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Li, Cherie --- "The Argument Against a Food-Specific International Regime: Fragmentation, Food Security in Brazil and Potential Reforms in International Law" [2022] UNSWLawJlStuS 20; (2022) UNSWLJ Student Series No 22-20



There currently exists a myriad of international regimes that deal with food in its various dimensions, whether it is as a commodity, regulatory object, or human right. These regimes all deal with food in some way to address food security, but there is currently no comprehensive international regime for food.[1] Given the lack of a food-specific international regime, it may be tempting to argue that one is needed to fill this void.

However, this paper argues it is both difficult and unnecessary to establish a ‘food’-specific international regime. Rather, a new regime that challenges the neoliberal features of the third food regime by championing the values associated with food sovereignty may better address the issue of food security.

It does so in four parts, firstly considering our current understanding and treatment of food and food security, which renders it extremely difficult to conceive how a food-specific international regime may look. The second part of this essay considers the theoretical underpinnings for fragmentation in international law through a food regime theory lens and why fragmentation rather than consolidation may be beneficial to achieving the goal of food security. Part III of the essay examines how the tensions discussed in Parts I and II have played out in Brazil, a middle-income developing country that has responded to the neoliberal forces which mark the third food regime but continues to grapple with food insecurity. Brazil’s policy response to the problem of food security is then considered, in turn highlighting two potential areas of change to consider at the international level. The two identified areas of potential international regulatory change do not centre on the establishment of a food-specific international regime as the panacea to issues identified with the current food regime; rather, the potential for the state to play a larger in challenging the corporate food regime is emphasised, and the need for greater championship of food sovereignty and its values is explored. Part IV considers the possible shapes that a new international organisation may take.


The label ‘food’ is “a terminological box that can be filled with wildly different phenomena depending on culture, circumstances and time period”.[2] It can encapsulate anything ranging from the genetic composition of food, its nutritious value to its cultural significance. Additionally, there is an entire system behind food, involving its production, processing, and supply. This complex picture of food has significant implications for what a ‘food’-specific international regime may look like.

Equally complicated is the concept of food security. The concept of food security initially began as a goal to eradicate hunger in the post-WWII years. This understanding eventually informed the formation of the Food and Agriculture Organisation under the United Nations, which has since been characterised as an “important step forward in man’s perpetual struggle against hunger and malnutrition.”[3] Additionally, a series of food-related crises in the 1970s spurred the formation of several international efforts to tackle the drivers of food insecurity, including the formation of the World Food Council and Committee on World Food Security in 1974.[4] A definition of food security was reached at the 1996 World Food Summit, that food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.[5] Evidently, there are multiple dimensions to securing food security: having sufficient and stable supply of food, which is safe and of good quality, being able to access the supply, and exercising choice unrestricted by socio-economic circumstances. Inevitably, these dimensions evoke other non-economic factors that affect food security, such as ecological balance, resource preservation, and political and legal systems overall.[6] These complexities underscore the multidimensional nature of what it means to think about food and food security.

Evidently, the concepts of food and food security are multifaceted, ultimately providing little to no normative guidance for the shape that a ‘food’-specific international regime may take. Simply attempting to deal with all these facets would result in a nebulous agenda for an incredibly large international regime that would have difficulty being accepted by countries.


In response to the evolving understanding of food security, the international regimes dealing with food have also undergone fragmentation, resulting in a regime complex for food security.[7] Fragmentation refers both to a process, the emergence of new and specialised subfields of international law, and its result: divergence in global governance as each regime ultimately has their own principles, expertise, objectives, and values.[8]

The fragmented treatment of food has primarily unfolded in response to the evolving understanding of food security, but utilising food regime theory can help shed further light on why and how this fragmentation has occurred. At its core, food regime theory is about the wider power struggles and politics of food.[9] International law in relation to food, in turn, is formed and deployed to manipulate these struggles to advance at times, contradictory visions of governance.[10] Many of the international efforts outlined in Part I largely emerged as a response to the global food crisis and instability which also marked the collapse of the second food regime.[11] Developments since the 1970s have been underpinned by a neoliberal approach, with an overt focus on trade, increasing production, and privatisation of aspects of food as a way of addressing food security.[12] Food regime scholars have since argued that these features represent the emergence of the third food regime.[13] However, this neoliberal approach to food security has been criticised for only exacerbating the problem, and any changes or additions to the existing regime complex should consider the features of the current food regime if the end goal is to achieve food security.

