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Pearce, Christopher --- "A Broken Record: Amending and Removing Registrations on the PPSA" [2016] UTSLRS 11; (2016) 25 Australian Property Law Journal 173

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A Broken Record: Amending and Removing Registrations on the PPSA [2016] UTSLRS 11 (1 August 2016); (2016) 25 Australian Property Law Journal 173

Last Updated: 24 March 2017

A BROKEN RECORD: AMENDING AND REMOVING REGISTRATIONS ON THE PPSA
CHRISTOPHER PEARCE[*]

This article examines a recent decision of the Federal Court in National Australia Bank Ltd v Garrett, which considered the provisions applying to the removal of a registration under Pt 5.6 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (the PPSA). This article will outline the relevant facts and the conclusion of Beach J in approving the application for amendment of the relevant registration, before turning to examine the wider issues raised by the decision. This article discusses whether the present civil penalty and enforcement provisions under the PPSA are being appropriately utilized. In addition, this article addresses the current onus of proof under these provisions, and whether it is appropriate to place the evidentiary burden upon an applicant who applies for the Register to be amended rather than the party who has registered the disputed interest. Finally, this article considers whether the process for amending the Register under the PPSA should instead be aligned with that presently applied to the lodgment and removal of caveats under the Torrens title system. This article posits the view that the fundamental inquiries of each statutory test justify such a shift, and would remove considerable strain from parties presently affected by unmeritorious registrations.

INTRODUCTION

The PPSA has had an immense impact upon previously understood personal property concepts. The introduction of new terms such as ‘security interest’, ‘attachment’ and ‘perfection’ has reconfigured the property law landscape for lawyers and academics alike, and introduced confusion into some aspects of the law which were previously certain. Although the consultation process surrounding the PPSA was lengthy, and engaged a number of relevant stakeholders so as to preempt problematic issues from arising, the new system nevertheless has a number of issues that require ironing out. One such issue relates to the process for registering upon the Personal Property Securities Register (‘PPSR’), and how courts and other interested parties are able to prevent unmeritorious registrations from occurring.

By way of reference to a recent decision of the Federal Court of Australia in National Australia Bank Ltd v Garrett, this paper examines the existing rules for the removal of a registration under Pt 5.6 of the PPSA.[1] To begin, this paper outlines the relevant provisions of the PPSA which apply to the registration of security interests and the means by which parties can apply to have registrations removed. The paper then turns to outline the conduct of the purported secured party in the present case, Mr Garrett, whose conduct provides an example of the some of the more egregious attempts made by parties to register an unsubstantiated interest upon the PPSR. Next, this paper discusses the conclusions of Beach J, and his Honour’s reasons for ultimately granting the application for an amendment of the Register. In addition to issues arising from Beach J’s decision, this paper considers the wider problems currently effecting registrations upon the PPSR. In particular, this paper notes that no individual has yet fallen foul of the civil penalty provisions under the PPSA as a result of registering an unmeritorious interest. In the absence of any penalty having been enforced, this paper considers whether the present powers available to the Registrar are adequate to dissuade such conduct from occurring in the future. This paper then examines the current onus of proof under the provisions, and whether it is appropriate to instead place the evidentiary burden upon the applicant. Finally, this paper questions whether the process for amending the Register under the PPSA should be aligned with that presently applied to the lodgment and removal of caveats under the Torrens title system for real property, positing the view that the fundamental similarities between each system justify such a shift.

I THE REGISTRATION PROCESS UNDER CHAPTER 5 OF THE PPSA


The process for registering a security interest under the PPSA is governed by Chapter 5 of the Act. For a party to register on the PPSR they must register a financing statement with respect to a relevant ‘security interest’; with ‘security interest’ defined in accordance with s 12 of the PPSA.[2] In contrast to pre-PPSA registers which required the registration of a copy of the relevant security agreement, the aim of the financing change statement is not to communicate the terms of the agreement between the secured party and the grantor, but is instead registered for the purpose of alerting other parties that a secured party may already have an interest in the relevant collateral.[3] Under s 150(3), the Registrar is only obligated to register the financing statement or financing change statement if they are satisfied that the application is not frivolous or vexatious, and has not been made in contravention of s 151. Relevantly, s 151(1) provides that a person must not apply to register a financing statement or financing change statement unless they believe on reasonable grounds they are or will become a secured party in relation to the collateral. Crucially, s 151(1) is a civil penalty provision, with the consequence being that breach of the provision will permit an affected party to obtain damages pursuant to s 271 of the PPSA.

