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University of New South Wales Law Journal Student Series |
ANNIKA DREGO
The Palestinian liberation movement is a defining political conflict of the modern era, comprising a series of revolutions spanning from 1948 to the present day. In the wake of Israeli colonisation, dispossession and displacement, the Palestinian struggle for independence exemplifies the radical revolutionary movements described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Peter Hallward in their analyses of the general will and the ways in which that will is asserted by the people. This article will apply the political theories of Rousseau and Hallward to the history of the Palestinian liberation movement, arguing that an analysis of the general will enables us to understand the goals and challenges of the Palestinian diaspora in its quest for revolution and independence. Part II of this article will provide an overview of the theoretical concepts and frameworks that will be drawn upon in this article. This part will set out the four propositions set out by Hallward regarding a collective’s ability to assert its general will. These four propositions will be elaborated on in the subsequent parts of this article, namely:
1. The collective must congregate to form a general will in accordance with their common purpose;
2. Individuals must be minimally differentiated and equal within the collective;
3. The collective has a duty to assemble to impose its general will; and
4. The government must act as an agent that executes the collective’s general will.[1]
Drawing on Hallward’s first proposition, Part III will provide a contextual background of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Palestinian resistance movement, positing that the general will of the Palestinian diaspora is formulated and enshrined in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence 1988.[2] Part IV will then discuss the role of the individual within the collective, arguing that the individual interests of Palestinian people do not undermine the general will of Palestine as a whole. Part V will evaluate the claim that assemblies that are concentrated in time and space are a precondition for a successful assertion of the general will. This part will argue that the geographically dispersed Palestinian population maintains its ability to conduct successful political demonstrations notwithstanding its lack of concentration in time and space. Finally, Part VI will critique the notion of representative democracy and discuss the role of the government in relation to the collective, utilising the Palestinian Fatah government as a case study.
Ultimately, this article will conclude that the Palestinian liberation movement serves as an effective case study that brings to light the strengths and weaknesses of both Rousseau’s and Hallward’s assessments of the general will, the social contract and representative democracy.
Arguably, a fundamental question at the core of political philosophy is how best to balance individual freedom against state authority.[3] This question remains salient in debates surrounding contemporary conflicts such as the Israel-Palestine conflict.[4] Rousseau aims to answer this question by putting forward the notion of the general will, that is, the source of law that is willed by each citizen within a collective.[5] This part will explain the key terms and concepts necessary to understand Rousseau’s theory of the general will, and discuss this theory in light of Hallward’s elaboration on Rousseau’s ideas.
A The Social Contract and the General Will
Underlying Rousseau’s philosophy is the idea that humans in the state of nature were healthy, happy, and fundamentally free.[6] It is argued that the state of nature existed before human civilisations were formed, and that humans during this period were solitary individuals that were not influenced by the will of others.[7] Over time, humans began to live in groups as communities, families and civil societies. Rousseau posits that these civil societies serve a two-fold purpose; to preserve an entitlement to private property for those who could afford possessions, and to protect the peace and safety of everyone within the society.[8]
Citizens are united within this society by the social contract; a social link between each individual citizen to the collective as a whole.[9] Under this social contract, all citizens must cooperate with one another to achieve and maintain order, state protection and social harmony.[10] In exchange, citizens must relinquish some of their individual freedoms that are incompatible with the will of the collective.[11] The social contract ensures that each person is sovereign but acts within the collective whole; by obeying the collective, Rousseau argues that each citizen obeys no one individual because all members of the collective are afforded the same rights and are equally devoted to the collective.[12] The social contract therefore functions as a means of establishing a collective body politic in which all persons collectively share sovereign power.[13] Meeting the needs of this sovereign collective is the main aim of civilised society, and this aim trumps the will of any individual sovereign, such as a King or other political leader.[14] By ensuring that all citizens are formally equal, the social contract facilitates the implementation of laws and conventions that apply equitably to all.[15]
For Rousseau, the will of the individual is eclipsed by the ‘general will’ of the collective.[16] The general will is the cumulative determination of the collective as a whole; it is what is willed by each and every person within the collective and reflects the common interests of civil society.[17] Rousseau argues that the general will is the only legitimate source of law.[18] It is conceived of via democratic processes, in which the general will is decided by citizens in a political assembly in line with the collective’s sense of justice and morality.[19] The general will does not have to be unanimously agreed upon, but any exclusion of an individuals’ right to voice their will or vote has the effect of diminishing and degrading the general will.[20] The state then has the role of carrying out the general will through law.[21] By obeying the law, the collective is obeying the general will; by obeying the collective will each individual obeys their own will, thus each individual remains free.[22]
It is clear that there are practical difficulties inherent in Rousseau’s conception of the general will and the social contract; a key problem is that direct self-rule by a collective of individual citizens, in which individual’s voice is heard in regard to every possible matter, is a difficult process to undertake.[23] As a result, Rousseau makes a distinction between a sovereign and a government.[24] For Rousseau, the sovereign comprises the people as a whole and expresses its general will in the form of laws.[25] On the other hand, the government is the body that applies the law and takes action on behalf of the state in compliance with the general will.[26] The distinction between the sovereign and the government can be seen in circumstances where a collective decides on a constitutional framework for a civilised society; the government is then tasked with enacting laws that correspond with the agreed upon constitution.[27] Rousseau stipulates that the sole role of the government is to execute the general will.[28] If the government deviates from this general will and instead enacts its own will, it loses its authority over the collective.[29]
B What is a ‘People’ and What is their Will?