The current food regime has seen greater power imbalances become entrenched on multiple levels.[14] On the global level, the focus on production and trade has inevitably led to the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) becoming the main body for the global governance of food. Within the WTO, the United States and the European Union hold significant control in shaping WTO rules and agendas given the significant market power, material, and informational resources that they command.[15] The current food regime is also focused on the development and implementation of agricultural biotechnologies, an area of innovation that is dominated by developed countries such as the United States.[16] The resulting inter-relationship between these new technologies and global regulation will ultimately exacerbate existing inequalities between nations, particularly between developed and developing countries, as they face increasing costs in implementing new regulations and adopting new technology. For example, developed countries provide an estimated $1 billion USD in agricultural subsidies per day;[17] this disproportionately impacts developing countries that are heavily reliant on agricultural exports which then face greater competition on the global market. These inequalities are heightened by the fact that many developing countries were indirectly forced to focus on agricultural exports as developed countries assumed the role of service and technology providers.

As a potential downside, fragmentation can encourage forum shopping and ultimately creates divergences between differing regimes.[18] Fundamentally, it may erode the rule of law at the international level. Nevertheless, the ability to approach food on multiple fronts may be beneficial for developing countries by challenging the dominance of one global institution such as the WTO and helping to protect against the concentrations of power in certain countries that have occurred in the current food regime. Additionally, fragmentation ultimately reflects a growing specialisation of regimes and rules. Having specialised regimes may better reflect the multidimensional nature of food as discussed in Part I. It would make little practical sense for a single regime to deal with both intellectual property protection of biotechnologies as well as the cultural value of food. Scholars also suggest greater regulatory compliance is encouraged by the specialisation of international regimes.[19] Evidently, due to the nature of the global food system, with significant power imbalances between developed and developing countries, fragmentation of international law rather than consolidation may be beneficial.

The inherent tendency for fragmentation to occur is also important to note, given the lack of one central global legislator and the varying political agendas of nations.[20] Fragmentation ultimately reflects the different preferences and interests of participants in the global society and is underpinned by normative beliefs in a particular regime and its role in governing a subject matter. These tensions in relation to food security are elucidated in the debates that occurred between Olivier De Schutter, as the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, and then-Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy.[21] While De Schutter was concerned with the right to food as a value that was in competition with – and trumped over – free trade, Lamy focused on free trade as the norm and food security policies which deviate from free trade as potential exemptions from this ideal.[22] The pluralistic nature of global society is ultimately intrinsic to its existence, and a food-specific international regime or an attempt to consolidate food-related regulations into one international organ will likely eventually come into conflict with the emergence of a new regime formed to address dissatisfaction with the existing system. Thus, rather than pursuing this agenda, it is arguably much more beneficial to the goal of food security if a new regime was established to address the perceived flaws with the existing system.

Food sovereignty is the main movement challenging the dominance of neoliberalism in global governance of food. While neoliberalism attempts to achieve food security through free trade and market forces, food sovereignty approaches food security through a focus on human rights. Food sovereignty as a movement in opposition to neoliberalism is explored in more depth in Part III through the successful policies implemented by Brazil, as a nation with abundant food availability yet still plagued with food insecurity.


Given the multidimensional nature of food and benefits of fragmentation to achieving food security, the current focus for reform should not attempt to create a food-specific international regime. As international responses developed in response to problems perceived with the second food regime, taking inventory of problems with the current food regime may provide normative guidance for a new international regime. This section will do so by considering the specific example of Brazil, “a relatively industrialised middle-income country that maintains a significant family farm sector oriented to the domestic market, while also playing a key role in the global agri-food sector as a dominant agricultural exporter.”[23]