In the event that a registration has been defective or a party wishes for the registration to be amended, Pt 5.6 of the PPSA governs the applicable process. Pursuant to s 178, a person with an interest may make a demand in writing known as an ‘amendment demand’ to the secured party for a financing change statement to be registered to amend the registration.[4] Upon receipt of an amendment demand the secured party then has five business days within which to either register a financing change statement or commence court proceedings to challenge the demand.[5] The secured party may commence court action for an order with respect to the amendment demand, and the party who issued the demand may also do so if the five day period for a response has expired.[6] If the Court considers the amendment demand to be authorized it may order the Registrar to register a financing change statement to amend the registration.[7] Importantly, s 182 requires the court to have regard to s 178(1), which provides that an amendment demand will only be authorized if it satisfies the requirements under the table provided in s 178(1). That table provides two instances where a demand will be valid: where either no collateral at all, or any particular collateral described in the registration secures any obligation owed by a debtor to the secured party. In an application for an amendment demand brought before a court, the applicant will bear the onus of establishing that their demand was authorized within the meaning of s 178(1).

These provisions, and particularly the amendment demand procedure, were considered at length by the Federal Court in the recent decision of National Australia Bank Ltd v Garrett, which this paper will now turn to discuss.

II NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD V GARRETT

A The Facts


The Respondent, Andrew Garrett, was a vexatious litigant and undischarged bankrupt who made a number of registrations on the PPSR against the property of the Applicant, the National Australia Bank (‘NAB’). On 24 April 2016, the ‘Trustee for the Andrew Garrett Family Trust No. 4’ registered a financing statement on the PPSR, claiming a security interest in respect of collateral described as “All present and after-acquired property – No exceptions” of NAB. Following the registration, Mr Garrett emailed NAB attaching a copy of a Security Deed (titled “Distributor License Purchase Vendor Finance Performance Security Deed”) (‘the Security Deed’) which purported to be a charge granted by NAB in favour of two parties: OenoViva and Mr Garrett as trustee for the Family Trust. The Security Deed relevantly stated that: “This Charge is registered pursuant to the undertaking as to lost costs and damage given by the Chargee in SCI-2004-127; Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Limited”.

The undertaking as to damages arose in connection with proceedings taken in South Australia by NAB to enforce its rights under two registered mortgages granted by Andrew Garrett Wine Resorts Pty Ltd (Resorts) and Mrs Averil Garrett (Mrs Garrett) in respect of three properties (collectively known as Springwood Park).[8] The parties claimed that they were entitled to a ‘royalty stream’ from Beringer Blass Wine Estates Ltd, which they proposed to sell to pay the interest payments in respect of the mortgages granted by NAB. NAB then applied for injunctive relief to prevent the parties from transferring their rights to the royalties. The relevant undertaking provided by NAB was described by Besanko J as requiring them “to abide by any order a court or a judge may make as to damages” in connection with the application. Mr Garrett contended that the undertaking as to damages in this prior proceeding provided a relevant foundation for a security interest to arise, thereby validating his financing statement.

After receiving Mr Garrett’s email of 24 April, NAB sent an amendment demand to Mr Garrett pursuant to s 178 of the PPSA. The demand stated that NAB had never granted a security interest in favour of Mr Garrett, and had not executed the Security Deed relied upon to found the security interest. Mr Garrett failed to register a financing change statement, and on 1 May 2016 sent another email to NAB, this time with two documents entitled, “Deed of Appointment of Controller” and “Notice of Crystallisation of Charges/Seizure of Assets” within which he purported to appoint himself as the “managing controller” in respect of all of NAB’s property. As Mr Garrett had failed to respond to the amendment demand within the five-day period provided for by s 179(1)(b), the Applicant applied to the Court for an order to remove the registration. In addition, the Applicant sought an injunction against Mr Garrett to restrain him from registering any further financing statements on the PPSR against NAB’s property, as well a declaration that his appointment as the Bank’s ‘managing controller’ was invalid.

B Justice Beach’s Decision


There were two key issues before the Court for determination. First, was the amendment demand issued by NAB authorised as required by s 178(1), with the consequence that an order could be made by the Court under s 182 of the PPSA. Secondly, if the amendment demand was authorised, the Court had to decide if Mr Garrett’s registration had complied with s 151(1), which would require him to have believed on reasonable grounds that he was the secured party of the relevant collateral.

