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University of Technology Sydney Law Research Series |
Last Updated: 21 September 2020
CHEAP AND EFFICIENT JUSTICE?
NEOLIBERAL DISCOURSE AND
CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT NOTICES
Criminal infringement notices (CINs) are now a familiar component of
the criminal justice system, especially in the policing of public
order and
minor offences. Successive Australian state and territory governments have
implemented CIN schemes with the objective of
reducing administrative demands
and trial backlogs, cutting down on paperwork, freeing up police time; saving
costs and keeping police
‘on the beat’. This article examines how
CINs have been rationalised on the basis of neoliberal economic values, which
have overshadowed ordinary criminal justice concerns of morality and
responsibility. It focuses on the introduction of criminal code
infringement
notices in Western Australia for two offences: disorderly behaviour, and steal
anything up to the value of $500. The
author argues that there is a need to
recognise—and to resist—the encroachment of neoliberal economisation
discourses
into the realm of criminal law.
INTRODUCTION
I think the offenders would prefer to simply cop it sweet, pay a fine, not spend all that time in court and not attract a criminal record ... Is it better for police? Is it better for the offender? I think it is. I think everybody is a winner here.[1]
In Western Australia (WA), police may issue criminal code
infringement notices (‘CCINs’) for two offences: disorderly
behaviour, and steal anything up to the value of $500. Commencing in March 2015,
the scheme enables police to issue infringement
notices with a ‘modified
penalty’ of $500 as an alternative to the person being charged or
summonsed and appearing before
a court. The WA Government promised that CCINs
would yield a number of benefits, including diverting alleged offenders away
from
the court system; allowing ‘victims’ to have their cases
remedied quickly; and enabling CCIN recipients to avoid a criminal
record.[2]
Several months after the
scheme commenced, WA police issued a CCIN fine of $500 to a 20-year-old
Indigenous woman for allegedly stealing
a $6.75 box of tampons at a Caltex
service station in Coolgardie, a remote WA mining town. The fixed $500 fine
amounted to 74 times
the value of the stolen property. The woman’s
‘excuse’ given to police was that she had taken the tampons for
another
woman who had been ‘too ashamed’ to purchase them. Constable
Evans accepted this to be ‘probably
true’.[3] He nonetheless
determined that issuing a CCIN was the appropriate course of
action.
Following the incident, Coolgardie Police tweeted about their
decision to issue the $500 fine on Twitter. The decision to issue the
CCIN and
the crowdfunding campaign soon attracted international media attention.
Essentials4 Woman SA, an organisation for disadvantaged women, responded
by launching a crowdfunding campaign to cover the $500 penalty. The campaign
acknowledged that sanitary items can be prohibitively expensive for women who
are financially disadvantaged.[4] In
just two days, the campaign had raised $3,456 over its goal of
$500.[5]
In many ways, this case
study reflects central problems with CCINs that will be further explored in this
article. Firstly, it demonstrates
how fixed infringement fines may be
disproportionate to, and fail to take into account, the recipient’s
circumstances and level
of culpability. Secondly, the WA Ombudsman has found
that CCINs have had the starkest net-widening impact on Aboriginal females for
alleged incidents of stealing.[6]
Further, persons recorded as being of ‘Aboriginal
appearance’[7] accounted for 36%
of CCIN recipients, despite Aboriginal Australians representing just 3.1% of the
WA population.[8] Thirdly, the WA
Ombudsman found a correlation between increased socio-economic disadvantage and
an increased likelihood of receiving
a
CCIN.[9] Finally, the ability to
source crowdfunding highlights O’Malley’s critique of fines more
generally as having ‘the
amazing characteristic’ and ‘striking
peculiarity’ of ‘being virtually the only criminal penalty that
legally
can be borne by someone other than the
offender’.[10]
What is
exceptional about this case, however, is that the officer’s tweet about
the decision to issue the CCIN meant that in
this instance, the police
officer’s exercise of discretion did not go ‘under the radar’
but was exposed to public
scrutiny. Ordinarily, there is no public account of
the rationale and process for issuing infringement notices. This is because
unlike
a judicial officer, a police officer is under no obligation to give
reasons for their decisions. Instead, CCINs are examples of
‘dividualised’
justice—highly ‘impersonal’
sanctions that can ‘be monitored, delivered and expiated privately and
anonymously’.[11]
A Quick and Efficient Justice
When Constable Evans was asked whether the
decision to issue the CCIN was an appropriate use of police discretion, he
rationalised
the decision in terms of efficiency: ‘prior to March, we
would have to arrest her under suspicion, bring her back, do a recorded
interview—it would have taken pretty much all
day’.[12] This statement is
misleading. Police had—and continue to have—the discretion to
caution a suspect for low-level offending.
But what is most striking about
Evans’ explanation is its lack of concern for the alleged offender’s
criminal culpability.
Instead, the decision to issue a CCIN was based on the
notion of quick and efficient justice. The constable’s message was echoed
by then WA Police Minister, Liza Harvey, who explained that CCINs provide
‘swift justice, save court time and allow police
to continue frontline
duties’. Harvey added: ‘this Government doesn't apologise for
handing out swift punishment of actual
consequence’.[13]
Both
police and politicians adopted a neoliberal discourse of economisation to
justify the implementation and use of CCINs in WA.
Within this discourse, CCINs
are justified in terms of increasing police productivity and flexibility;
reducing administrative demands,
paperwork and trial backlogs; freeing up police
time; and saving costs. Routine police investigation and traditional court
processes
are commodified and depicted as unnecessary impediments to
productivity; while justice is measured in hours and dollars rather than
in
terms of procedural fairness, the punishment fitting the crime and the
application of the rule of law.
This article examines the introduction and
operation of CCINs in WA to demonstrate how criminal justice is being
discursively reconstructed
along economic lines. This argument will be advanced
via five parts. Part I outlines the methodology which informs the article. Part
II examines key features of, and identifies problems associated with, criminal
infringement notices (referred to generally as ‘CINs’,
whereas the
acronym ‘CCINs’ is used to refer specifically to the WA scheme).
Part III examines key features of the CCIN
scheme in WA and reflects on the WA
Ombudsman’s 2017 report (‘the Ombudsman’s report’) on
the scheme’s
operation from the year commencing 5 March 2015 (‘the
monitoring period’).[14] After
addressing key concerns relating to the use of CCINS, Part IV highlights how
CCINs have been represented, legitimised and evaluated
in discourse with
reference to second reading speeches and ministerial statements relating to
CCINS, as well as the Ombudsman’s
report.
Part V summarises key
findings and evaluates the implications of these for the application of
administrative fines to criminal offending
more generally. It argues that
criminal justice discourse in relation to infringement notices has fostered and
naturalised an ideology
in which fiscal goals overshadow and supplant values
traditionally associated with criminal law and punishment: impartiality,
fairness,
moral culpability, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. The
author ultimately takes an interventionist stance by denaturalising
the market
logic that has infused criminal justice discourse. Prior to advancing this
argument, the following section details the
methodology used in the article.
I METHODOLOGY
In
2001, Bourdieu and Wacquant noticed how, within a matter of a few years, a
‘new planetary vulgate’ had entered the
language of
‘employers, international officials, high-ranking civil servants, media
intellectuals and high-flying
journalists’.[15] This strange
‘Newspeak’ was replete with a vocabulary that seemed to ‘have
sprung out of nowhere’, yet now
flowed freely from everyone’s lips,
with words including globalisation, flexibility, governance, employability, new
economy
and zero tolerance.[16]
Alongside the emergence of this NewLiberalSpeak was the
‘conspicuous’ suppression of terms such as capitalism, class,
exploitation, domination and inequality, such words having been
‘peremptorily dismissed under the pretext that they are obsolete
and
non-pertinent’.[17]
These
buzzwords associated with the domain of free market capitalism are now far from
peculiar. Neoliberal free market thinking and
values have made considerable
inroads into areas where it was once thought the market did not belong. The tide
of the ‘Neoliberal
project’[18] rose in the early
1980s, a period in which US and UK leaders Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
maintained an unswerving commitment
to free markets and private enterprise and
alongside these, the dismantling of government institutions and social welfare.
This neoliberal
agenda was encapsulated in Reagan’s mantra:
‘Government is the
problem’.[19] Adherents to
neoliberal economic ideologies professed free, deregulated markets to be the
primary means for achieving the public
good. From the 1980s onwards, the market
expanded into and
‘colonised’[20] parts of
the public realm.[21] As a result of
this colonisation, we now have for-profit schools and hospitals;
‘entrepreneurial
universities’[22]—restructured
and rebranded around the goals of increased outputs, competitiveness,
customer-orientation, student employability,
market relevance and private
partnerships; and privatised prisons, where private companies are building
prisons, providing food and
medical care and are also involved in their
day-to-day management, transforming this once government institution into a
for-profit
business.[23] As Sandel
has observed: ‘The reach of markets, and market-oriented thinking, into
aspects of life traditionally governed by
nonmarket norms is one of the most
significant developments of our
time’.[24]
The concepts
associated with neoliberal economics and its jargon are reengineering all
aspects of social, economic and cultural life,
including criminal law and
procedure. CINs are but one example of new measures implemented in the criminal
justice system on the
rationale of increasing efficiency and productivity while
reducing expenditure. Another recent initiative is the New South Wales
(NSW)
Government’s ‘tough and smart justice’ sentencing reforms.