Hallward develops social contract theory further by delving into the notion of a collective or a ‘people’.[30] Hallward presents a bipartite classification of ‘the people’; ‘the masses’ and ‘the realm’.[31] The realm refers to a civil society that is hierarchically constructed.[32] In the realm, each individual has a place within the hierarchy, and the degree of power and freedom that one can attain is influenced by where the individual sits within the hierarchy.[33] The realm serves to preserve the status of an elite, upper class, and oppress and subordinate the lower classes.[34] On the other hand, the masses are a collective that is made up of individuals.[35] The differences between each individual within the mass do not impact their ability to assert their will in relation to the collective.[36] The masses, Hallward argues, embody the general will in a Rousseauian sense; it represents a universal and egalitarian mechanism for asserting the will of the people and reduce class divisions.[37]
For Hallward, the masses must directly and deliberately participate in a political process to assert their will.[38] This process requires a collective struggle. Hallward notes that such a struggle must be voluntary, rather than forced by external parties.[39] The process of achieving sovereignty for the masses can be broken down into four key steps. First, the masses must congregate and formulate a general will in line with their common purpose.[40] Next, it must be ensured that individuals within the collective are minimally differentiated; in other words, class hierarchies and differences in power must be reduced, if not eradicated.[41] Third, the masses must assemble to impose their general will.[42] Finally, the government must act as a mere agent that executes the general will of the masses, rather than a dominant and oppressive body.[43] Underlying the first step of this process is the idea that a popular demand must be consciously formulated, clear and well-organised, and made with ‘unshakeable conviction’.[44] If these conditions are met, Hallward argues, the masses have the best possible chance at successfully asserting their general will. The second, third and fourth steps will be further analysed in Parts III, IV and V of this article.
Rousseau and Hallward agree that the general will is fundamentally inalienable, indivisible and advantageous to the public.[45] It is inalienable in the sense that it is formulated by and for the people, and the sovereignty of the people is conferred upon them by their own will.[46] Further, it is indivisible as it is complete and shared by the collective.[47] If the will were divided or inconsistent, it would no longer be a general will.[48] Finally, the general will is fundamentally virtuous, right and advantageous to the collective; by negotiating the differences between the individual wills, the interests that are common to all individuals will be discovered.[49]
A The Israel-Palestine Conflict
The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the longest running territorial conflicts in global history.[50] It is, at its core, a dispute between two self-determination movements that have asserted claims to one territory; these are the Palestinian Arab nationalists and the Jewish Israeli Zionists.[51] Both parties assert that their land entitlements have existed for thousands of years, however many historians argue that the conflict, in its current form, began at the end of World War Two.[52] During this time, Jewish people were fleeing extreme oppression and persecution at the hands of the burgeoning nationalist and antisemitic movements that were gaining favour throughout Europe during the Holocaust.[53] In opposition to this, Zionist sentiments began to increase in popularity among Jewish refugees, which called for the establishment of Israel, a homeland state for Jewish people in the territory that was then known as Palestine.[54] Palestine, at the time, was a Muslim-Arab majority territory that was controlled by the British Empire.[55]
In the period between 1896 and 1948, hundreds of thousands of Jewish people migrated to Palestine, with the bulk of this group resettling during the Holocaust.[56] The mass migration of Jewish people was interpreted by the Arabs as a colonial invasion, who resisted the Israeli Zionist claims to the land.[57] In 1947, the land was partitioned into two territories – Israel and Palestine – by the United Nations in an attempt to curb the rising conflicts between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Zionists.[58]
The partition was unsuccessful and resulted in several wars between the two opposing parties, the most significant of which occurred in 1948 and 1967.[59] The territorial lines between Israel and Palestine were disputed and re-established as a result of these wars.[60] The 1948 war, known as ‘Nakba’, caused the death and statelessness of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, resulting in the destruction of approximately 600 Palestinian municipalities and the expulsion of 85% of inhabitants from their homelands.[61] Following these attacks, the state of Israel enacted exclusionary property laws that prevented Palestinians from reclaiming their land.[62] ‘Nakba’, the Arabic word for ‘catastrophe’, was a defining event for the Palestinian diaspora and serves as a symbol of Israeli oppression, with lingering ramifications for Palestinians and their general will.[63] The 1967 war further entrenched the ethnic cleansing, dispossession and statelessness of the Palestinian people as it enabled Israel to take charge of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, two regions that were home to substantial Palestinian populations.[64] Due to this long history of displacement, Palestinians are scattered across the world, as migrants, refugees and detainees.[65]
B Palestinian Politics