In considering NAB’s amendment demand, Beach J commenced by determining that NAB bore the onus of establishing that its demand was authorised in accordance with the requirements of s 178(1) of the PPSA. It was found that the amendment application had complied, on the basis that the collateral described in Mr Garrett’s registration did not secure any obligation owed by NAB to him as a secured party. As NAB had established that its amendment demand was authorised, Beach J was then required to consider whether an order should be made under s 182 for the removal of Mr Garrett’s registration.

The primary issue for determination by Beach J, was whether Mr Garrett had an interest sufficient to meet the statutory definition for a ‘security interest’. Section 12 of the PPSA requires an interest in personal property, provided for by a transaction that secures payment or performance of an obligation. His Honour concluded that an undertaking as to damages cannot be a security interest for the purposes of the PPSA.[9] In coming to this conclusion, his Honour noted that the inclusion of the word ‘transaction’ in the definition of a ‘security interest’ imports a requirement that the relevant transaction be a consensual arrangement. His Honour noted that the undertaking was granted to the South Australian Supreme Court in any case, thereby precluding Mr Garrett from obtaining an interest. His Honour also pointed to discussion in Cirillo v Citicorp Australia Ltd where Gray J commented that an undertaking as to damages “is given to the court and not to an enjoined party....and does not found a cause of action.”[10]

Beach J also noted that the definition of a security interest under the PPSA does not extend to interests that arise by operation of law, such as constructive trusts or equitable charges. His Honour considered the comments made by Robson J in Sandhurst Golf Estates Pty Ltd v Coppersmith Pty Ltd, where it was noted that a claim based upon obtaining equitable relief does not arise from a consensual transaction, and is therefore not a security interest for the purposes of the PPSA.[11] In that case, Robson J concluded that in such circumstances the court would have the jurisdiction to restrain a person from registering a security interest in another’s personal property in circumstances where that person has been found to have no such interest.[12] Justice Beach agreed with this conclusion, and granted NAB the order sought under s 182(4)(a) to require an financing change statement to be filed. In addition, his Honour also granted injunctive relief to NAB to prevent Mr Garrett from filing similar financing statements. In arriving at his conclusion, his Honour noted that Mr Garrett could not believe on reasonable grounds, as required under s 151(1), that he possessed a valid security interest to support such an application, and consequently, should be restrained from doing so in the future.[13]

III IS THE PENALTY AND ENFORCEMENT REGIME EFFECTIVE?


The Court’s decision highlights a key issue presently facing the PPSR, which is how to best address the issue of improper registrations, either through court imposed penalties, or under the Registrar’s own powers of enforcement. At the outset, it must be noted that Mr Garrett’s behavior would not typify the conduct of most parties seeking to register an interest upon the PPSR. However, that should not detract from the lessons to be drawn from Beach J’s conclusions in relation to the registration process and the court’s ability to prevent against abuses of the register. Bearing in mind that a breach of s 151(1) constitutes a civil penalty, Mr Garret’s conduct, while unusual, would seem to be the perfect candidate for the application of a penalty. Beach J’s decision did not consider the provision, as no civil penalty order was sought against Mr Garrett’s trustee in bankruptcy, likely owing to his bankruptcy status. Yet, as Mirzai notes, this continues a trend whereby Australian courts have yet to apply a civil penalty to conduct in breach of s 151(1).[14] While the NAB was able to obtain a court order in the present matter to remove the registration, it is clear that a more stringent approach is required.

In the absence of any form of penalty being imposed by the Court, the only remaining avenue of redress for parties facing a vexatious litigant is to hope that the Registrar will exercise its powers under Pt 5.3 of the Act and refuse the registration. However, the present powers of the Registrar are ill-equipped to prevent such an outcome, and ultimately do little to prevent the accumulation of clutter upon the Register. This was noted in the Whittaker Review into the PPSA, which found that the ease of the registration process made it impracticable for the Registrar to exercise its powers for refusal under ss 150(3)(c) and (d), resulting in the Review recommending that the provisions be deleted.[15] The ineffectiveness of these provisions also raises the broader question of whether the Registrar’s powers under the demand application regime are worthwhile inclusions in the Act. The Whittaker Review has noted that the process presents difficulties for the Registrar, who is required to act in a quasi-judicial capacity on such applications, usually with limited information.[16] Furthermore, the applications are highly frequent placing tremendous strain upon the Registrar, who receives more than two requests per day to issue an amendment notice.[17] The reforms presented by the Whittaker Review have suggested a reversal of the onus of proof in the amendment demand procedure, which this paper will turn to consider in the next portion. Given the recent publication of the Review, the recommendation is yet to be acted upon by the Federal Parliament, leaving parties little choice but to remain vigilant in monitoring their registered interests in relevant collateral, and following the amendment demand procedure to challenge any questionable registrations.