Introduced in 2017, the reforms encompass measures
such as fixed sentencing
discounts for the utilitarian value of early guilty pleas, regulating the early
disclosure of evidence including
the ability to serve briefs of evidence in
inadmissible form, mandatory case conferencing between parties and the
replacement of
committal hearings presided over by a magistrate with senior
prosecutors who ‘screen out’ cases through charge
certification.[25] Similar to CINs,
these reforms replace judicial processes with
‘technocratic’[26] and
administrative ones, reduce judicial discretion and oversight within the
criminal justice process, and represent a significant
departure from the
traditional adversarial system. And like CINs, these reforms were sold to the
public using utilitarian, neoliberal
reasoning, in terms of their ability to
‘deliver swifter, more certain justice’ and to ‘reduce time
and money wasted
on police, courts and
lawyers’.[27]
With this
socio-political context in mind, this research identifies—and argues
against—free market and economic logic
as a rationale for implementing
on-the-spot fines for criminal offending. In doing so, the article builds on
O’Malley’s
analysis of fines as melded into, and symptomatic of,
consumer societies.[28] In 2009,
O'Malley postulated that: ‘The persistence and expansion of regulatory
fines in the "post-social era", the era of
consumer-led market liberalism,
perhaps is due not to their "technical" nature alone, but also to their
conformity with neoliberal
political
ideals’.[29] The author
advances O’Malley’s suggestion by demonstrating how CINs have been
rationalised using neoliberal economic
ideals of increasing efficiency and
productivity, while cutting expenditure, paperwork and 'red tape'. These
neoliberal ideals have
crowded out criminal sentencing concerns which prioritise
the proportionate punishment of an offender in a fashion which reflects
the
objective seriousness of the offence and their individual culpability.
The
analysis is distinguished from O'Malley's in that its focus is not on
money’s peculiar characteristics as a legal
sanction.[30] Instead, this article
examines how CINs—‑a quasi-administrative, quasi-criminal
sanction—have been legitimised
using neoliberal economic reasoning.
Criminal law scholars have largely overlooked how neoliberal economic principles
have become
the central justification for applying administrative fines to
criminal offences.[31] Further,
previous studies have failed to account for the role of discourse in
fashioning a view of CINs as an appropriate and necessary solution to the
asserted problem of administrative inefficiency in the
justice system. This
article fills these gaps in the literature by arguing that, with the advent of
administrative fines for criminal
offending, there has been a marked discursive
shift in how criminal justice is conceived of and rationalised. The article
evaluates
the legitimacy of CINs from the premise that a critical analysis of
discourse illuminates the various ways in which neoliberal economic
ideologies have infiltrated the criminal justice system and transformed
its
values. Criminal ‘justice’ is being discursively reconstructed along
economic lines.[32]
Drawing on
the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis
(‘CDA’),[33] discourse
is viewed as the primary unit of communication and defined as ‘socially
constructed ways of knowing some aspect of
reality’.[34] The author
analyses the limited set of written texts publicly available in relation to the
operation of and justifications provided
for CCINs to show how discourse plays a
fundamental role in ‘making the socio-economic transformations of new
capitalism and
policies of governments to facilitate them seem inevitable;
representing desires as facts; and representing the imaginaries of interested
policies—the interested possible realities they project—as the way
that the world actually
is’.[35] Simply put, a
neoliberal discourse of economisation has reshaped practices within the criminal
justice system, so much so that this
commodification of justice is now accepted
as obvious, logical and inevitable. A key principle of CDA is that discourse is
both socially
constituted and
constitutive:[36] discourse plays a
key role in structuring conduct, but it is also shaped by social
conduct.[37] As the study is
situated within the realm of criminal justice, the term criminal justice
discourse is employed to describe how ‘primary
definers’[38] in criminal
justice debates linguistically construct reality, with a focus on politicians,
police and policy-review agencies such
as the
Ombudsman.[39] It pays particular
regard to political discourse—the linguistic strategies used by political
actors to mobilise support for
CCINs.
Due to practical constraints, the
study’s focus is on the jurisdiction of WA, but uses as a point of
comparison the operation
of CINs in NSW. The texts selected for analysis detail
the State’s justification for the implementation of, evaluate the
operation
of and rationalise CCINs, including second reading speeches and
parliamentary debates in relation to the CCIN scheme; ministerial
press releases
and statements made to media; and the WA Ombudsman’s report which
evaluated the operation of CCINs in their
first year of operation. Further, the
texts were selected due to their public availability: police need not give or
publish reasons
for issuing CCINs and the WA Police policy in relation to CCINs
is, at the time of writing, not publicly available.
Through this selection of
texts, the study examines ‘not only the entry of discourses into new
domains, but the diverse ways
in which they are received, appropriated, and
recontextualised’.[40] Having
detailed the methodology informing the analysis of CCINs, the following Part
traces the rise of infringement notices in criminal
law and reviews the
literature regarding their use.
II CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT NOTICES
Criminal infringement
notices (CINs, also referred to as CCINs in WA, expiation notices in SA, and
more generally, penalty notices
or on-the-spot
fines)[41] are notices to the effect
that if the person served does not elect to have the matter determined by a
court (court-elect), they must
pay the amount prescribed for the offence within
a fixed time period. A once unconventional sanction limited to traffic and
parking
breaches, CINs are now a familiar component of the criminal justice
system, especially in the policing of public order and minor
offences.
A The Rise of CINs as a Criminal Justice Measure
The creep of administrative fines into criminal
law was overlooked by mainstream criminal law scholarship until Fox’s
analysis
of administrative fines in
1995.[42] Fox then warned: ‘To
date, the offences which can be handled by way of an on-the-spot fine have not
strayed sufficiently into
the domain of 'real crime' to be regarded as posing a
threat to civil liberties, but the potential is
there.’[43] In the decades
since that prediction, successive state and territory governments across
Australia have touted CINs as the obvious
solution to reducing court delays,
increasing police productivity, saving money and even turning a profit.
All
Australian states and territories now have CINs as an alternative to a criminal
charge or summons for nominated
offences.[44] For example in NSW,
CINs currently apply to the crimes of larceny of property up to the value of
$300, being unlawfully in possession
of property, offensive behaviour, offensive
language, unauthorised entry of vehicles, and drunk and disorderly
behaviour following a move-on
notice.[45] In Queensland,
infringement notices are available for the crimes of solicitation for the
purposes of prostitution;[46]
certain drug offences;[47] public
nuisance (including obscene or offensive language and disorderly, threatening or
offensive behaviour), public urination, begging, wilful
exposure, trespass, and tattooing or selling spray paint
to a minor.[48]
B Common Features of CINs
CINs impose a uniform penalty regardless of the
culpability of the offender or their ability to pay the fine. This means that
the
punishment imposed may be unduly lenient or unduly harsh. Despite the NSW
Law Reform Commission’s recommendation in 2012 that,
except in
‘exceptional’ circumstances, penalty notice amounts should not
exceed 25% of the maximum court fine for an
offence, the fixed penalty notice
amounts for a number of NSW offences range from 66-75% of the maximum
court-imposed fines. For
instance, the CIN amounts for offensive language and
offensive conduct in NSW are $500, whereas the maximum fine a court can impose
is $660.[49] The CIN amount for the
continuation of intoxicated and disorderly behaviour following a move on
direction is a sizeable $1100, while
a court can impose a maximum fine of $1650.
These fixed fine amounts are ‘impossible to
pay’[50] for many recipients,
an issue that is examined below.
CINs are administrative rather than
judicial in nature; the question of whether the recipient has committed an
infringement offence
is determined by a police officer (part of the executive
branch of government), not adjudicated by a court (part of the judicial
branch
of government), and a police officer’s findings in this regard do not
carry the weight of a judicial officer’s
findings of criminal liability.
The WA Police Force’s webpage substantiates this when it states:
‘Paying an infringement
is not regarded as an admission for the purposes
of any civil or criminal court case, and does not have to be declared on your
criminal
history.’[51] Because
no determination of criminal guilt has been made, CIN recipients are neither
‘offenders’ nor ‘criminals’,
although they are regularly
misrepresented as such in criminal justice
discourse.[52] The regular misuse of
the label ‘criminal’ to refer to a person receiving a CIN, as well
the association of CINs with
criminal liability, demonstrates that despite being
‘administrative’ fines, the stigma associated with criminality
attaches
to those who receive a CIN.
As CINs are—or purport to
be—administrative sanctions, police may use these fines to circumvent the
protections and principles
ordinarily attached to criminal prosecution, which
aim to guard against arbitrary and unjust punishment. A CIN need not, and
ordinarily
does not, detail the facts constituting the charge; police need only
specify the relevant criminal offence that has allegedly been
committed on the
notice.[53] Accordingly, CIN
recipients considering whether or not to challenge the CIN through internal
police processes or in court, will not
have available to them the details of the
case against them (presumably, they may be apprised of these details once a
request has
been made to the police for such information).