One of the main criticisms levelled at the current food regime is its neoliberal approach to food. Also termed the ‘corporate food regime’, developments since the 1980s have been marked by agricultural liberalisation which encourages trade and technological innovations to achieve food security. An accompanying feature is the emergence of agribusiness as the only consistent winner of this current regime.[24] These global corporations benefit both through inherent advantages such as holding significant capital for research and development of biotechnologies, and international regimes such as the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (‘UPOV’) in turn prioritising the protection of these innovations. Perhaps best capturing this is the ex-CEO of Cargill, an America food corporation with operations in all continents but Antarctica, stating that the focus on capacity to grow food for local consumption is a misguided one, and that “countries should produce what they produce best – and trade”.[25] This trade-driven view of food security positions these corporations to derive significant profits from the neoliberalisation of food and agriculture: their sale of protected seeds, chemicals for farming and the final produce such as grain grants them an incredibly large stake in the whole process of food production, from field to plate.[26]

Additionally, as touched upon in Part II, international food law has currently fragmented due to the conflict between neoliberalism and the rising food sovereignty movement. Brazil has keenly embraced aspects of the food sovereignty movement in its domestic policies addressing food security.

A The Food Insecurity Problem in Brazil

If food security is indeed secured through trade and ensuring availability, a third of Brazil’s population should not be in a constant state of food insecurity despite having sufficient food availability for its entire population.[27]

Neoliberal approaches food security through the lens of production and ultimately distorts food output patterns by encouraging concentration of production in a few valued crop species. Brazil’s main agricultural exports are soybeans and soybean products, coffee, meat and meat products, as well as sugar products.[28] These patterns largely reflect the food commodities most traded on the global market, with Brazil’s sugar products mainly being cane products for biofuels and soybeans for feeding livestock. In turn, traditional small-scale farmers who produce food for consumption rather than export in developing countries are displaced in favour of large agribusiness operations that can reap the supposed economic benefits such as economies of scale and competitive advantage on the global market. Furthermore, as noted above, global trade and the regulating regimes are skewed in favour of developed nations. With the prevalence of dumping encouraged by the concentration of power in a few agribusiness players, exporters from developing countries such as Brazil face significant market competition despite neoliberalism’s purported goal of reducing artificial price distortions. The dependency on these export commodities is also problematic given the financialisation (and subsequent speculation on price) of food which has marked the third food regime, rendering their prices extremely volatile, and thus hurting the farmers involved in their cultivation.[29] The focus on biotechnologies and protectionist barriers to accessing such innovations also has an impact in Brazil, where most farmers choose to plant non-GMO soybeans that have lower outputs as the price of accessing GMO varieties are too high.

Due to the structural changes encouraged by the neoliberalist features of the current food regime, other developing countries have become net food importers and thus much more vulnerable to fluctuations in the global food market. However, Brazil’s ongoing struggle with food insecurity is largely associated with existing income and geographical imbalances that are specific to the country. In essence, food security in Brazil is more of an access problem rather than a production problem.[30] The Brazilian government has also played an important role as an anti-corporate neoliberal food regime actor.

B Brazil’s Domestic Food Security Policies

This section considers the policies implemented in Brazil to address the issue of food security and contrasts its focus on food and nutritional security with the definition of food security being applied at the international level to provide further guidance for regulatory developments on the international level.

The Organic Law on Food and Nutrition Security (‘LOSAN’) guarantees a right to adequate food and offers a broader, explicit understanding of the food security concept: “food and nutritional security is the realisation of everyone’s right to regular and permanent access to quality food in sufficient quantity, without compromising access to other essential needs, based on health-promoting food practices that respect cultural diversity and that are environmentally, culturally, economically and socially sustainable.”[31] The term ‘food and nutritional security’ used in Brazil itself reflects a broader understanding, which in turn reaffirms the need for multi-sectoral intervention to address food security. Furthermore, the enunciation of food and nutritional security as a right rather than an end to be achieved by various means aligns the Brazilian stance with the growing view in international law that food is a human right. This contrasts with the current global governance of food which takes place mainly through the WTO and views food security as a non-economic consideration nevertheless underpinned by normative neoliberal values which consequently reduces consideration of food security as “issues of poverty and food supply.”[32]

In line with this nuanced understanding of food security, Brazil has a national strategy for food and nutritional security – the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) Strategy – which consists of four pillars and roughly 30 initiatives:[33]