Today, there are several national representative bodies that act for Palestine and strive to work towards its liberation. A key body is the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (‘PLO’), which oversees the Palestinian National Council (‘PNC’) and Palestinian National Authority (‘PNA’).[66] The PLO holds itself out as the embodiment of the Palestinian resistance movement and the only legitimate advocate for Palestinian interests.[67] The PNC, controlled by the PLO, is responsible for serving Palestinians within the territories that have been occupied by Israeli forces and acts as the executive arm of government.[68] Finally, the PNA is a semi-autonomous interim government.[69] Its role is to negotiate with Israel and manage and supervise Palestinian territories during the interim before a deal is made.[70] The PNA falls within the ambit of Israeli power, whereas the PLO and PNC proclaim to be independent of Israel.[71] The PLO, PNC and PLA have all been hit with myriad claims of corruption.[72]
There are two central political parties that feature in Palestinian politics; Fatah and Hamas.[73] Fatah is a nationalist, secular political party that has been the dominant force in Palestinian politics for many years.[74] It controls the PLO, PNC and PLA and governs the West Bank of the territory.[75] Following its initial inception in 1964, Fatah aimed to defeat Israel and reinstate a wholly Palestinian nation using military force.[76] However in 1993, Fatah affirmed Israel’s right to exist as a state and instead sought to enter peace negotiations to enable Israel and Palestine to coexist.[77] Fatah is currently lead by President Mahmoud Abbas.[78] In contrast, Hamas, Fatah’s rival political organisation, is an Islamist militant group that refuses to recognise the Israeli state as legitimate.[79] Hamas has waged war against Israel since its creation in 1987, and independently governs the Gaza Strip.[80] The rivalry between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank has complicated peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel.[81] It should be noted that Palestinian refugees and other people who have been dispossessed from the region do not have the right to vote or assert themselves politically during elections.[82]
C The Intifada
The Arabic word ‘intifada’ refers to a resistance movement, uprising or rebellion.[83] Translated to mean ‘shake-off’, intifada connotes an uprising against an oppressive political force.[84] To date, there have been at least two intifadas during the contemporary Israel-Palestine conflict.[85] The First Intifada was a series of violent protests from 1987 to 1993 against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.[86] These riots are said to have arisen as the beatings, deportations and imprisonments without trial of Palestinians at the hands of Israeli authorities increased.[87] The Second Intifada occurred from 2000 to 2005 and involved violent riots in response to an offensive visit to a significant Islamic religious site by Israeli political leaders.[88] Some critics have argued that subsequent intifadas took place in 2014 and 2015, and that others are continuing to play out within the disputed territories.[89] The consensus among political theorists appears to be that the intifadas should be extolled as the measures against Israeli authorities were cohesive, targeted and independent.[90] However, these actions ultimately failed to generate any real and enduring political change or improvements to the rights of the Palestinian people.[91]
D Palestine’s General Will
Hallward states that the collective struggle to assert a general will begins with the congregation and formulation of this general will.[92] A consequence of the Israel-Palestine conflict is that many Palestinians have been displaced from their homelands and dispersed across the world, with many Palestinians residing in refugee camps and temporary housing across Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[93] The fact that so many Palestinians are separated from their families and communities poses difficulties for these groups when formulating and asserting their general will.[94] Noting that Hallward and Rousseau have identified that assembly and congregation are fundamental to forming a general will, the question arises of how the dispersed Palestinian diaspora can collectivise and determine their general will.[95]
The answer to this question, as argued by Palestinian Rousseauian academic Karma Nabulsi, can be found in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence 1988 (‘Declaration’).[96] The Declaration was drafted by the PNC and is said to represent Palestinians who remain in Palestine as well as those who have been displaced by Israeli forces and other military operations.[97] Nabulsi argues that the Declaration is a direct expression of the general will of the Palestinian people; it declares that Palestinians have a longstanding connection to the territory that has existed since before the Nakba.[98] It also declares that Palestine will be ‘liberated to and from the homeland’ and demands that its independence and sovereignty is recognised.[99]
Yossi Yonah posits that the Declaration is an essential source of the Palestinian state’s identity, thereby promoting their political legitimacy, unity and social harmony.[100] This corresponds with the Rousseauian notion that the general will serves as a social tie that links the individual to the collective.[101] This general will unites the Palestinian people, despite their displacement, and this will is in turn imposed by Palestinians. This is demonstrated by the assembly and congregation of Palestinians in refugee camps throughout the Middle East.[102] Although Palestinians have been alienated from their right to vote for their own interests, many communities within refugee camps have established internal democracies and public assemblies that strive towards liberating Palestine.[103] The committees, unions and political associations that have been witnessed across numerous refugee camps imitate those championed by Rousseau.[104] These makeshift assemblies in refugee camps across the world are a means of asserting the Palestinian general will that is enshrined in the Declaration.