Unless and until
a CIN recipient decides to court-elect, the presumption of innocence does not
apply. CINs reverse the onus and burden
of proof, given that the State need not
prove the elements of the offence, nor disprove any defences raised, to the
standard of beyond
reasonable
doubt.[54] Given that CIN fines are
punitive in effect (especially considering the serious fines-enforcement
consequences attached to non-payment);
carry the stigma of being
‘criminal’; and that police retain the threat of criminal charge
until a fine has been paid
in full, CINs belong in the ‘foggy grey
zone’ between criminal and administrative law, branded
‘criministrative’
law.[55] The fourth Part of this
article will demonstrate the role of discourse in blurring these boundaries and
displacing concerns about
procedural safeguards and transparent justice,
replacing these with market-related objectives of efficiency and productivity.
Recipients of CINs are encouraged to accept and pay their fines—or at
the very least not appeal them—via a number of built-in
‘incentives’.[56] Then
WA Police Minister Rob Johnson recognised this when he stated that
‘offenders would prefer to simply cop it sweet, pay
a fine, not spend all
that time in court and not attract a criminal
record’.[57] As Johnson
stated, by ‘copping the fine’, CIN recipients: avoid a judicial
finding of criminal guilt and a criminal record;
to some extent elude the stigma
attached to a finding of guilt; save any time and expenses associated with court
proceedings; and
avoid the possibility that a court could impose a larger fine
and, for some offences, a sentence of
imprisonment.[58] A CIN recipient
who believes that they are innocent of the alleged offence may nonetheless feel
compelled to pay the fine to avoid
the possibility of criminal punishment. This
threat can be phrased coercively; for instance, the WA Police Force website
warns: ‘If
you do not want to be prosecuted in court for the alleged
offence, pay the Amount Due by the Due
Date.’[59] Although this
statement represents criminal prosecution as inevitable upon
non-payment,[60] in practice, the
consequence of non-payment by the due date is unlikely to result in the
initiation of court proceedings, but in
a Final Demand notice being
issued.[61] That police nonetheless
retain the threat of criminal prosecution until a fine is paid shows one way in
which CINs amplify police
power, by adding to the range of coercive tools at a
police officer’s disposal to control public behaviour.
Fox not only
foreshadowed the likelihood that CINs would stray into other areas of the
criminal law; he also foreshadowed their net-widening
capacity,[62] in other words, the
likelihood that CINs will result in the criminal justice system ‘scooping
into its net a larger group of
citizens than might otherwise have been the
case.’[63] Fox attributed the
phenomenon of net-widening predominantly to the ‘ease with which
infringement notices can be issued’—police
may choose to issue a CIN
rather than ignore, caution or warn the alleged
offender.[64] These contentions have
since been, in some respects, validated by statistics collated in NSW and WA.
For example, as detailed below,
the WA Ombudsman found the net-widening effect
of CCINs to be most striking for Aboriginal females having actions taken against
them
for alleged incidents of stealing.
C Impact of CINs on Disadvantaged People and Indigenous Australians
The literature
demonstrates that CINs are disproportionately issued to Indigenous Australians
and operate especially harshly against
those who cannot, or will not, pay their
fines.[65] In the year ending 31
March 2017, Indigenous Australians comprised 476 (11%) of the 4386 adults who
received a CIN for offensive
language or behaviour in NSW, despite Indigenous
Australians representing only 3% of the NSW
population.[66] The numbers in WA
are even more troubling. Of the 1800 CCINs issued in the year ending 4 March
2016 for the crime of disorderly behaviour
(which includes offensive language
and behaviour), 752 (42%) were issued to recipients whose ‘offender
appearance’ was recorded as Aboriginal. Of the total 2978 CCINs issued
in
that period, 1080 (36%) were issued to recipients whose ‘offender
appearance’ was
Aboriginal.[67] This percentage more
or less reflects that of the prisoner population in WA: Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Australians comprised
38% of the WA prison population as at 30
June 2016.[68] By way of contrast,
the WA Indigenous population was recorded at 3.1% of the WA population in
2016.[69]
The WA Ombudsman found
a correlation between increased vulnerability and socio-economic disadvantage,
and an increased likelihood
of receiving a
CCIN.[70] Further, vulnerable CIN
recipients, many of whom are also Indigenous Australians, often do not and
cannot pay their fines on time,
if at all. This leads to fines, the initial
amount of which is already prohibitive, spiralling into insurmountable
debt.[71] The NSW Ombudsman in 2009
documented that nine out of every 10 Indigenous Australians issued with a CIN
failed to pay within the
time
allowed.[72] The WA Ombudsman also
found a correlation between increased socio-economic disadvantage and a
decreased likelihood of paying one’s
fine on
time.[73] In addition, the Ombudsman
found a low payment rate for CCINs generally: only 21% of all CCIN recipients
had paid their CCINs in
full as at 22 April
2016.[74] For Aboriginal recipients,
only 3% had paid their CCIN for disorderly behaviour and just 1% had paid their
CCIN for stealing.
The fact that Indigenous Australians are more likely to
receive infringement notices for public order and other minor offences is
a
result of multiple and complex factors. Firstly, many Indigenous Australians are
more likely to conduct everyday activities, including
‘private’
activities and disputes, in public space than non-Indigenous
Australians.[75] This is primarily
due to socio-cultural factors and Indigenous Australians’ unique
connection to the land. People who are homeless
or living in temporary
accommodation are also often forced to conduct their private lives, including
personal disputes, in public
spaces.[76] There is also a greater
proportion of physical disability, mental illness, alcohol or drug-dependency,
and a history of family and
domestic violence among these
groups.[77] Factors of disadvantage
prevalent within Indigenous communities cannot be divorced from the
intergenerational effects of colonisation
and government policies which resulted
in dispossession, disenfranchisement and the Stolen
Generations.[78]
D Fines Enforcement Sanctions
Every Australian state and territory has
progressive, often punitive, sanction regimes for fine default. If CIN fines are
not paid
on time, people may accumulate further debts, have their driver’s
licence suspended or disqualified, have property seized,
their vehicle
immobilised or may be ordered to perform community service work. In WA, the CCIN
recipient’s details may also
be published on a
website.[79]
Driver licence
sanctions operate especially harshly on Aboriginal people living in regional,
rural or remote communities, where private
vehicles can be the only practical
means of transport available to access work or basic services, such as health
care.[80] In some circumstances,
such as where a person is unable to comply with a community service order, fine
default may lead to
imprisonment.[81] Sentences of
imprisonment may also be imposed as a result of secondary offending from fines
enforcement actions, such as driving
whilst unlicensed due to driver licence
disqualification.[82] The Kimberley
Community Legal Services has suggested that for many Indigenous people, those
who are homeless and other groups experiencing
disadvantage, the imposition of a
$500 fixed fine for swearing is ‘tantamount to a prison
sentence’.[83] The Australian
Law Reform Commission recommended in a 2018 report that governments work with
relevant Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander organisations to develop options
to reduce the imposition of infringement notices, limit penalty amounts, avoid
suspension
of drivers’ licences for fine default and provide alternative
ways of paying infringement
notices.[84]
This article has so
far examined key features of CIN regimes, and discussed related issues such as
net-widening, arbitrariness, and
entrenching socio-economic and Indigenous
disadvantage. The following Part scrutinises the WA CCIN regime in detail,
before addressing
the role of criminal justice discourse in legitimising CCINs
and overshadowing concerns raised thus far in relation to their operation.
PART IV CRIMINAL CODE INFRINGEMENT NOTICES
CCINs commenced
operation in a pilot scheme across selected WA suburbs on 30 March 2015, and
were rolled out across the state on 3
August
2015.[85] The scheme was modelled on
the CIN scheme operating in NSW since
2008,[86] a key difference being
that in NSW a recipient must be 18 years or older, whereas in WA the recipient
need only have attained the
age of 17
years.[87] As at the time of
writing, CCINs apply to two prescribed offences: disorderly behaviour in public
or a police lock-up (‘disorderly
behaviour’),[88] and steal
anything capable of being stolen to the value of
$500.[89]
A Issuing a CCIN
Although colloquially referred to as on-the-spot
fines, WA police do not actually serve infringement notices on-the-spot;
currently,
police must first return to the police station, enter the details of
the CCIN into the NTIMS (the Non-Traffic Infringement Management
Solution)
system,[90] and following this, post
the notice to, or serve it personally on, the
recipient.[91] As evident in the
example below, a CCIN specifies the offence which the recipient is alleged to
have committed (for instance, ‘behaving
in a disorderly manner’),
but does not stipulate further details of the conduct constituting the alleged
offence (for instance,
whether it was offensive language or insulting language),
nor the officer’s reasons for issuing the CCIN.
When a CCIN is issued,
the suspect is taken to be ‘charged’ for the purposes of the
Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA)
(although for other purposes, the suspect has not been charged with a crime).