1. Coordination, Mobilisation and Control;

2. Access to Food;

3. Strengthening of Family Agriculture; and

4. Income Generation.

Significant programs include Bolsa Familia, a conditional credit transfer program aimed at improving human capital through health and education and named as the credit transfer roughly allows for the purchase of a basket of food for the family. The program reflects the multisectoral approach to FNS that is being undertaken in Brazil, with the program being targeted at ending the cycle of poverty by encouraging better health and education outcomes through the conditions imposed to receive the transfers. It is also noting that the transfers are made directly to women and has the secondary effect of challenging traditional conservative ideas about gender roles in Brazilian society.[34] Reviews of the program have confirmed that most of the cash is used on food, thus directly addressing food security, while the program has also been effective in increasing school attendance.[35] This in turn helps recipients to overcome the upfront price barriers associated with accessing food, while also addressing underlying causes of inequality which limit access.

The Financing of Family Agriculture Program (‘PRONAF’) also provides lines of credit, but for family farmers to promote local family centred agriculture through increasing farmers’ productive capacities, generating jobs in rural areas and increasing income for family farmers. This is extremely significant in Brazil, where family farming employs around 75% of labour in rural areas and accounts for 38% of national food production.[36] The program also indirectly counters the commodification of food by excluding crops favoured for their export value from being eligible for credit.[37] PRONAF also supports women through special credit lines called PRONAF Women. The program is reminiscent of the food sovereignty movement that is taking place in response to the corporate food regime, which is characterised by a focus on local production, small-scale agriculture, and preservation of biodiversity.[38] La Via Campesina, an international farmers organisation, introduced a definition of food sovereignty at the World Food Summit in 1996: “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through sustainable methods and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems.”[39] This movement is closely tied to international human rights, with Patel arguing that the call for food sovereignty is precisely about a right to food.[40] It is clear that this definition largely aligns with the focus on food and nutritional security that is pursued in Brazilian policy. Food sovereignty was essentially adopted as a right in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (‘UNDROP’) in 2018 – Article 15 of the Declaration provides that there is a “right to produce food and the right to adequate nutrition” for farmers, as well as imposing an obligation on states to ensure that people will “enjoy physical and economic access at all times is produced and consumed sustainability and equitably, respecting their cultures”.[41] Nevertheless, the UNDROP, as a General Assembly resolution, is not binding on member states and requires further action to create any legal entitlements or obligations to fill this vacuum of enforcement.

Despite the success of Brazil’s attempts to achieve food and nutritional security, these public policies and the role of the state in challenging the corporate food regime faces limitations. Significantly, the political nature of the state renders it vulnerable to corporate forces. Though the state has been a key actor in opposing features of the corporate food regime, its power and actions are ultimately dictated by society. In turn, the effectiveness of any nation in challenging the neoliberal features of the current food regime are inherently advanced and constrained by the rise and fall of progressive and conservative forces.

C Implications for Regulatory Change

The case study on Brazil provides two key takeaways when considering regulatory reform at the international level.

1 Role of the State and Domestic Politics

There is potential for the state to take on a greater role in resisting the dominant neoliberal treatment of food and championing food sovereignty principles and values at the national level in order to achieve food security.

The participation of existing international organisations in creating Brazil’s food and nutritional security policy response indicates that they are likely to prioritise upholding the corporate food regime, which states need to play a larger role in resisting. While the World Bank and FAO both recognised the dominance of small family farms and their economic significance to Brazilian food production and job creation, they nevertheless recommended a reduction of public intervention in agriculture.[42] Given the significant role that international organisations and their recommendations tend to play in shaping the structural reform undertaken by developing countries,[43] it is important to recognise that these organisations are nevertheless driven by a desire to promote their own values, which often reflect the neoliberal leanings of their member states. States need to remain cognizant of this and challenge their recommendations and guidelines where necessary. The case study of Brazil reveals that the state can be a powerful advocate for food sovereignty.

Former President Lula’s key role in creating and implementing the Zero Hunger Strategy has also been cited as a driving force behind the policy’s success.[44] There is clearly a role to be played by individual politicians in the domestic sphere when challenging corporate agendas.