The Palestinian general will is further exemplified through the intifadas and other violent resistance movements. In addition to the intifadas, Hamas and its followers have used suicide bombings, gun violence and military rockets against Israeli forces.[105] Such demonstrations correspond with the third step in the process of a collective struggle outlined by Hallward; the imposition of the general will by the masses.[106] However, these movements have been short-lived and tactically unsuccessful, evinced by the failure to reclaim lost territories or obtain political concessions from Israel.[107] This lack of success is likely due to the impulsive and rushed nature of such demonstrations, given that they are usually a consequence of an aggravating action by Israel rather than the result of careful and deliberate planning.[108] This is in line with Hallward’s stipulation that a resistance movement ‘must be intellectual before it is physical’.[109] Notwithstanding this lack of deliberation, the intifadas nonetheless prove that there is collective solidarity among the Palestinian people, and a strong desire to impose their general will.
A foremost criticism of Rousseau’s theory of the general will stems from the role that the individual has within the collective.[110] Rousseau states that all individuals have private wills, which dictate their self-interested motives as single entities.[111] Insofar as the individual identifies with a collective, they then assume the identity of a ‘citizen’, and in doing so set aside their private wills in favour of the will of the collective or mass.[112] Therefore, Rousseau argues, the general will is the property of the collective, as it stems from the collective’s deliberations and debate, and the property of the individual, given that the individual identifies as part of the masses and shares its collective will.[113] Through this collective will and common purpose, the will of the individual and the will of the masses are one and the same.
However, Rousseau acknowledges that each individual has a distinct private and public life. Through entering the social contract, the individual relinquishes enough of her liberty, powers and property as is necessary for the good of the collective.[114] Outside of this, the individual maintains their liberty and freedom.[115] Critics argue that inherent in Rousseau’s theory is a paradox of individuality and freedom; if individual wills are only assured when they do not compromise the general will of the collective, this prevents the individual from truly asserting their own private will.[116] The result of this, critics argue, is that the individual is rendered subordinate to the masses and is placed under the thumb of authoritarian rule in pursuit of the general will.[117] Applying this criticism to the Palestinian liberation movement, one could argue that it is false to say that the Declaration truly embodies the will of each individual within the Palestinian diaspora, because it would be impossible to take into account the individual interests and wills of each person in the collective.[118]
This article posits that such critiques oversimplify and fail to grasp the fundamental assertion that underpins Rousseau’s conception of the social contract; that the will of the individual and the will of the collective are not diametrically opposing forces. The collective or mass is made up of a diverse group of individuals that possess sufficient individual freedom to bargain and advocate for themselves and the collective when determining the general will.[119] Although these individuals renounce some of their autonomy and liberty when entering the social contract, they do so understanding that not all of their interests and wills will correspond with the general will; the individual consents to this when they enter the social contract.[120] Although a manifestation of the general will may not completely align with one’s individual will, one’s participation in the social contract entails an acceptance that the general will aims to protect the common interests of the collective.[121] By participating in the collective, the individual affirms and accepts its general will.
To apply this notion to the Palestinian situation, it can be accurately said that the Declaration represents the general will of the Palestinian diaspora.[122] This is because the Declaration was formed by travelling to the many refugee camps across Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank and consulting with committee representatives who had been democratically elected by Palestinian refugees within these communities.[123] Each and every individual was involved in creating and affirming the Declaration through their participation in the social contract as members of the Palestinian collective.
