Sensemaking’ (2006) 37(1) Small Group Research 36.
[26] Kumar J Ajith and Amaresh Chakrabarti, ‘Bounded Awareness and Tacit Knowledge: Revisiting [the] Challenger Disaster’ (2012) 16(6) Journal of Knowledge Management 934, 934-949.
[27] Bruce Patton, ‘The Deceptive Simplicity of Teaching Negotiation: Reflections on Thirty Years of the Negotiation Workshop’ (2009) 25(4) Negotiation Journal 497; Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 3) xxv.
[28] William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating in Difficult Situations (Bantam Books, Rev ed, 2007) 17.
[29] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 104.
[30] Boisjoly et al (n 16) 219.
[31] Richard Dunford, Organisational Behaviour: An Organisational Analysis Perspective (Addison-Wesley, 1992) 36.
[32] Ury (n 28) 18.
[33] Fiona Mac Vane Phipps, ‘The Blind Men and the Elephant’ (2018) 23(4) International Journal of Health Governance 330.
[34] Malcolm McConnell, Challenger: A Major Malfunction (Doubleday, 1st ed, 1987).
[35] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 104.
[36] Boyce Rensberger and Kevin Klose, ‘Thiokol Engineers Tell of Being Overruled: Rocket Engineers Detail NASA Pressure for Shuttle Launch’, The Washington Post (Washington, D.C., 26 February 1986), A6.
[37] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 104.
[38] Ibid 92-93.
[39] Ibid 99.
[40] Weather Atlas, ‘January weather forecast and climate Orlando, FL’ (Web Page) <https://www.weather-us.com/en/florida-usa/orlando-weather-january#temperature>.
[41] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 96.
[42] Ibid 125.
[43] Richard P Feynman, ‘An Outsider's Inside View of the Challenger Inquiry’ (1988) 41(2) Physics Today 34.
[44] See, for instance, Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter VI, 125-128.
[45] A Bayesian forecasting model for the probability of primary O-ring damage, conditional on the temperature at the time of launch, is set out in Coire J Maranzano and Roman Krzysztofowicz, ‘Bayesian Reanalysis of the Challenger O-Ring Data’ (2008) 28(4) Risk Analysis 1053.
[46] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter VI, 127.
[47] Elliot et al (n 11) 100.
[48] Joseph Palca and Tim Beardsley, ‘Shuttle Catastrophe: Rogers Commission Report Makes Waves All Round’ (1986) 321(6071) Nature (London) 637.
[49] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter VI, 127.
[50] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter VII.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Kumar and Chakrabarti (n 26) 938.
[53] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter VII.
[54] Max H Bazerman, Jared R Curhan, Don A Moore and Kathleen L Valley (2000) 51 ‘Negotiation’ Annual Review of Psychology 279.
[55] A E Walzer and A Gross, ‘Positivists, Postmodernists, Aristotelians, and the Challenger Disaster’ (1994) 56(4) College English 420.
[56] Patricia H Werhane, ‘Engineers and Management: The Challenge of the Challenger Incident’ (1991) 10(8) Journal of Business Ethics 611.
[57] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 99.
[58] Patrick Moore, ‘When Politeness Is Fatal’ (1992) 6(3) Journal of Business and Technical Communication 269.
[59] Roy J Lewicki, David M Saunders and Bruce Barry, Negotiation (McGraw-Hill Education, 7th ed, 2015).
[60] Allan McDonald, Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (University Press of Florida, 2012).
[61] Werhane (n 56) 606-7.
<https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/25/466555217/your-letters-helped-challenger-shuttle-engineer-shed-30-years-of-guilt%3E>.
[63] Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 3) 99.
[64] Terence M Garrett, ‘Whither Challenger, Wither Columbia’ (2004) 34(4) American Review of Public Administration 389.
[65] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapters VII, VIII, IX.
[66] Robert Allinson, ‘The Ethical Relevance of Risk Assessment and Risk Heeding: The Space Shuttle Challenger Launch Decision as an Object Lesson’ (2016) 7 Ramon Lull Journal of Applied Ethics 93.
[67] Hugh Harris, ‘NASA, the Challenger Disaster, and How One Phone Call Could Have Saved the Crew’ The Portalist, (Online Magazine, 27 Jan 2019) <https://theportalist.com/nasa-the-challenger-disaster-and-how-one-phone-call-could-have-saved-the-crew>.
[68] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 103.
[69] Ury (n 28) 19.
[70] Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 3) 59 - 81.
[71] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1.
[72] Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 3) 62.
[73] Ibid 68-70.
[74] Patton (n 27).
[75] Boisjoly et al (n 16) 222.
[76] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 93.
[77] Boisjoly et al (n 16) 223.
[78] Ibid 219.
[79] Vanessa Dean Arnold and Josh C Malley, ‘Communication: The Missing Link in the Challenger Disaster’ (1988) 51(4) The Bulletin of the Association for Business Communication 12.
[80] E Matricciani, ‘The "missing" Damage-Temperature Relationship in the Challenger Incident’ (2001) 48(3) IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 267.
[81] Vaughan (n 12).
[82] For further discussion on the communication style of the Morton-Thiokol engineers prior to the Challenger launch see Elliot et al (n 11) 91.
[83] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 88.
[84] For Richard Feynman’s analogy of the Thiokol and NASA managers playing Russian roulette, see Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter VI, 148.