2 A Need to Challenge the Current Food Security Regime Complex

There is also a clear need to decentralise the role of existing international regimes that approach global governance of food through a neoliberal stance. The formation of the WTO and international treaties such as the Agreement on Agriculture have contributed a very strong normative orientation to food governance which has proven mostly unsuccessful in addressing food security: the liberalisation of agriculture in line with market-oriented principles.[45]

While the movement against the corporate food regime has been articulated clearly by La Via Campesina, the organisation itself has no power; it is not a form or source of international law and ultimately has limited power to challenge neoliberalism in food governance apart from influencing policy, though the organisation played a central role in advancing the UNDROP. Nevertheless, as discussed above, as a Declaration made by the General Assembly, the UNDROP is not binding on member states, thus leaving a void that may be filled by a new international regime.

Brazil’s approach to food security and poverty reduction has already been implemented in other Latin American and African countries given its initial achievements in addressing food security.[46] In turn, an international regime focused on championing the values associated with food sovereignty and challenging the traditional power structures associated with the corporate food regime may be beneficial to realising the ultimate goal of food security.


While the establishment of a ‘food’-specific international regime is clearly not the panacea to the problems identified with the third food regime, this section considers the potential for an international organisation that may challenge the dominance of neoliberalist views that currently dominate the global governance of food.

A Composition

Member states would likely be made up of those considered developing countries as the effects of neoliberalist approaches to food security have impacted them disproportionately;[47] these are the countries that have the most to gain from food sovereignty gaining more momentum on the international stage. Developed countries such as the United States and Australia who voted against the UNDROP would likely be excluded from membership of this new regime, or have little to no interest in participating, as its agenda would largely work against their own interests.

B Agenda

The agenda of this regime is likely to overlap with various UN specialised agencies, such as the FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development which are focused specially on reducing rural poverty.[48] Its agenda should largely be to challenge the dominance of neoliberal approaches to food security and global food governance, as such approaches have clearly failed to achieve food security and only served to enable the monopolisation of power by large agribusiness corporations.[49]

Such an agenda may be implemented in various manners, such as:

1. The establishment of an additional platform for developing countries to advocate for their own rights and interests;

2. An agency to coordinate existing international bodies; or

3. An international interest group.

1 Additional Platform

As previously discussed, the WTO has become one of the main organs governing food and agriculture at the international level. However, developing countries face significant disadvantages such as lack of expertise and information resources to navigate WTO rules and negotiations. Furthermore, despite the support provided to developing countries by other international organisations such as the World Bank, it has been often noted that counter-productive policies of the WTO tend to offset any benefits gained from attempts to implement food security policies.[50] Critics have likened the impact of the WTO’s policies, as pursued by advanced economies, to a ladder used by an individual to climb up that is later destroyed to keep others below.[51]

The establishment of an additional front on which developing countries can have their voices heard may be beneficial in challenging the dominance of one international organisation. This approach is also supported by the scholarship on fragmentation in international law. As discussed in Part II, the creation of additional international regimes furnishes protection against concentrations of power in one regime, and accordingly, the countries who hold more power in agenda-setting.[52] While this may contribute to forum-shopping, it nevertheless serves as a legitimate method for weaker parties such as developing nations to challenge existing rules.[53] For example, this new forum may allow countries to overcome the intellectual property protection of biotechnologies that have the potential to widely alleviate hunger, akin to how Brazil chose the UN Human Rights Council as an alternate forum for the debate on affordable medicines that may breach intellectual property rights rules under other international regimes.[54]

2 Coordination Agency

An international body to coordinate the responses of UN agencies and other organisations involved with financing agricultural restructures in developing countries may be beneficial. As previously discussed, the reforms pushed by international organisations tend to be neoliberal in nature and do not benefit the country in question. Having an intermediary body to coordinate international support and ensure that policies will account for each country’s specific circumstances may assist developing countries in making better choices. Alternatively, an international organisation responsible for research and advisory functions to these countries may help them obtain a better outcome for their nation, both financially and in terms of achieving food security.

3 Interest Group

An international organisation with a focus on reining in the powers currently exercised by transnational agribusiness through lobbying for better access arrangements for developing countries to valuable plant varieties through UPOV may also help reduce the existing inequalities that currently exist between developed and developing nations.

C Fit in Relation to Other Regimes

As noted above, its agenda would likely overlap with numerous UN agencies, However, for the regime to play a role beyond policy guidance, it may be best set up as an individual intergovernmental organisation, closer in nature to the WTO rather than the UN.