Robin Douglass also makes the important point that the general will is formed under dire and desperate conditions, such as those experienced by the Palestinian diaspora over the past several decades.[124] Given these dire circumstances, the foremost concerns of Palestinians are to liberate Palestine and prevent dispossession and death at the hands of Israeli forces.[125] The unfortunate reality for the people of Palestine is that the threat of violence, tyranny and dispossession leaves little freedom to conduct nuanced debates about the particulars of individual wills.[126]
Hallward and Rousseau agree that all citizens within the collective or mass must actively participate in the political process to formulate and maintain the general will.[127] It is argued that assembling as a collective is not only a right but a duty, as this active participation through political demonstration is the source of the collective’s sovereign power.[128] The process of assembly must happen regularly and repetitively, and must involve active participation from all citizens of the collective; it is not sufficient for an assembly to only occur occasionally when an unusual or significant matter needs to be deliberated on.[129] According to Rousseau, if the people only choose to obey the will of the collective, rather than actively influence and participate in it, the general will and its sovereignty is dissolved.[130]
Hallward in particular is a proponent of mass assemblies, and asserts that assemblies and political demonstrations must be as strong, vibrant and involve as many people as possible.[131] It is argued that mass association is the most effective means of imposing the general will, and that through this mass association, the collective is at its most sovereign and powerful.[132] Assemblies also serve an important function in recognising, strengthening and refining the general will, as they provide a forum in which individuals can freely debate and negotiate with one another.[133]
Hallward asserts that concentration in time and space are integral to empowering the collective.[134] The masses must gather in a significant location at a pivotal moment in time, and the individuals that form the masses must be present in the space in high numbers.[135] By mobilising in a single space at a specific point in time, the collective can transform the space into a rallying point which captures the imagination and enthusiasm of the people, thereby further asserting the general will.[136]
The collective is at its strongest when it is concentrated in time and space, but when the individuals within the collective are dispersed, the collective itself becomes weak.[137] Hallward asserts that this fact is often known by the forces that the collective seeks to overthrow; whenever a political assembly begins to form, the top priority of the ruling class is to disperse and separate the crowd to quell the demonstration and minimise its reach.[138] These dispersals are effective in curbing political assemblies because they interfere with the time and space of the movement.[139] Once the collective is no longer concentrated in time and space, its power and momentum evaporates. An example of this can be seen in the Palestinian demonstrations in response to President Mamoud’s cancellation of the 2021 election.[140] In response, hundreds of Palestinians assembled in the West Bank to protest against the corrupt Fatah regime.[141] Seeking to end the demonstrations, Fatah soldiers were tasked with dispersing and segregating the crowd of protesters.[142]
The importance of time and space has unsettling implications for the Palestinian liberation movement, given that the Palestinian people have been dispossessed and dispersed across the world. Because of this disenfranchisement, Palestinians lack a homeland or physical space to congregate in. However, Nabulsi argues that is it unnecessary for the Palestinian people to have a common physical locus, and asserts that the Palestinian dispossession should not take away from their identity as a unified people.[143] Despite this claim, the practical difficulties of impactfully mobilising a populace that is largely confined to refugee camps and militarised zones should not be understated.
Applying Hallward’s conception of time and space, it would appear that the scattered and dispersed Palestinian diaspora has little chance of success in assembling to impose their general will. However, Nabulsi argues that the intifadas and other demonstrations suggest that this dispossession has not prevented Palestinians from mobilising to condemn Israeli authority and assert their general will.[144] Although the intifadas were short-lived and have not yet achieved Palestinian liberation, they indicate that the lack of concentration in time and space of the Palestinian populace does not necessarily preclude the collective from effectively assembling.[145]
Although Hallward asserts that concentration in time and physical space is critical to the success of an assembly, the Palestinian liberation movement suggests that this is not the case. This is in part owed to the digital revolution and the increased accessibility of smart technology, which enables the collective to gather together in a digital space.[146] The proliferation of social media and other communication tools has enabled Palestinians to discuss and refine the general will, organise assemblies and demonstrations, and expand the reach of the Palestinian liberation movement far beyond the Israel-Palestine territories.[147] A key example of this is the #FreePalestine hashtag, which gained prominence on platforms such as Twitter, Instagram and TikTok.[148] This hashtag and similar methods of communication enable Palestinian activists to share information and organise protests. Social media technology has therefore enabled dispossessed Palestinians to congregate in a digital rather than physical space; Hallward may therefore be correct in stating that concentration in time and space is essential, but this space may be located online rather than within a particular territory.
However, much like physical assemblies, digital assemblies are at risk of being dispersed by external authorities. Censorship laws and online moderation mechanisms have proven to be very effective means of separating and silencing digital Palestinian assemblies. Because social media movements occur within the domain of privately owned technology companies, information can be censored or removed by external parties at will.[149] An example of this occurred when Twitter, a popular social media app, blacklisted the #FreePalestine hashtag, thereby preventing people from accessing information about the Palestine liberation movement and assembling in dedicated digital spaces.[150] This vulnerability to censorship and dispersal further demonstrates that concentration in space, whether physical or digital, is an essential component of an effective assembly.[151] To assert their general will, Palestinians will need to find ways to assemble at a particular time and space, and mitigate the risks of dispersal.