[85] Richard P. Feynman, ‘An Outsider's Inside View of the Challenger Inquiry’ (1988) 41(2) Physics Today 34.
[86] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 92.
[87] Boisjoly et al (n 16) 222.
[88] Elliot et al (n 11) 104.
[89] Janis Irving, Victims of Groupthink, (Houghton Mifflin, 1972) 9.
[90] Boisjoly et al (n 16) 225-226.
[91] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Chapter V, 95.
[92] Kumar and Chakrabarti (n 26) 943.
[93] Patrick Moore, ‘Intimidation and Communication’ (1992) 6(4) Journal of Business and Technical Communication 403.
[94] Robert Elliott Allinson, The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (Springer, 2005) 116.
[95] Vaughan (n 12).
[96] Presidential Commission Report (n 4) Vol 1, Ch V.
[97] Terence M Garrett, ‘The Waco, Texas, ATF Raid and Challenger Launch Decision’ (2001) 31(1) American Review of Public Administration 66.
[98] C F Larry Heimann, ‘Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems’ (1993) 87(2) The American Political Science Review 421.
[99] Amy K Donahue and Rosemary O'Leary, ‘Do Shocks Change Organizations? The Case of NASA’ (2012) 22(3) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 395.
[100] Roger L. M. Dunbar and Raghu Garud, ‘Distributed Knowledge and Indeterminate Meaning: The Case of the Columbia Shuttle Flight’ (2009) 30(4) Organization Studies 397.
[101] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, ‘Space Shuttle Era’ (Web Page) <https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/flyout/index.html>.
[102] Joe Atkinson, ‘Engineer Who Opposed Challenger Launch Offers Personal Look at Tragedy’ Researcher News, (Web Page, 10 March 2012) <https://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/researchernews/rn_Colloquium1012.html>.
[103] Leah Crane and Jacob Aron, ‘Richard Branson reaches the edge of space on Virgin Galactic flight’ New Scientist (Online edition, 12 July 2021) <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2283785-richard-branson-reaches-the-edge-of-space-on-virgin-galactic-flight/>.
[104] Jonathan Amos, ‘Virgin Galactic: Sir Richard Branson rockets to the Edge of Space’, BBC News/Science, (Online news service, 11 July 2021)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-57797297>.
[105] Justin Silver, ‘Houston, We Have a (Liability) Problem’ (2014) 112(5) Michigan Law Review 833.
[106] Guy B Adams, and D Balfour, ‘An Historical Analysis of a Destructive Organizational Culture: The Von Braun Team, the Marshall Space Flight Center and the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster’ (1998) 20(3) Administrative Theory & Praxis, 300-314.
[107] Lenore C Terr, Daniel A Bloch, Beat A Michel, Hong Shi, John A Reinhardt, SuzAnne Metayer, ‘Children's Thinking in the Wake of Challenger’ (1997) 154(6) The American Journal of Psychiatry 744.
[108] Robert D Dimitroff, Lu Ann Schmidt and Timothy D Bond, ‘Organizational Behavior and Disaster: A Study of Conflict at NASA’ (2005) 36(2) Project Management Journal 28.
[109] Archilles A Armenakis (2002) ‘Boisjoly on Ethics: An Interview with Roger M. Boisjoly’ Journal of Management Inquiry 11(3) 274-81; Boisjoly et al (n 16) 221; Elliot et al (n 11) 91.
[110] Heimann (n 98).
[111] Michael Peregrine, ‘The Lasting Leadership Lessons from the Challenger Disaster’, Forbes, 24 January 2021 <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelperegrine/2021/01/24/the-lasting-leadership-lessons-from-the-challenger-disaster/?sh=5e4804861c37>.
[112] Larry D Browning, ‘Interpreting the Challenger Disaster: Communication Under Conditions of Risk and Liability’ (1988) 2(3) Industrial Crisis Quarterly 211.
[113] Hanan Altabbakh, Susan Murray, Katie Grantham, Siddharth Damle, ‘Variations in Risk Management Models: A Comparative Study of the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster’ (2013) 25(2) Engineering Management Journal 13.
[114] Paul G Dembling and Richard C Walters, ‘The 1986 Challenger Disaster: Legal Ramifications’, (1991) 19(1) Journal of Space Law.
[115] Vaughan, Challenger Launch Decision (n 13).
[116] Diane Vaughan, ‘The Trickle-Down Effect: Policy Decisions, Risky Work, and the "Challenger" Tragedy’ (1997) 39(2) California Management Review 80; Kumar and Chakrabarti (n 26) 934-949; Randy Y Hirokawa, Dennis S Gouran and Amy E Martz, ‘Understanding the Sources of Faulty Group Decision Making’ (1988) 19(4) Small Group Behavior 411.
[117] Robert D Dimitroff, Lu Ann Schmidt and Timothy D Bond, ‘Organizational Behavior and Disaster: A Study of Conflict at NASA’ (2005) 36(2) Project Management Journal 36.
[118] Hal Movius, 'The Effectiveness of Negotiation Training' (2008) 24(4) Negotiation Journal 515. See also John Lande, ‘Teaching Students to Negotiate Like a Lawyer’ (2012) 39 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 109. See also Aspasia Tsaoussi and Andreas Feidakis, ‘Competitiveness, Gender and Ethics in Legal Negotiations: Some Empirical Evidence’ (2009) 14(3) International Negotiation 537.
[119] Russell Korobkin, 'A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation' (2000) 88(6) Georgetown Law Journal 1789.
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