This allows police to take and retain identity
information such as fingerprints,
photographs and the person’s measurements on a forensic
database.[92] Police need only
destroy the identity information once requested to do so. The WA Ombudsman found
that of the 2,978 CCINs issued
to 2,817 individuals during the 12-month
monitoring period, WA police obtained identifying particulars from 530 (19% of)
recipients.
Extrapolating from statistics of state-wide
data,[93] the Ombudsman estimated
that none of the individuals who had paid off their fine had requested the
destruction of their identity
information.
Image I: example of a
CCIN.[94]
B Consequences of non-payment and fine enforcement
measures
If
a CCIN recipient fails to pay the prescribed amount within 28 days, the person
receives a Final Demand Notice. Police also retain
the discretion to prosecute
the person in court for the alleged offence. If, following the additional 28-day
period, the recipient
fails to pay the amount specified on the Final Demand
Notice, the infringement may be registered at the WA Fines Enforcement Registry
(‘WAFER’) and the infringement is made an order of the court. The
recipient may then either pay the fine and added costs
within a further 28 days,
or elect to have the matter referred to a magistrate. If full payment is still
not received within the
specified time, enforcement action can include the CCIN
recipient’s driver’s license being suspended or their details
published on a website. Alternatively, an enforcement warrant may authorise the
Sheriff to immobilise the recipient’s vehicle
and/or seize and sell their
property to satisfy the debt.[95]
B Offences Subject to CCINs
As described above,
the CCIN regime currently applies to two offences in the WA Criminal
Code: disorderly behaviour and steal anything up to the value of $500. Each
CCIN offence attracts a modified penalty of $500. These two
offences were
selected due to ‘the volume of people committing these offences’ and
their ‘low-level
nature’.[96] It is anticipated
that the regime will apply to further
offences,[97] however there is no
framework against which to assess whether CCINs should apply to a particular
offence. In 2010, the NSW Law Reform
Commission (‘NSWLRC’)
recommended that guidelines should provide that penalty notices are suitable for
minor offences
(although the NSWLRC admitted that there was ‘no
consistency in submissions as to what a definition of “minor
offence”
should
be’).[98] The NSWLRC
recommended that CINs are not suitable for offences involving violence.
[99]
1 Disorderly Behaviour
The offence of
disorderly behavior in s 74A of the Criminal Code comprises a number of
discrete offences, including using insulting, offensive or threatening language
and behaving in an insulting,
offensive or threatening manner. The offence may
target conduct ranging from swearing at police to urinating in
public.[100] Conduct is considered
‘disorderly’ if it:
is conduct which, while sufficiently ill-mannered, or in bad taste, to meet with the disapproval of well-conducted and reasonable men and women, is also something more—it must ... tend to annoy or insult such persons as are faced with it—and sufficiently deeply or seriously to warrant the interference of the criminal law.[101]
The crime of disorderly conduct has a location element, in that the
behaviour must occur ‘in a public place’, ‘in
the sight or
hearing of any person who is in a public place’ or ‘in a police
station or lock-up’. The maximum sentence
that a court can impose for
disorderly conduct is a fine of $6000.
Given broad judicial definitions of
‘disorderliness’ and ‘offensiveness’, the discernment of
disorderly conduct
is highly
subjective.[102] Words are
considered to be ‘offensive’ if they provoke in the reasonable
person an emotional reaction such as anger,
resentment, disgust or outrage in
the context in which they are
used.[103] The WA Supreme Court
has also held that language which challenges ‘the authority of police
officers’ is likely to be
considered offensive and
disorderly.[104] Relevantly, the
ALRC in 2018 recommended that state and territory governments review provisions
which criminalise offensive language
with a view to repealing these provisions
or narrowing their scope.[105]
This recommendation was made in light of the continued disproportionate use of
offensive language and public nuisance charges against
Indigenous
Australians.[106] Police officers
are regularly the ‘victims’ or addressees of behaviour characterised
as disorderly, promoting a situation
where the investigator, enforcer and
adjudicator of a CCIN may also be the alleged
victim.[107] Consequently, a level
of bias and self-interest may operate in an officer’s determination of
whether the conduct is disorderly.
2 Stealing
Under s 378 of the Criminal Code, a
person who steals anything capable of being stolen is liable to imprisonment for
up to seven years, although if the value does
not exceed $1000, the person is
liable to a summary conviction and a fine of up to
$6000.[108] As noted above, CCINs
can only be issued where the value of the property is no greater than $500.
Generally, a thing is considered
capable of being stolen if it is inanimate,
moveable
‘property’.[109]
Stealing is further defined as
‘fraudulently’[110]
taking anything capable of being stolen or converting property to one’s
own use or the use of any other person, with an intent
to permanently deprive
the owner of the property. Despite being considered a ‘low-level’
offence where the value of the
property stolen does not exceed $500, the
criminal law elements of stealing are
complex,[111] a factor which would
weigh against its inclusion within a CCIN regime where liability is determined
expediently by police officers.
The WA Ombudsman’s report found that
the option to use CCINs for stealing resulted in net-widening, and that this had
the starkest
impact on Aboriginal female alleged offenders. The number of
actions (including CCINs, arrests and summonses) taken for stealing
in the
monitoring period when compared to the number of actions (arrests and summonses)
taken in the benchmarking period (the year
before CCINs commenced operation)
increased by 34% for Aboriginal female alleged offenders, and 18% for Aboriginal
male alleged offenders.[112]
Exemplified by the case study examined at the outset of this article, in some of
these instances, the $500 fine would have been disproportionate
to the gravity
of the offence committed.
The Ombudsman offered a number of explanations for
the large proportion of CCINs issued for the offence of stealing during the
monitoring
period. Notable among these is that where a CCIN is issued, police
are able to return the property alleged to have been stolen to
the apparent
owner or possessor. In contrast, where a defendant is charged with stealing, the
property owner may have to forfeit
the property to police as
‘evidence’ to be presented in court. This distinction is likely to
render CCINs a preferred
option for the alleged victim, given that CCINS not
only give the impression of ‘swift’ retribution, but also, the
alleged
victim avoids the time and effort associated with the investigatory
process and giving evidence in court, and can have their property
returned to
them ‘on the spot’. These factors in turn provide an incentive for
police to issue a CCIN as an alternative
to a charge, summons or
caution.[113]
This Part has
detailed the framework of the CCIN regime in WA, and considered its operation
with respect to the crimes of stealing
and disorderly behaviour in light of the
WA Ombudsman’s findings. It has brought to the fore a number of concerns
relating
to the ‘swift justice’ delivered by CCINs, including
increased arbitrariness; excessive police discretion; the reversal
of the onus
of proof; the imposition of disproportionate punishment; a lack of oversight and
accountability; and the reproduction
of inequalities. With these concerns in
mind, Part IV evaluates how CCINs have been discursively represented and
legitimised as beneficial
to the police, the public and the court system.
PART IV A DISCOURSE OF ECONOMISATION
This is all about smarter and more effective law enforcement, ensuring that our police officers are on the beat fighting crime and our court system is working more efficiently.[114]
A Cheap and Efficient Justice
While criminal punishment has manifold aims, it
is commonly recognised that punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of
the
crime and the culpability of the offender, denounce the conduct, deter the
offender and others from committing similar offences,
rehabilitate the offender,
account for any harm occasioned to the victim, and protect the
community.[115] The justifications
provided for introducing CCINs in WA and the principles upon which they were
based bear little resemblance to
ordinary objectives of criminal
punishment.[116] When the Criminal
Code Amendment (Infringement Notices) Bill 2010 (‘the Bill’) was
first introduced in WA Parliament,
then WA Minister for Police, Rob Johnson,
touted CCINS as a ‘quick alternative to arrest’ which would reduce
administrative
demands, increase productivity and deliver
cost-savings.[117] The
Minister’s press release explained that CCINs would deliver
‘smarter’ and ‘more effective’ law
enforcement. Johnson
stated that the regime ‘will allow police to remain on frontline duties
rather than having to go through
a lengthy administrative process to bring an
offender before the courts for relatively minor offences’; will save
‘the
court system the cost of having to deal with relatively low-level
crime’; and will ensure ‘that our police officers are
on the beat
fighting crime and our court system is working more
efficiently.’[118]
This
emphasis on increasing efficiency, reducing paperwork and allowing police to
remain on the streets was reflected in the language
of the Opposition Labor
Party and the National Party, which each supported the
legislation.[119] This message was
also reproduced a few days prior to the commencement of the pilot scheme on 25
March 2015, when then Police Minister
Liza Harvey was questioned about the
operation of CCINs. Harvey stated: ‘Police officers welcome this
initiative. It will reduce
red tape. It will take them from behind a desk and
onto the front line. It will allow us to divert offenders from the criminal
justice
system and from the
courts.’[120]
There are
some noteworthy features of the political discourse in relation to CCINs.