IV WHO BEARS THE ONUS?


A key point of discussion raised by Beach J was the question of who should bear the onus of proof in an amendment demand application. In reaching his decision, Beach J commented on the interpretation of the registration process made in the previous decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Capital Finance Australia Ltd v Clough.[18] In that decision, Rein J adopted the views of the New Zealand High Court in concluding that the purported secured party bore the onus of establishing that they had a reasonable belief for registering their financing statement or financing change statement.[19] Justice Rein’s comments reiterated the previous view he had stated in the earlier case of Macquarie Leasing, where he had similarly found a secured party had failed to provide sufficient reasons to justify their registration.[20] However, Beach J resisted this interpretation of s 182(4). As his Honour noted, this view would import a reverse onus contrary to the provisions of the Act. Section 182(4) provides that on an application for judicial review of an amendment demand, the court may make an order requiring the Registrar to amend the registration if it considers the amendment demand to be authorised under s 178. Relevantly, s 178(1) provides that a person with an interest in the collateral may give a demand for a financing change statement to be registered and that such a demand will be authorised if it satisfies the table provided in s 178(1). That table provides two instances where a demand will be valid: where either no collateral at all, or any particular collateral described in the registration secures any obligation owed by a debtor to the secured party. In his Honour’s view, the NAB bore the onus of establishing that its demand was authorised under the table in s 178(1), and as it had established that it was authorised it succeeded in its application.[21]

There are good reasons to favour the approach of Beach J over that of Rein J. Justice Rein’s view would appear to conflate two separate issues under the PPSA. The first question arises under s 151(4), and applies where a person is seeking to establish that they had reasonable grounds for their belief that the person described in the financing change statement was the secured party. In that situation, the person who has registered the financing statement bears the evidential burden of proving that they held such a belief. This is to be contrasted with the situation where a party has made an amendment demand, where the key issue is instead whether the demand itself is authorised, a question which must be proven by the applicant for the amendment demand, not the secured party.

While Rein’s J view may not accord with the PPSA in its current form, the policy position reflected in Rein J’s position is not without support. The Whittaker Review has recommended a reversal of the onus of proof within the amendment demand provisions to accord with the approach presently taken under the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (NZ).[22] In New Zealand, a person who gives an amendment demand can procure an amendment of the Register in accordance with the demand, unless the secured party can produce a court order within a 15-day period.[23] Such an approach favours the grantor’s interest to that of the secured party, and has the potential for grantors to improperly use the system. However, the Registrar has noted that, so far, approximately 90% of amendment demands have resulted in the removal of the relevant registration, thus, any reversal of the onus of proof is unlikely to create too great of an imbalance.[24] As a registration implies a valid security interest, it should be for the party seeking to protect that interest to provide sufficient proof of its existence, and thus, the validity of the relevant registration. As this paper will go on to discuss in the next section, it would be fair to expect a secured party to bear the onus of proof in establishing the validity of their registration, and would align with the process presently applied to the lodgment of caveats under the Torrens title system.

V FOLLOWING THE TORRENS APPROACH


A further consideration briefly alluded to by the Court, is whether the PPSA provisions should be interpreted in a similar way to the rules applying to caveats under the Torrens System. This discussion was first raised in the case of Sandhurst, where Robson J had commented that ‘the statutory procedure that enables a person to register a financing statement claiming a security interest over personal property under the PPSR is for relevant purposes not dissimilar to the statutory procedure for lodging caveats over Torrens land.”[25] In reaching this view, Robson J referred to the comments of Waddell CJ in Halaga Developments v Grime, where his Honour had noted that lodging a series of identical caveats amounted to an abuse of the caveat provisions, entitling the court to exercise its jurisdiction under s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) and grant an injunction to restrain the action.[26] Justice Robson also referred to similar comments made by Murray J in Milne Feeds v Bride, who concluded that it was within the jurisdiction of the court “to grant an injunction restraining a party from conduct which is lawful...upon the ground that such a restraint is necessary in the interests of justice.”[27] However, this interpretation was resisted by Beach J in the present case, who noted that, “in my view, caution has to be exercised in aligning the procedure under s 182 with the procedure for removing or maintaining a caveat over real property and the suggestion of some reverse onus mechanism.”[28]