D Potential Challenges

Such a proposal is likely to face numerous challenges. These include practical and legal challenges.

Firstly, the establishment of a new regime will inevitably face resistance from the states currently enjoying power and control through the current regimes. For example, countries such as the United States and European Union who are currently able to apply heavy agricultural subsidies through the WTO would not be supportive of an additional platform where their actions may be challenged. Moreover, given the possibility of significant pushback, the resulting regime may be significantly curtailed in terms of any negotiation and enforcement powers, leaving it to perform an extremely policy-oriented, advisory role, in which case there would be little to differentiate it from the many UN specialised agencies that already exist.

Further difficulties for implementation and enforcement arise if the new regime is ambitious enough to tackle the problem of agribusiness and corporate free riders enjoying little to no regulation in certain areas of their operations. The main participants in the creation of international law – nation states – are inevitably susceptible to lobbying by powerful corporations, especially if national interests such as economic growth are at stake. Despite the success of Brazil’s Zero Hunger Strategy, it was nevertheless designed in a way that minimised the threat posed to corporate interests.[55] Moreover, the country’s economic growth was also crucial to the strategy’s success.[56] Any international regime that threatens to impact economic growth or infringe on the powers of transnational agribusiness will likely be met with fierce opposition both domestically and internationally, no matter how necessary the regime may be perceived. States could simply refuse to participate in the regime or enforce any of its regulations.

Finally, the creation of a new regime represents further fragmentation which does pose its own problems. Given the nature of this new regime and its goal of challenging food security, conflicts with existing international organisations are inevitable. It can undermine legal certainty, in turn eroding the rule of law. Ultimately, extreme fragmentation may lead to a loss of legitimacy of international law, which threatens its very existence.[57]


Evidently, establishing a ‘food’-specific international regime will not address the pressing issue of food security. Given the multidimensional nature of food itself and the concept of food security, it is extremely difficult to identify the scope of a food-specific international regime. Moreover, fragmentation of global governance has benefits especially when considering the regime complex for food security, one which is marked by large power disparities between the participants. Through the case study of Brazil, which has been mostly successful in alleviating food security due to its multidimensional focus on food and nutritional security, it is argued that a food sovereignty approach should be championed at the international level in order to address the downfalls identified with current global governance of food.

[1] Anne Saab, ‘An International Law Approach to Food Regime Theory’ (2018) 31(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 251, 253.

[2] Michael Carolan, The Sociology of Food and Agriculture (Taylor & Francis Group, 2012) <> .

[3] Ralph W Phillips, FAO, Its Origins, Formation, and Evolution, 1945-1981 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1981).

[4] D Shaw, World Food Security: A History Since 1945 (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007) <> (‘World Food Security’).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ruosi Zhang, ‘Food Security: Food Trade Regime and Food Aid Regime Part I: General Articles’ (2004) 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 565, 566 (‘Food Security’).

[7] Matias E Margulis, ‘The Regime Complex for Food Security: Implications for the Global Hunger Challenge Special Focus: Regime Complexity’ (2013) 19(1) Global Governance 53 (‘The Regime Complex for Food Security’).

[8] Anne Peters, ‘The Refinement of International Law: From Fragmentation to Regime Interaction and Politicization’ (2017) 15(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 671 (‘The Refinement of International Law’); Anne Orford, ‘Food Security, Free Trade, and the Battle for the State’ (2015) 11(2) Journal of International Law and International Relations 1, 22.

[9] Mikael Bergius, ‘Expanding the Corporate Food Regime in Africa through Agricultural Growth Corridors: The Case of Tanzania’ 20, 2; Saab (n 1) 262.

[10] Saab (n 1) 262–263.

[11] Saab (n 1).

[12] Ibid 254.

[13] Gabriela Pechlaner and Gerardo Otero, ‘The Third Food Regime: Neoliberal Globalism and Agricultural Biotechnology in North America’ (2008) 48(4) Sociologia Ruralis 351 (‘The Third Food Regime’).

[14] Ibid.

[15] Gregory Shaffer, ‘Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach’ in Power in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 3.

[16] Pechlaner and Otero (n 13) 353.

[17] Shaffer (n 15) 3.

[18] Orford (n 8) 22.

[19] Gerhard Hafner, ‘Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’ (2004) 25(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 849, 859.