Firstly, the politicians represent the capacity
of CCINs to cut paperwork, save
time and divert offenders away from the court system as categorical facts by
repeatedly prefacing
each proposition with the high modality phrase: ‘It
will’.[121] This expresses
the speaker’s certainty of, or categorical commitment to, CCINs achieving
these objectives. Many of the politicians’
overwhelmingly positive
statements about the diversionary and productive capacity of CCINs are framed as
objective truths (as opposed
to subjective opinions), without the politicians
providing any evidence to ground their assertions. Further examples include
Johnson’s
claim that: ‘These [CCINs] will allow police to remain on
frontline duties rather than having to go through a lengthy administrative
process’, as well as then President of the WA Law Society, Hylton
Quail’s statement that ‘there'll be reduced backlog
in the
courts’ and ‘that'll also liberate resourcing in
policing’.[122] Each of
these statements presents the idea that CCINs will benefit the criminal justice
system as a universal truth without qualification.
Another noteworthy
feature of the political rhetoric in relation to CCINs is the politicians’
reduction of complex processes
into simple nouns, pronouns and
metaphors.[123] Consider
Harvey’s statement: ‘It will reduce red tape.’ In this concise
sentence, the pronoun ‘It’
replaces the CCIN scheme introduced by
the Bill. This abstraction misrepresents the truth, for the legislation which
introduced the
scheme cannot, on its own, ‘reduce red tape’. Whether
CCINs will perform their stated objectives will depend on how often
police
officers issue CCINs in circumstances where they would otherwise have charged
the recipient, and how often CCIN recipients
pay their fine on-time rather than
‘court-elect’ or are subject to fine enforcement measures. In this
way, the political
rhetoric oversimplifies the productive and diversionary
capacity of the legislation, and masks the variables (such as police exercise
of
discretion) upon which the Bill’s ability to reduce red tape
depends.
B Reducing Red Tape
Another transformation within the sentence
‘It will reduce red tape’ is the replacement of a variety of actions
with the
metaphor ‘red tape’. Red tape serves as a symbol for all
manner of ills associated with an ‘overly constrictive
bureaucracy’;[124] red tape
could allude to unnecessary or meaningless paperwork; too many formal processes
or constraints; unnecessary or overly-restrictive
rules, procedures and
regulations; or unjustifiable
delays.[125] Of course, red tape
is not actually being reduced by the Bill in a physical
sense.[126] Instead, metaphors
structure our experience of one thing in terms of another, and are an important
ideological means by which to
(re)construct
reality.[127]
Harvey’s
use of the phrase ‘red tape’ with reference to CCINs must be viewed
in the broader context of her, and
her political party’s, neoliberal
agenda to reduce forms of government regulation and oversight. Harvey cited
CCINs as an example
of the WA government’s ‘red tape reduction
initiatives’ introduced in
2015.[128] The Bill can be viewed
as part of a broader package of WA government initiatives, including a
‘Red Tape Reduction Report card’,
calls for the public to submit
ideas to Treasury to #ShredTheRed and a ‘Red Tape Rapid Assessment
Tool’ to identify areas
in which red tape could be reduced by
Government.[129] In her inaugural
speech in 2008, Harvey argued: ‘We must reduce bureaucratic interference
and needless compliance. Government
needs to keep its nose out of the business
of small business, thereby encouraging prosperity in their
enterprises’.[130] While
initially as Minister for Small Business, Harvey’s red-tape-cutting agenda
was concentrated on business and consumers,
in 2015 as Police Minister, this
focus was expanded to include reducing ‘bureaucratic interference’
in criminal justice
measures, such as allowing suspects to be kept in custody
without being personally guarded by a police officer, and—relevant
to this
article—introducing
CCINs.[131] By tracing the
increasing application of the phrase red tape and its associated goals of
cost-cutting and reduced paperwork to criminal
justice policies, we see how
business and market-oriented values colonise parts of the public sphere
‘traditionally governed
by nonmarket
norms’.[132]
In
Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson observed that once metaphors are
naturalised into our understanding of reality, they can guide appropriate future
actions that ‘fit the metaphor’, becoming ‘self-fulfilling
prophecies’.[133] If red
tape is conceived of in negative terms as unnecessarily burdensome, the obvious
solution is to cut or eliminate it, hence
its correlation with the verb
‘reduce’ in the sentence: ‘It will reduce red
tape’.[134] Lakoff and
Johnson also remind us that metaphors provide only partial and not total
understandings of concepts; for if metaphors were total, that concept would
actually be the other, rather than be understood in terms of the
other concept. As metaphors provide partial understandings of concepts, they
also obscure or downplay other aspects of
concepts.[135] And the
understandings that metaphors create can be resisted by substituting new
metaphors or symbols for old ones.
In Harvey’s sentence: ‘It will
reduce red tape’, the processes that the metaphor ‘red tape’
replaces—investigating
and prosecuting crime, taking a suspect back to a
police station to be charged and fingerprinted, interviewing suspects, drafting
up witness statements, proving a crime beyond reasonable doubt, providing
reasons for decisions, and adducing fair and admissible
evidence in
court—do not have to (and it is argued, should not) be conceived of
in negative terms. In addition, Harvey’s lexical choice to replace such
processes with the metaphor red tape
was not inevitable; she could have chosen
to spell out the processes which she replaced, or alternatively, used phrases
with more
positive connotations, such as ‘procedural
justice’[136] or
‘procedural safeguards’. From a different ideological
standpoint—one concerned less with reducing government
‘interference’ and increasing ‘efficiency’—the
processes that Harvey replaced with the phrase red tape
would be correlated with
positive values such as increasing fairness, oversight and accountability, and
reducing the risk of bias
and prejudice. As Kaufman has observed: ‘one
person’s “red tape” may be another’s treasured
safeguard’.[137] However the
business-focused, anti-bureaucratic discourse which characterised the
introductions of CCINs meant that questions of
procedural fairness were framed
as impediments to efficiency and productivity.
C The vocabulary of business and economics
The lexis in parliamentary debates, press
releases and police websites in relation to CCINs, as well as the
Ombudsman’s evaluation
of the scheme, is replete with near-synonymous
words, ordinarily associated with the fields of business and economics. In the
texts
analysed, terms and phrases such as ‘red tape’, being
‘behind a desk’, ‘paperwork’, ‘in-house
office
work’, ‘administrative demands’, ‘court time’ and
offenders being dealt with in ‘the criminal
justice system’ are
framed in negative terms, and collocated with verbs such as reduce, free up,
save, cut, slash and divert.
Meanwhile, terms such as ‘efficiency’,
‘flexibility’, ‘economic benefits’ and
‘productivity’
are positively appraised, and collocated with verbs
such as increase, provide and improve.
Much of this vocabulary evokes the
NewLiberalSpeak described by Bourdieu and Wacquant, and shows an ‘intense
preoccupation’[138] of the
speakers with a narrow set of free market values. Like the phrase ‘red
tape’, many of these words such as ‘efficiency’,
‘productivity’, ‘administrative demands’ and
‘paperwork’ are examples of abstractions in that
they abstract away
from more specific micro-actions. Being abstract in form, each of these terms
could be infused with a number of
different interpretations, depending on the
textual context in which they are used, and the ideological position and
background of
the audience infusing the terms with meaning. For example,
‘efficiency’ in the context of criminal justice to some might
necessitate each police officer imposing the highest number of fines in the
least amount of time (which may or may not have regard
to culpability) to
achieve maximum profit to the State. To others, efficiency might involve only
imposing fines on those who have
the means to pay them, or only issuing CCINs
where they might produce a diversionary
effect.[139] An imprecise measure
of success when applied to the criminal justice system, the term
‘efficiency’ is apt to be misused
and abused depending on the
motivations of the person using it.
Out of the office and on the beat
An additional
preoccupation discerned from the parliamentary debates and media statements is
that of ‘frontline policing’.
The politicians commonly express that
the best—and sometimes the only—place for police to be is ‘on
the streets’, ‘out amongst the public or on the
road’, ‘on the beat’, ‘outside the office’, doing
‘frontline
duties’ or ‘on the front
line’.[140] By contrast,
police should not be ‘typing’ ‘in-house’, ‘behind
a desk’ and doing
‘paperwork’.[141] This
notion that police belong on the streets is encapsulated in the following
excerpt from the speech of then Minister for Agriculture
and National Party
member, Philip Gardner, regarding the Bill:
the best place for the police is, mostly, out amongst the public or on the roads ... They play a valuable role in ensuring that those of us who are tempted or pressured to break the law in minor ways hold to the law. Therefore, anything that reduces police paperwork is a good thing. Those of us who have been in police offices must be appalled at how much typing and in-house office work the police are meant to do. Coming from an agricultural background, I can say that the more time spent in the office, the less time spent where the work that needs to be done is, because the season is always pressing for the work out in the paddock to be done. In my view, the same principles apply to the police function.