It would be appropriate to equate the position applying to caveats under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) and its interstate equivalents to the registration of financing statements under the PPSA.[29] Before turning to note the similarities between the processes, it must be borne in mind that the Torrens system, unlike the PPSA, is a system of title by registration rather than a system of priorities. Further, unlike the Torrens system, registration under the PPSA is not the sole or even strongest method for perfecting an interest and thereby gaining priority under the PPSA.[30] The mere act of registering upon the PPSA will not confer a party an interest or even ensure them priority unless they have also complied with the requirements for attachment and enforcement under sections 19 and 20 of the PPSA. However, those fundamental distinctions aside, the inquiry under both the Real Property caveat provisions, and the PPSA amendment demand provisions each strike at a similar question.

Under the Torrens System, it must be noted that caveats are not in fact ‘registered’ but are instead ‘lodged’, with the consequence that the lodgment of a caveat will not constitute registration of the interest claimed by the caveator.[31] Nevertheless, the provisions require proof that the relevant party has a ‘caveatable interest’ in the particular parcel of land, whether that is a legal or equitable interest. In seeking to remove a caveat, the caveator bears the onus of sustaining the caveat, and the test is substantially equivalent to that which applies on an application for an interlocutory injunction in that the caveator must show two things. First, a seriously arguable claim to a caveatable interest which would entitle the caveator to an injunction prohibiting the proposed dealing, and secondly, that the balance of convenience favours the retention of the caveat.[32] This inquiry ultimately results in the caveator needing to establish the foundation for their relevant interest or estate in the land, and whether such an interest would be of the type capable of registration under the Torrens system. This process is directed towards examining the genuineness of a caveat that has been lodged, but in essence, requires the court to consider issues which go to the very foundation of the Torrens title register, namely whether the party has a valid interest or estate in the relevant parcel in land.

While the process outlined under s 182 of the PPSA is not seeking to determine whether somebody has a perfected security interest, title to the relevant goods or even priority over other parties, it nevertheless entails an examination of the underlying interest itself. Although s 182 is primarily directed towards determining whether the request to amend the relevant registration was carried out in accordance with the relevant provisions, that inquiry necessitates a Court to consider whether the party named as a ‘secured party’ upon the registration is in fact a secured party within the meaning of s 10. Relevantly, s 10 defines a ‘secured party’ as a “person who holds a security interest for the person’s own benefit or for the benefit of another”.[33] The question of whether a party is secured, and therefore whether they hold a security interest, goes to the very heart of the PPSA. Without a valid security interest within the terms of s 12, a party is incapable of satisfying the other requirements under the PPSA for obtaining a perfected interest, and therefore priority under the priority regime in Pt 2.6 of the PPSA.

Accordingly, although each system operates upon with a different functional basis, one for the purposes of title and the other for determining priority, each statutory process will require a court to examine the party’s fundamental interest in the relevant property. Thus, it would be only logical that an inquiry which requires a Court to determine whether a party does in fact have a relevant interest capable of registration under the Act should place the burden upon the party seeking to maintain that registration. Consequently, the views posited in the Whittaker Review and by Robson J in Sandhurst can be seen as more persuasive, and a reversal in the onus of proof in line with the position presently applicable to caveats over Torrens title land has much to commend it.