VI REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MASSES
According to Hallward and Rousseau, there is a complex relationship between the government and the masses; ideally, the government would act as an agent that enacts the general will of the masses, but in practice, governments may threaten the sovereignty of the masses and abuse their position of power to execute their own will.[152] When such an abuse of power occurs, the government loses its authority to enact the general will.[153]
Rousseau is sceptical of the notion of representative democracy, arguing that sovereignty is inalienable and thus cannot be transferred to a representative body.[154] A representative body can never function as a true and legitimate representative of the people, as its representatives would be imbued with more legislative power than other members of the collective or mass.[155] This would result in an imbalance of power between the collective and its representatives and create inequalities that undermine the social contract.[156] Consequently, representative organisations such as governments cannot represent the general will; they can act as an agent that executes the general will, but cannot themselves represent it.[157] It follows that laws can only be created by the masses or collective, rather than the representatives of the people.[158] Any law which is established by the representatives, independent of the will of the people, is rendered void as the representatives are stripped of their sovereignty by departing from the general will.[159] Rousseau urges the collective to avoid thinking of itself as being represented; once a people accepts that they are represented, the social contract ceases to operate.[160]
Like Rousseau, Hallward has significant reservations about representative democracy, arguing that it causes the people to resemble the ‘realm’ rather than the ‘masses’.[161] Hallward asserts that representative democracy alienates and disenfranchises the collective from the political process, causing them to become political spectators rather than active participants; as a result, the representative remains in control of absolute power and the collective is deceived into believing that they maintain political power and sovereignty.[162] Further, representative democracy dilutes the general will of the masses as it denigrates robust political debate in favour of promoting illusory and misleading public marketing campaigns which serve to uphold private interests.[163]
The problems with this theoretical framework are made clear when it is applied to large states. When formulating his arguments against representative democracy, Rousseau intended for his ideas to be applied to smaller states, which are better suited to facilitate the direct participation of each individual in politics.[164] These arguments are less compelling in the context of larger collectives such as Palestine, in which the individuals that belong to the collective are dispersed across different territories. This dispersal limits the opportunities of the average individual to be involved in the political process and prevents them from exercising direct democracy.[165] In these situations, representative democracy may be the only practical alternative which enables all individuals to be somewhat involved in exercising their will. Unlike Rousseau, Hallward accepts the practical reality that representative democracy is unavoidable in large states, asserting that in these cases, representatives must be obedient agents of the general will.[166] However, Hallward fails to explain how this obedience can be ensured. The implication of this is that representative democracies in large states are forced to contend with the problems outlined by Hallward and Rousseau above.
A powerful representative of Palestine is President Abbas, leader of the PLO.[167] Abbas has the role of representing Palestinian interests in national arenas such as the meetings of the United Nations.[168] Although Abbas and the PLO are tasked with advocating for Palestinian interests and propelling the liberation movement, these representatives have been affiliated with Israeli and United States forces and are arguably entirely financially dependent on funding from these parties.[169] The interests of the United States and Israel are in direct opposition to those of the Palestinian diaspora, and Abbas and the PLO have been criticised for upholding foreign interests at the expense of Palestinian interests.[170]
The PLO is also alleged to have actively suppressed democratic processes among the Palestinian diaspora;[171] this is evinced by the fact that no elections have occurred since Fatah gained office over fifteen years ago.[172] The past decade has seen Fatah continuously announce and cancel elections, and it is likely that this rigmarole is designed to illegitimately appease foreign interests.[173] Critics have also suggested that these elections have been cancelled to prevent Fatah losing an election to Hamas, which has been gaining popular support within the region.[174] This erosion of democracy is a manifestation of the worst fears of Hallward and Rousseau, in which a corrupt representative body attains power and utilises it in pursuit of its own selfish interests, ignoring the general will of the Palestinian diaspora.
VII CONCLUSION
The Palestinian liberation movement serves as an impactful case study that elucidates the strengths, weaknesses and areas of contention present in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Peter Hallward. In particular, Hallward’s four criteria for an effective assertion of the collective’s general will serve as a useful framework for understanding the Israel-Palestine conflict. In line with Hallward’s first proposition, the Palestinian populace has congregated to stipulate a general will, enshrined in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence 1988. On application of Hallward’s second proposition, the individuals that comprise the Palestinian collective are afforded a voice and a means of participating in the political process without compromising their individual wills. Per Hallward’s third proposition, Palestinians have a long history of assembling to impose their general will, although the effectiveness of these assemblies has been adversely impacted by a lack of concentration in space and time. Finally, Hallward’s fourth proposition has not been met by the Palestinian liberation efforts, as a corrupt and self-interested representative government has prevented the Palestinian collective from asserting and achieving its general will.
[1] Peter Hallward, ‘Concentration or Representation: The Struggle for Popular Sovereignty’ (2017) 4 Cogent Arts and Humanities 1, 5.
[2] Palestinian Declaration of Independence 1988.
[3] Philip J Kain, ‘Rousseau, the General Will, and Individual Liberty’ (1990) 7(3) History of Philosophy Quarterly 315, 319.
[4] Roger Heacock, ‘Palestinians: The Land and the Law, An Inverse Relationship’ (2004) 57(2) Journal of International Affairs, 151, 160.