In this excerpt, Gardiner draws similarities between the occupations of
policing and farming. If one were to unpack this analogy,
it could be argued
that a police officer’s primary responsibilities: to detect crime, enforce
the law and protect the community,
bear little resemblance to those of the
average Western Australian farmer: sowing seeds, planting crops or raising
animals for human
consumption to make a profit. This analogy, and the consistent
pairing in parliamentary debates of ‘police’ with places
such as
‘on the front line’ and ‘on the beat’, promote a
dichotomous ordering of the environment in which
police belong outside, or are
‘in place’[142] on the
street, but are ‘out of place’ inside a courtroom or an office. With
repetition, the notion that police belong
on the street assumes the character of
‘orthodoxy’, a taken-for-granted truth or ‘law and order
commonsense’.[143] Not one
politician in the parliamentary debates in relation to the Bill interrupted or
challenged this orthodoxy by proposing the
heretical view that time spent
indoors typing, documenting interactions and doing research might be necessary
or appropriate tasks
for police officers to
undertake.[144]
Part V Conclusion
This article has
demonstrated how CCINs have been legitimised as a necessary criminal justice
measure in WA using neoliberal economic
reasoning. Drawing on CDA, the author
has demonstrated how market values have been applied to criminal law and
procedure, displacing
the application of criminal justice policies that
incorporate due process, transparency and accountability. In addition, from the
discourse examined, it is clear that policy-makers and evaluators have
privileged the ‘engine of economic
activity’[145] over
traditional criminal punishment objectives relating to proportionate punishment,
deterrence, denunciation of the conduct, rehabilitation,
protection of the
community, and recognition of the harm done to the victim and the
community.
A key problem with evaluating criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions
in terms of economic objectives is that in doing so other priorities,
particularly those concerned with morality, culpability and justice, are
overshadowed. Language associated with the domains of business
and free-market
capitalism is particularly adept at stifling moral and ethical values,
especially when the primary imperative of
business is to increase its profits or
maximise shareholder value.[146]
As John Lanchester has argued: ‘The language of money doesn’t
express any implied moral perspective: Judgements of right
and wrong are left
out.’[147] An alternative
proposition, and one that this author finds even more convincing, is that the
language of money does profess a moral judgment, a morality which
prioritises profit over all other goals.
Neoliberal goals of maximising
productivity and profit, while reducing government expenditure and oversight,
can distract us from
the central question of whether administrative fines for
criminal offences are capable of delivering justice. To this end, the
author suggests that the following justice-related factors, raised in the
analysis above, should replace (or at
least be ranked before) neoliberal
concerns if we are to properly evaluate the operation and legitimacy of CINs
schemes:
These factors taken together not only operate as a
barrier to any further implementation of CINs schemes; they also provide a
strong
foundation for an argument that Parliaments should reconsider their use
in the context of minor and public order offences, at least
until issues such as
unequal application, lack of transparency and judicial oversight, and
disproportionate punishment are adequately
addressed. The focus of lawmakers,
and those evaluating CINs, must shift to whether CINs adequately incorporate
these criminal justice
safeguards.
This argument is made with knowledge of
the likelihood that CINs will apply to an increasing number of offences in the
near future.
On this issue, the WA Ombudsman in 2017 recommended that CCINs be
used ‘for a range of other appropriate offences subject to
consideration
of the findings and recommendations in this report regarding the impact on
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and
vulnerable
communities.’[149] This
recommendation was made with the objective of maximising profit and increasing
productivity, being largely based on the Ombudsman’s
assessment that
broadening the CCIN scheme will result in an ‘economic benefit’. The
NSW Police have similarly foreshadowed
an expanding use of CINs in that state.
The NSW Police Force’s Corporate Plan for the years 2016-2018 lists as one
of its priorities:
‘Maximise use of available court alternatives for minor
offences’. The strategy that the NSW Police will implement to
achieve this
is to: ‘Explore legislative amendment to expand the use of criminal
infringement notices’. Incredibly, in
light of the many variables upon
which criminal offending numbers depend, the Corporate Plan lists as an
‘indicator of success’
the NSW Police Force achieving a target of
greater than or equal to 11,300
CINs.[150]
There is a need to
question the consequences of expanding the application of on-the-spot fines to
minor offences, and alongside this,
to resist the intrusion of a neoliberal
discourse into the domain of criminal justice. This is not to say that questions
of cost
and efficiency should not be considered in criminal justice policy
reform. Instead, market values should not be the dominant paradigm
according to
which (quasi-) criminal sanctions are measured. By implementing criminal justice
reform based on market values, we risk
displacing the safeguards ordinarily
attached to the criminal justice system.
[1] Western Australia,
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 9 November 2010, 8351b-8363a
(Rob Johnson). The research for this article was funded by a University of
Technology
Sydney early career research grant: ‘Swift Justice? Police
discretion and on-the-spot fines for offensive language’ (2018).
[2] Ibid 8351b-8363a (Rob
Johnson).
[3] Calla Wahlquist,
‘Aboriginal Woman in WA Fined $500 for Stealing $6.75 Box of
Tampons’ The Guardian, 15 October 2015
<http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/oct/15/aboriginal-woman-in-wa-fined-500-for-stealing-675-box-of-tampons>
.
[4]
Until recently, tampons, sanitary pads and liners (unlike condoms or lubricants)
were considered to be ‘non-essential’
or ‘luxury’ items
in Australia which attracted a 10% GST, raising approximately $38 million a year
in revenue: Alice
Workman, We Have The Receipts On How Much It Would Cost To
Remove The Tampon Tax, And It Ain’t That Much BuzzFeed
<https://www.buzzfeed.com/aliceworkman/tamponomics>; Josh Butler,
‘Senate Votes To Keep The GST On Tampons And
Sanitary Pads’
Huffington Post, 19 June 2017
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2017/06/18/senate-votes-to-keep-the-gst-on-tampons-and-sanitary-pads_a_22488719/>
.
[5]
The fine was paid on the woman’s behalf with the remainder (minus the
crowd funding fees) given to the woman and donated to
charity: Restoring
Dignity for the Woman WA Police Fined $500 for Stealing Tampons!
<https://ozcrowd.com/campaign/1035>; Saffron Howden, ‘Woman Fined
for $6.75 Tampon Box Theft Donates Crowdfunded Money
to Charity’ The
Sydney Morning Herald, 3 November 2015
<http://www.smh.com.au/national/woman-fined-for-675-tampon-box-theft-donates-crowdfunded-money-to-charity-20151103-gkpnfm.html>
.
[6]
WA Ombudsman, A Report on the Monitoring of the Infringement Notices
Provisions of The Criminal Code, Final Report, WA Ombudsman, 2017) vol 3, 71
<http://www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au/Publications/Infringement-Notices.htm>
.
[7]
See n 67 for criticism of recording Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
identity in police statistics in this way.
[8] Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2011 - 2016 Statistics: Western Australia
<http://stat.abs.gov.au/itt/r.jsp?RegionSummary & region=5 & dataset=ABS_REGIONAL_ASGS2016 & geoconcept=ASGS_2016 &
measure=MEASURE & datasetASGS=ABS_REGIONAL_ASGS2016 & datasetLGA=ABS_REGIONAL_LGA2016 & regionLGA=LGA_2016 & regionASGS=ASGS_2016>
.
[9]
WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 3,
94-7.
[10] Pat O’Malley,
The Currency of Justice: Fines and Damages in Consumer Societies
(Routledge, 2009) 4.
[11] Ibid
160–1.
[12] Wahlquist,
above n 3.
[13]
Ibid.
[14] The Criminal Code
(WA) s 723 provides that: ‘For the period of 12 months after the
commencement of this section [4 March 2015], the Ombudsman
is to keep under
scrutiny the operation of the provisions of this Chapter and the regulations
made under this
Chapter’.
[15] Pierre
Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, ‘NewLiberalSpeak: Notes on the New
Planetary Vulgate’ (2001) 105 Radical Philosophy 2,
2.
[16]
Ibid.
[17]
Ibid.
[18] Rick Matthews,
‘Marxist Criminology’ in Walter S DeKeseredy and Molly Dragiewicz
(eds), Routledge handbook of critical criminology (Routledge, 2012) 93,
99; Neoliberalism is characterised by the ‘deregulation of business, the
privatization of state enterprises
and responsibilities, the dismantling of
social programs, the expansion of market forces into new corners of society, a
much-weakened
trade union movement, the return of unrestrained competition, and
the rebirth of previously rejected free-market economic theories’:
Terrence McDonough, Michael Reich and David M Kotz, Contemporary Capitalism
and Its Crises: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the 21st Century
(Cambridge University Press, 2010)
9.
[19] Michael Sandel, What
Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Penguin, 2012) 6;
Anthony S Campagna, The Economy in the Reagan Years: The Economic
Consequences of the Reagan Administrations (Greenwood, 1994)
123.
[20] Norman Fairclough,
‘Critical Discourse Analysis and the Marketization of Public Discourse:
The Universities’ (1993) 4(2)
Discourse and Society
133.
[21] Christopher Hart, Piotr
Cap and Gerlinde Mautner (eds), ‘The Privatization of the Public Realm: A
Critical Perspective on Practice
and Discourse’ in Contemporary
Critical Discourse Studies (Bloomsbury, 2014)
461.
[22]
Ibid.
[23] Paul Leighton and
Donna Selman, ‘Private Prisons, the Criminal Justice–Industrial
Complex and Bodies Destined for Profitable
Punishment’ in Walter S.
DeKeseredy and Molly Dragiewicz (eds), Routledge Handbook of Critical
Criminology (Routledge, 2012) 265. Also of note are for-profit schools and
hospitals.