CONCLUSION


The decision in National Australia Bank Ltd v Garrett provides a timely reminder of some of the issues which presently affect the PPSA register. Justice Beach’s examination of the amendment demand process under Pt 5.6 of the PPSA presents yet a further illustration of the types of considerations that the court must take into account when deciding to remove a registration from the Register. Although Mr Garrett ultimately escaped from a civil penalty, his actions provide a perfect example of the types of conduct the penalties scheme was designed to prevent. While a civil penalty was not sought by the NAB, future actions of a similar type are likely to attract an appropriate penalty. As this article notes, although the Registrar is empowered to amend or remove registrations pursuant to s 150(3) of the PPSA, the sheer volume of such applications has meant that such a power is not as effective as a tool for parties as it would have appeared at first glance. Furthermore, the provisions in Pt 5.6 relating to amendment demands presently place the onus of proof upon the party seeking to alter the registration. That onus would be more appropriately borne by the party seeking to retain the registration. As this paper notes, much like the Torrens Title system of registering caveats, amendment demands require a court to examine the underlying nature of a secured party’s interest, namely, whether they do in fact possess a security interest as defined by the PPSA. Such a requirement should necessarily place the burden of proof upon the secured party seeking to prioritise their interest, rather than the purported grantor who may not be as well placed to disprove the relevant interest. Yet, in the absence of an amendment to such provisions, this decision serves to reinforce that parties will need to be as proactive as possible in monitoring any registrations made against them either as grantor, or against any collateral over which they hold a relevant security interest.


[*] BA, LLB (Hons I), LLM (Syd). PhD candidate and Tutor at the University of Sydney.
[1] Ibid.
[2] Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), s 150(1)(a).
[3] Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), s 153(1) prescribes the details to be included on a financing change statement, including details of the grantor, the secured party and a brief description of the relevant collateral.
[4] Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), s 178(1).
[5] Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), ss 179(1)(b)-(c).
[6] Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), ss 182(1)-(2).
[7] Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), s 182(4)(a).
[8] Issued in connection with the Court’s decisions in Andrew Garrett Wine Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd [2004] SASC 60, and Andrew Garrett Wine Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd (No 2) [2004] SASC 229.
[9] National Australia Bank Ltd v Garrett [2016] FCA 714 at [42] per Beach J.
[10] Cirillo v Citicorp Australia Ltd [2004] SASC 293 at [72]- [74] per Gray J.
[11] Sandhurst Golf Estates Pty Ltd v Coppersmith Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 217; (2014) 285 FLR 267 at [98]- [99].
[12] Sandhurst Golf Estates Pty Ltd v Coppersmith Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 217; (2014) 285 FLR 267 at [117].
[13] National Australia Bank Ltd v Garrett [2016] FCA 714 at [50] per Beach J.
[14] Nicholas Mirzai, ‘Pollution on the PPSR – and what to do about it’, (2015) 33 Company and Securities Law Journal 30 at 34.
[15] Bruce Whittaker, ‘Review of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 – Final Report’, 249, Recommendation 163.
[16] Bruce Whittaker, ‘Review of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 – Final Report’, 227.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Capital Finance Australia Ltd v Clough [2015] NSWSC 1327, per Rein J.
[19] Toyota Finance New Zealand Ltd v Christie [2009] NZHC 827 at [16]- [19] per Asher J.
[20] Macquarie Leasing Pty Ltd v DEQMO Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1466 at [27] per Rein J.
[21] National Australia Bank Ltd v Garrett [2016] FCA 714 at [33] per Beach J.
[22] Bruce Whittaker, ‘Review of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 – Final Report’, 229, Recommendation 139.
[23] Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (NZ), s 165.
[24] Bruce Whittaker, ‘Review of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 – Final Report’, 227.
[25] Sandhurst Golf Estates Pty Ltd v Coppersmith Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 217; (2014) 285 FLR 267 at [115].
[26] Halaga Developments Pty Ltd v Grime (1986) 5 NSWLR 740.
[27] Milne Feeds Pty Ltd v Bride (unreported, Supreme Court, WA, Murray J, No Civ 1076 of 1996, 7 May 1996).
[28] National Australia Bank Ltd v Garrett [2016] FCA 714 at [33] per Beach J.
[29] Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), Property Law Act 1969 (WA), Real Property Act 1886 (SA), Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas).
[30] Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), s 21.
[31] Peter Butt, Land Law, (Lawbook Co, 2010, 6th ed), 763, referring to Crown Developments Australia Pty Ltd v Ginger Development Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 593 at [46] and Finlayson v Finlayson [2002] FamCA 898; (2002) 29 Fam LR 460 at 526-532.
[32] Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331 at 337-338; Ridge v Incentive Programmes Ltd (1987) Q ConvR 54-172 at 57-163; Re Clement’s Caveat [1981] Qd R 341.
[33] Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), s 10, ‘secured party’ (a).


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