[5] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York: Carlton House, 1968) Book 1 ch 5.
[6] Ibid, Book 1 ch 1.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid Book 1 ch 2.
[9] Ibid Book 1 ch 5.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Tim Fisken, ‘Wilful Feelings: On the Effects of the Political Will’ (2015) University of California Press 11, 12.
[12] Ibid.
[13] H Woolner, ‘To What Extent Can Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “The Social Contract’ and John Berger’s “G” Be Said to Show Democracy as the Best Political Model for Society’ (2009) 1 University of Nottingham 308, 311.
[14] Rousseau (n 5) Book 2 ch 1.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid book 1 ch 5.
[17] Woolner (n 13) 309.
[18] Rousseau (n 5) Book 2 ch 1.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Jack DuVall and Peter Ackerman, A Force More Powerful (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 25.
[21] David Hiley, ‘The Individual and the General Will: Rousseau Reconsidered’ (1990) 7(2) University of Illinois Press 159, 160.
[22] Rousseau (n 5) Book 2 ch 1.
[23] Nicola-Ann Hardwick, ‘Rousseau and the Social Contract Tradition’ (2011) University of London 1, 9.
[24] Rousseau (n 5) Book 1 ch 5.
[25] Ibid Book 1 ch 2.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Hardwick (n 23) 8.
[28] Hiley (n 21) 159.
[29] Rousseau (n 5) Book 2 ch 1.
[30] Hallward (n 1) 4.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid 6.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Simon Aondohemba Saapera, ‘Evaluating the Social Contract Theoretical Ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: An Analytical Perspective on the State and Relevance to Contemporary Society’ (2015) 9(2) Department of Political Science Nigeria 36, 38.
[38] Hallward (n 1) 4.
[39] Ibid 5.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Peter Hallward, ‘From Prescription to Volition’ (2014) Politics and Culture 1.
[45] Rousseau (n 5) Book 2 ch 1.
[46] Hallward (n 1) 6.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid 7.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Rashid Ismail Khalidi, ‘Palestine’, Britannica (Webpage Article, 13 August 2021) <https://www.britannica.com/place/Palestine>.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (Columbia University Press, 2009) 21, 22.
[53] Mohammed Haddad, ‘Mapping Israeli Occupation, Al Jazeera (online, 18 May 2021) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/18/mapping-israeli-occupation-gaza-palestine>.
[54] Benjamin Brown, ‘The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’ (2019) 23(3) Journal of International Issues 58, 59.
[55] Ibid 60.
[56] Robert Olson, ‘The Arab-Palestine, Israel Conflict, 53 Years On: Perceptions and an Assessment’ (2002) 19(1) Journal of Third World Studies 37, 40.
[57] Ibid 41.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Phyllis Bennis, ‘The United Nations and Palestine: Partition and its Aftermath’ (1997) 19(3) Arab Studies Quarterly 47, 71.
[60] Ibid, 70.
[61] Adel Manna, ‘The Palestinian Nakba and its Continuous Repercussions’ (2013) 18(2) Israel Studies 86, 87.
[62] Elias Khoury, ‘Rethinking the Nakba’ (2012) 38(2) Critical Inquiry 250, 260.
[63] Ibid 266.
[64] Gideon Gera, ‘Israel and the June 1967 War: 25 Years Later’ (1992) 46(2) Middle East Journal 229, 233.
[65] Reuven Pedatzur, ‘Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967’ (1995) 49(2) Middle East Journal 269, 278.
[66] Mazen Masri, ‘Distinction Between PLO, PA, PNC and PLC’, Al Jazeera (online, 5 February 2006) <http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/projects/thepalestinepapers/201218205949656112.html> .
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Jamil Hilal, ‘The Fragmentation of the Palestinian Political Field’ (2018) 11(1) Contemporary Arab Affairs 189, 200.
[71] Asad Ghanem, ‘Palestinian Nationalism: An Overview’ (2013) 18(2) Israel Studies 11, 14.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Nathan Brown, ‘The Hamas-Fatah Conflict: Shallow but Wide’ (2010) 34(2) Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 35, 38.
[74] Nasuh Uslu and Ibrahim Karatas, ‘Evaluating Hamas’ Struggle in Palestine’ (2020) 22(1) Insight Turkey 109, 109.
[75] Ibid 112.
[76] Ibid 118.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid 109.
[79] Brown (n 73) 36.
[80] Ibid 35.
[81] Ibid 36.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and security of the Palestinian State’ (1995) 24(4) University of California Press 5, 7.
[84] Rahman, Omar, ‘The Real Threat to Palestine is a Crisis of Leadership’, Brookings (online 13 February 2020) <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/13/the-real-threat-to-palestine-is-a-crisis-of-leadership/>.