[24] Sandel, above n
19, 7.
[25] See the Justice
Legislation Amendment (Committals and Guilty Pleas) Bill 2017 (NSW) and Crimes
(Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Sentencing Options) Bill 2017 (NSW); as at the
time of writing the reforms had not commenced.
[26] Pat O’Malley,
‘Technocratic Justice in Australia’ (1984) 2 Law in Context: A
Socio-Legal Journal 31.
[27]
Community Relations Division and NSW Department of Justice, Early Guilty
Pleas
<http://www.justice.nsw.gov.au:80/Pages/Reforms/early-guilty-pleas.aspx>
.
[28]
O’Malley, The Currency of Justice, above n
10.
[29] Ibid 169; see also Pat
O’Malley, ‘Simulated Justice: Risk, Money and Telemetric
Policing’ (2010) 50(5) British Journal of Criminology
795.
[30] See also Julia Quilter
and Russell Hogg, ‘The Hidden Punitiveness of Fines’ (2018) 7(3)
International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy
9.
[31] However, see Melinda
Cooper, Money as Punishment: Neoliberal Budgetary Politics and the Fine,
2017, where the issue of administrative fines and neoliberalism is critiqued
from a sociological perspective
<http://www.academia.edu/34333175/Money_as_Punishment_Neoliberal_Budgetary_Politics_and_the_Fine>
.
[32] O’Malley, The
Currency of Justice, above n
10.
[33] Fairclough provides the
example of how the ‘language of management has colonised public
institutions and organisations such
as universities’: Norman Fairclough,
‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ in James Paul Gee and Michael Handford
(eds),
The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis (Routledge, 2013) 9,
283.
[34] Theo van Leeuwen,
‘Discourse as the Recontextualization of Social Practice: A Guide’
in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer
(eds), Methods of critical discourse
analysis (Sage, 2009) 144,
144.
[35] Fairclough,
‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, above n 33,
282.
[36] Norman Fairclough,
Discourse and Social Change (Polity Press, 1992)
64.
[37] Gerlinde Mautner,
‘The Entrepreneurial University: A Discursive Profile of a Higher
Education Buzzword’ (2005) 2(2) Critical Discourse Studies 95,
100.
[38] Russell Hogg and David
Brown, Rethinking Law and Order (Pluto Press, 1998)
18–19.
[39] See Elyse
Methven, Dirty Talk: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Offensive Language
Crimes (University of Technology Sydney,
2017).
[40] Fairclough,
‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, above n 33,
283.
[41] While often referred to
as ‘on the spot’, the fine itself is never exacted in the initial
police-citizen interaction:
Richard Fox, ‘On Punishing Infringements
Sentencing: Some Key Issues: Chapter II’ (1995) 13 Law in Context: A
Socio-Legal Journal 7,
9.
[42] See Fox, ‘On
Punishing Infringements Sentencing’, above n 41; Richard Fox, Criminal
Justice on the Spot: Infringement Penalties in Victoria (Australian
Institute of Criminology Canberra, 1995); Richard Fox, ‘Infringement
Notices: Time for Reform?’ (51, Australian
Institute of Criminology,
1995).
[43] Fox, ‘On
Punishing Infringements Sentencing’, above n 41,
19.
[44] Criminal Procedure
Regulation 2017 (NSW) sch 4; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss
333-40; Summary Offences Regulations 1994 (NT) regs 3-4A; State
Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld) ss 13-15, 27-3; State Penalties
Enforcement Regulation 2014 (Qld) sch 1; Expiation of Offences Act
1996 (SA); Expiation of Offences Regulations 2011 (SA); Police
Offences Act 1935 (Tas) s 61; Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005
(Tas) s 14; Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) ss 60AA and 60AB(2);
Criminal Code (WA) ss 720-3; Criminal Procedure Act 2004
(WA) pt 2; Criminal Code (Infringement Notices) Regulation 2015 (WA)
sch 1. For discussion of the use of penalty notices for offensive language in
NSW see: Elyse Methven, ‘Should Penalty
Notices Be Issued for Using
Offensive Language?’ (2012) 37 Alternative Law Journal 63; Elyse
Methven, ‘A Very Expensive Lesson: Counting the Costs of Penalty Notices
for Anti-Social Behaviour’ (2014) 26 Current Issues in Criminal
Justice 249.
[45] Criminal
Procedure Regulation 2017 (NSW) sch 4; Summary Offences Act
1988 (NSW) s 9(1) provides that ‘A person who: (a) is given a
move on direction for being intoxicated and disorderly in a public place, and
(b)
at any time within 6 hours after the move on direction is given, is
intoxicated and disorderly in the same or another public place,
is guilty of an
offence’.
[46]
Prostitution Act 1999 (Qld) s 73(1)(a), where it is a first
offence.
[47] For example,
Drug Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) s 10(2): unlawful possession of thing
used in connection with the administration, consumption or smoking of
a dangerous drug.
[48]
State Penalties Enforcement Regulation 2014 (Qld) sch
1.
[49] For offensive conduct, a
court can also impose up to three months’ imprisonment, and there are also
a range of other sentencing
options available: Elyse Methven, ‘A Very
Expensive Lesson’, above n 44; the NSWLRC has recommended that only in
‘exceptional
circumstances involving demonstrated public interest may a
penalty notice amount be up to 50% of the maximum court fine, for example
where
(i) the harm caused by the offence is likely to be particularly severe, (ii)
there is a need to provide effective deterrence
because the offender stands to
make a profit from the activity, or (iii) the great majority of offences are
dealt with by way of
penalty notices, so that the maximum court penalty is less
significant as a comparator’. These exceptional circumstances currently
do
not exist for the crimes of offensive language or conduct in NSW: NSW Law Reform
Commission, Penalty Notices, Final Report, (2012)
108.
[50] Australian Law Reform
Commission, Pathways to Justice–An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Report No 133 (2018)
[12.182]
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/indigenous-incarceration-report133>.
[51]
Western Australia Police, Criminal Code Infringements (19 September 2016)
Western Australia Police
<https://www.police.wa.gov.au/Police-Direct/Infringement-Payments-and-Enquiries/Criminal-Code-Infringements>.
[52]
See, eg, Western Australia Police, Criminal Code Infringement FAQs
Western Australia Police
<https://www.police.wa.gov.au/Police-Direct/Infringement-Payments-and-Enquiries/Criminal-Code-Infringements/Criminal-Code-Infringement-FAQs>
which states that: ‘A CCIN is a Criminal Code Infringement Notice that
will be issued to offenders for nominated minor criminal
offences’; cf the
Criminal Code (WA) s 722, which uses the wording of ‘alleged
offender’ and ‘alleged
offence’.
[53] Under
Article 14.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, (entered into force 23
March 1976), a person must be ‘informed promptly and in detail in a
language which he understands of
the nature and cause of the charge against
him’.
[54] Woolmington
v DPP [1935] AC 462; see also Article 14.2 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights
ibid.
[55] Anne Weyembergh and
Nicolas Joncheray, ‘Punitive Administrative Sanctions and Procedural
Safeguards: A Blurred Picture That
Needs to Be Addressed’ (2016) 7(2)
New Journal of European Criminal Law 190,
190.
[56] Fox, ‘On
Punishing Infringements Sentencing’, above n 41,
9.
[57] Western Australia,
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 9 November 2010, 8351b-8363a
(Rob Johnson).
[58] For example,
the crime of offensive conduct, contrary to the Summary Offences Act
1988 (NSW) s 4, currently carries a penalty of $660 or imprisonment for
three months, in comparison to a fixed CIN amount of
$500.
[59] Western Australia
Police, above n 52.
[60] For
discussion of representations of causality in discourse, see Norman Fairclough,
Language and Power (Longman, 1989) 51; see also Elyse Methven, ‘A
Little Respect: Swearing, Police and Criminal Justice Discourse’ (2018)
7(3) International Journal of Crime, Justice and Social Democracy
58.
[61] WA Ombudsman, above n 6,
vol 1, 16-17. If payment is not made in the 28 day time period specified in the
Final Demand Notice, further
fine enforcement measurements may be ordered after
the fine is registered with the Fines Enforcement Registry: Fines, Penalties
and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) ss
14-21A.
[62]
‘Net-widening’ refers to the phenomenon where people receive a CIN
in circumstances where they would have otherwise had
their conduct ignored,
received a warning, a caution or had the proceeding dismissed in
Court.
[63] Fox, ‘On
Punishing Infringements Sentencing’, above n 41,
10.
[64]
Ibid.
[65] Gaye Lansdell et al,
‘Infringement Systems in Australia: A Precarious Blurring of Civil and
Criminal Sanctions?’ (2012) 37(1) Alternative Law Journal 41; NSW
Ombudsman, ‘Review of the Impact of Criminal Infringement Notices on
Aboriginal Communities’ (Legislative Report,
New South Wales Ombudsman, 1
August 2009)
<https://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/3407/FR_CINs_ATSI_review_Aug09.pdf
>.