[20] Peters (n 8) 674.

[21] Michael Fakhri, ‘Food as a Matter of Global Governance’ (2015) 11(2) Journal of International Law and International Relations 68.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Stefano Ghinoi, Valdemar João Wesz Junior and Simone Piras, ‘Political Debates and Agricultural Policies: Discourse Coalitions behind the Creation of Brazil’s Pronaf’ (2018) 76 Land Use Policy 68 (‘Political Debates and Agricultural Policies’).

[24] Monica Garcia-Salmones, ‘Food Security and International Organisations: Why Not Global? Why Not Now?’ in Cambridge Companion to International Organisations Law (Cambridge University Press, 2022) <> (‘Food Security and International Organisations’).

[25] Philip McMichael, ‘Global Development and The Corporate Food Regime’ in Frederick H. Buttel and Philip McMichael (eds), New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2005) 265 <>.

[26] Pechlaner and Otero (n 13).

[27] Weber Antonio Neves Do Amaral and Alessandro Peduro, Food Security: The Brazilian Case (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2010).

[28] Ibid 6.

[29] Anuradha Mittal, ‘The 2008 Food Price Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies’ in UNCTAD/GDS/MDP/G24/2009/3 (United Nations, 2009) <>.

[30] Kate Kilpatrick, Fighting Hunger in Brazil: Much Achieved, More to Do (Oxfam International, 2010).

[31] Danuta Chmielewska and Darana Souza, The Food Security Policy Context in Brazil (Country Study No 22, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 2011) 3.

[32] Margulis (n 7) 54.

[33] Chmielewska and Souza (n 32) 4.

[34] Alessandro Bonanno and Steven A Wolf, Resistance to the Neoliberal Agri-Food Regime: A Critical Analysis (Taylor & Francis Group, 2017) 101–102 <> (‘Resistance to the Neoliberal Agri-Food Regime’).

[35] Marilia Mendonca Leao and Renato Maluf, ‘Effective Public Policies and Active Citizenship: Brazil’s Experience of Building a Food and Nutrition Security System’ <;hrdhrd98242014003>.

[36] Issa Ibrahim Berchin et al, ‘The Contributions of Public Policies for Strengthening Family Farming and Increasing Food Security: The Case of Brazil’ (2019) 82 Land Use Policy 573, 575 (‘The Contributions of Public Policies for Strengthening Family Farming and Increasing Food Security’); Kilpatrick (n 31) 2.

[37] Ghinoi, Wesz Junior and Piras (n 23) 77.

[38] Saab (n 1) 260.

[39] Elizabeth Mpofu and Henk Hobbelink, ‘Small Farmers Have the Answer to Feeding the World. Why Isn’t the UN Listening? : Via Campesina’, Via Campesina English (online, 24 September 2021) <> (‘Small Farmers Have the Answer to Feeding the World. Why Isn’t the UN Listening?’).

[40] Raj Patel, ‘Food Sovereignty’ (2009) 36(3) The Journal of Peasant Studies 663, 663.

[41] United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, A/RES/73/165, (21 January 2019, adopted 17 December 2019).

[42] Ghinoi, Wesz Junior and Piras (n 23) 73.

[43] Muesiri O Ashe, ‘International Agencies and the Quest for Food Security in Nigeria, 1970-2015’ (2019) SI(1) Ubuntu : Journal of Conflict Transformation 251.

[44] Kilpatrick (n 31) 3.

[45] Margulis (n 7) 58.

[46] Kilpatrick (n 31) 5.

[47] Pechlaner and Otero (n 13) 376.

[48] ‘Vision’, IFAD <>.

[49] Philip McMichael, ‘Commentary: Food Regime for Thought’ (2016) 43(3) The Journal of Peasant Studies 648, 651 (‘Commentary’).

[50] Ashe (n 44) 268.

[51] Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem Press, 2002) (‘Kicking Away the Ladder’).

[52] Peters (n 8) 681.

[53] Peters (n 8).

[54] Cohen, ‘Fragmentation’ in Fundamental Concepts for International Law: The Construction of a Discipline (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) 10 <>.

[55] Kilpatrick (n 31) 4.

[56] Kilpatrick (n 31).

[57] Peters (n 8) 680.

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