[85] Karma Nabulsi, ‘Being Palestinian: The General Will, Government and Opposition’ (2003) 38(4) Cambridge University Press 479, 485.
[86] Ibid, 487.
[87] Ramzy Baroud, “Palestine’s Impossible Democracy Dilemma’, Arab News (online, 8 March 2021) <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1822136>.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Mohammaed Ayoob, ‘The Beginning of a New Intifada’, The Strategist (online, 17 May 2021) <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-beginning-of-a-new-intifada/>.
[90] Karma Nabulsi, ‘The Hope of Shatila’, The Guardian, (online, 8 January 2004), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/08/comment.israelandthepalestinian.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Hallward (n 1) 6.
[93] Brown (n 54) 59.
[94] Nabulsi (n 85) 485.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid 488.
[97] Ibid 487.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid 489.
[100] Yossi Yonah, ‘Patriotism, Alienation and Well-being: Rousseau on Political Legitimacy’ (1997) 46 The Jerusalem Philosophical 293, 297.
[101] Rousseau (n 5) Book 2 ch 1.
[102] Nabulsi (n 85) 485.
[103] Yonah (n 100) 297.
[104] Nabulsi (n 85) 485.
[105] Ibid 487.
[106] Hallward (n 1) 9.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Yonah (n 100) 299.
[109] Hallward (n 1) 9.
[110] Brown (n 54) 59.
[111] Rousseau (n 5) Book 1 ch 5.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Douglass (n 124) 646.
[114] Rousseau (n 5) Book 1 ch 5.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Yonah (n 100) 300.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Nabulsi (n 143) 11.
[119] Hallward (n 1) 11.
[120] Rousseau (n 5) Book 1 ch 4.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Nabulsi (n 85) 485.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Robin Douglass, ‘Rousseau’s Critique of Representative Sovereignty: Principled or Pragmatic?’ (2013) 57(3) Journal of Political Science 635, 646.
[125] Ibid 647.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Hallward (n 1) 9.
[128] Rousseau (n 5) Book 1 ch 5.
[129] Hallward (n 1) 9.
[130] Rousseau (n 5) Book 1 ch 5.
[131] Hallward (n 1) 11.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Hiley (n 21) 160.
[134] Hallward (n 1) 9.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Hallward (n 1) 9.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Khaled Abu Toameh, ‘Mahmoud Abbas: The Biggest Loser in the Israel-Gaza Escalation’, The Jerusalem Post (online, 14 May 2021) <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/mahmoud-abbas-the-biggest-loser-in-israel-gaza-escalation-analysis-668101>.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Karma Nabulsi, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Collective Rights, Participation and Crafting Durable Solutions for Palestinian Refugees’ (2003) 4 Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights 3, 7.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Nabulsi (n 143) 7.
[146] Christina Ruby, ‘Social Media and Democratic Revolution; The Impact of New Forms of Communication Democracy’ (2014) City University of New York Academic Works 1, 7.
[147] Meeshaal Almahmoud, ‘Digital Intifada: A Discourse Analysis of the Palestine Solidarity Groups in Social Media’ (2016) University of Texas Scholar Works 1, 14.
[148] Ibid 13.
[149] Vivian Yee, ‘Social Media is the Mass Protest: Solidarity with Palestinians Grows’, The New York Times (online, 19 May 2021) <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/18/world/middleeast/palestinians-social-media.html>.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Omar Zahzah, ‘Digital Apartheid’, Al Jazeera (online, 13 May 2021) <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/13/social-media-companies-are-trying-to-silence-palestinian-voices>.
[152] Howard Doughty, ‘Rousseau and Representative Democracy Reconsidered’ (2014) 19(1) Public Sector Innovation Journal 2, 5.
[153] Hallward (n 1) 5.
[154] Rousseau (n 5) Book 1 ch 5.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Doughty (n 152) 6.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Rousseau (n 5) Book 2 ch 1.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Hallward (n 44) 22.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Doughty (n 152) 6.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Omar Rahman, ‘Elections in Palestine: Prelude or Play?’, Brookings (online, 24 February 2020) <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/02/24/elections-in-palestine-prelude-or-ploy/>.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Carnegie Group, ‘Halting Palestine’s Democratic Decline,’ Carnegie Group (online, 23 April 2021) <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/04/23/halting-palestine-s-democratic-decline-pub-84383>.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Marwa Fatafa and Alaa Tartir, ‘Why Palestinians Need to Reclaim the PLO’, Foreign Policy (online, 20 August 2020) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/20/palestinians-reclaim-plo-palestinian-authority-democracy/>.
[174] Khaled Abu Toameh, ‘Mahmoud Abbas: The Biggest Loser in the Israel-Gaza Escalation’, The Jerusalem Post (online, 14 May 2021) <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/mahmoud-abbas-the-biggest-loser-in-israel-gaza-escalation-analysis-668101>.
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