[66] Statistics obtained by
researcher in 2017: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, ‘Persons
of Interest (POIs) Proceeded
against by the NSW Police Force for Offensive
Language or Conduct
Offences’.
[67] The WA
Police determine and record ‘offender appearance’ from three
categories: Aboriginal, Caucasian and Other. There
is no category for Torres
Strait Islander People given the very small percentage of Torres Strait
Islanders in WA: Only 0.06 per
cent of the Western Australian population
identified as Torres Strait Islander people in the 2016 Census and a further
0.07 per cent
identified as both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. Note
that criticisms can be levelled at WA Police for identifying the Aboriginal
or
Torres Strait Islander identity of a person by means of ‘offender
appearance’. The standards for collecting and recording
Aboriginal or
Torres Strait Islander status should instead be derived from the identification
of a person as Aboriginal or Torres
Strait Islander, including by descent,
self-identification, and acceptance of the person as an Aboriginal or Torres
Strait Islander
by their community: WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 1, 35-6; vol 4,
7.
[68] Ibid
35.
[69] Australian Bureau of
Statistics, above n 8.
[70] WA
Ombudsman, above n 6, 34,
46.
[71] Bernadette Saunders et
al, ‘An Examination of the Impact of Unpaid Infringement Notices on
Disadvantaged Groups and the Criminal
Justice System - Towards a Best Practice
Model’
<http://youthlaw.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CJRC-Examination-Web-Copy.pdf>
.
[72]
NSW Ombudsman, above n 65.
[73]
WA Ombudsman, above n 6, 20. Advantage was measured using suburbs and addresses
provided to WA Police and the Australian Index of
Relative Socio-economic
Advantage and Disadvantage.
[74]
Ibid 18. Seventeen per cent of the total (2,978) had been paid after the initial
notice was issued, and 4 per cent after a final
demand notice was
issued.
[75] Tamara Walsh,
‘Who Is “Public” in a “Public Space”?’
(2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 81; Jarrod White,
‘Power/Knowledge and Public Space: Policing the “Aboriginal
Towns”’ (1997) 30 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Criminology 275.
[76] Tamara
Walsh, ‘Poverty, Police and the Offence of Public Nuisance’ (2008)
20 Bond Law Review 7.
[77]
Australian Law Reform Commission, above n
50.
[78] Thalia Anthony,
Indigenous People, Crime and Punishment (Routledge,
2013).
[79] WA Ombudsman,
‘Monitoring of the Infringement Notices Provisions of The Criminal
Code’ (Consultation Paper, WA Ombudsman,
8 April
2016)
<http://www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au/CCINs/Documents/Monitoring_infringement_notices_provisions_Criminal_Code_Consultation_Paper.pdf>
.
[80]
Australian Law Reform Commission, above n
50.
[81] Ibid ch 12; Mary Spiers
Williams and Robyn Gilbert, Reducing the Unintended Impact of Fines
(Indigenous Justice Clearinghouse, 2011); Elyse Methven, ‘We Need
Evidence-Based Law Reform to Reduce Rates of Indigenous Incarceration’
The Conversation (online), 9 April 2018
<http://theconversation.com/we-need-evidence-based-law-reform-to-reduce-rates-of-indigenous-incarceration-94228>
.
[82]
Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 50; Methven, above n
81.
[83] Australian Law Reform
Commission, above n 50,
[12.182].
[84] Australian Law
Reform Commission, above n 50, Recommendation
12-2.
[85] See WA Ombudsman,
Infringement Notices Provisions Report, above n 6, vol 1, 13 for a list
of the pilot suburbs.
[86] The
CIN regime was introduced firstly in a trial in 2002, when legislation was
passed to authorise a 12-month trial period for CINs
for certain prescribed
offences, including common assault, larceny or shoplifting, offensive language,
offensive conduct, obtaining
money by wilful false representation, obstructing
traffic, and unauthorised entry of vehicle or boat. This list was subsequently
amended with some offences being added and others - such as common assault -
removed. The scheme was implemented state-wide in 2008:
NSW Law Reform
Commission, above n 49, 6; Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates,
Legislative Council, 23 February
2011.
[87] Criminal Code
(Infringement Notices) Regulations 2015 (WA) reg
5.
[88] Criminal Code (WA)
s 74A(2).
[89] The enabling Act,
the Criminal Code Amendment (Infringement Notices) Act 2011 (WA),
was introduced in 2011, however it took four years for the WA Parliament to
introduce CCINS under this Act by introducing the
Criminal Code (Infringement
Notices) Regulations 2015 (WA); s 378 Criminal Code
(WA).
[90] The Non-Traffic
Infringement Management Solution (NTIMS) system is a computerised system
developed by WA police to manage the use
of CCINs. The development of this
system was a key reason why it took WA approximately four years to implement the
CCIN scheme from
the date of the introduction of the legislation into
Parliament. It is now also being used for other non-traffic infringements, such
as infringements related to firearms: WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 2,
21.
[91] Ibid vol 1,
16.
[92] Criminal
Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA) s 47. Note
that for stealing, if considered a serious offence (as the statute contains a
penalty of 12 months or more: s 3), the police may also retain other identity
information such as dental imprints and the person’s DNA profile. If the
person
does not consent or withdraws consent to the identifying
procedure pursuant to s 49 of the Criminal Investigation (Identifying
People) Act 2002 (WA) the suspect may be arrested;
and the procedure may be done on the suspect against the suspect’s
will. The identity information
may be compared with other police
information (whether or not this information is in the database) and could be
used in any court
proceedings.
[93] State-wide,
requests for destruction of identity information are made in only 0.02% of
instances.
[94] Western Australia
Police, above n 52.
[95]
Department of Justice: Court and Tribunal Services, Infringement Notices
<http://www.courts.dotag.wa.gov.au/I/infringement_notices.aspx?uid=4916-1423-2566-8813>
Criminal Code (Infringement Notices) Regulations 2015 (WA) sch
2.
[96] Peter Collier in
contributing to the debate on the Bill, Western Australia, Parliamentary
Debates, Legislative Council, 23 February 2011 911; WA Ombudsman, above n 6,
vol 2, 45.
[97] See WA Ombudsman,
above n 6.
[98] NSW Law Reform
Commission, above n 49, 67.
[99]
Ibid 69.
[100] Criminal Code
(WA) s 74(1); Each of these adjectives (offensive, insulting and so on) is
not defined in statute, but has been considered in case
law. See Methven, above
n 39.
[101] Melser v
Police [1967] NZLR 437, 444 (Turner J); quoted with approval in Heanes v
Herangi [2007] WASC 175; (2007) 175 A Crim R 175 (Johnson J at
209).
[102] For discussion, see
Luke McNamara and Julia Quilter, ‘Time to Define the Cornerstone of Public
Order Legislation: The Elements
of Offensive Conduct and Language under the
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW)’ [2013] UNSWLawJl 20; (2013) 36 University of New South
Wales Law Journal 534; Elyse Methven, ‘“Weeds of Our Own
Making”: Language Ideologies, Swearing and the Criminal Law’ (2016)
34(2) Law in Context
117.
[103] Coleman v
Power [2004] HCA 39; (2004) 220 CLR 1, 25–6 (Gleeson CJ); Heanes v Herangi
[2007] WASC 175; (2007) 175 A Crim R 175,
[135].
[104] Heanes v
Herangi [2007] WASC 175; (2007) 175 A Crim R 175,
[177].
[105] Australian Law
Reform Commission, above n 50, Recommendation 12–4, 17
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/indigenous-incarceration-report133>.
[106]
Ibid; see also Tamara Walsh, ‘Public Nuisance, Race and Gender’
(2017) 26(3) Griffith Law Review
334.
[107] For example, a study
conducted by the NSW Ombudsman found that, of those CINs issued for offensive
language to Aboriginal people
between 2002 and 2007, 70 per cent of the language
used was directed at police only. Twenty three per cent of the language was
directed
at police and others: NSW Ombudsman, above n 65; See also Walsh,
‘Public Nuisance, Race and Gender’, above n 106, in
relation to the
offence of public nuisance in
Queensland.
[108] Criminal
Code (WA) ss 378; 426(4). The section also contains aggravated offences with
higher penalties depending on the nature of the item stolen
(for example, the
stealing of a testamentary instrument or an aircraft attracts a penalty of up to
10 years).
[109] The term
‘property’ is defined inclusively in s 371(7) and comprises any real
and personal property, money, debts, bank
credits, and legacies and all deeds
and instruments relating to or evidencing the title or right to any property or
giving a right
to recover or receive any money or goods. Things considered
capable of being stolen also include tame animals and wild animals kept
in a
state of confinement (such as a lion in a zoo), or dead bodies of animals; for a
complete list, see s 370.
[110]
Criminal Code (WA) s 371(3) provides that the ‘taking or conversion
may be fraudulent, although it is effected without secrecy or attempt
at
concealment’.
[111] See
Ilich v The Queen [1987] HCA 1; (1987) 162 CLR
110.
[112] The number of
actions by police in response to incidents of stealing for Aboriginal male
offenders increased by 18 per cent: WA Ombudsman,
above n 6, vol 1,
39.
[113] Ibid vol 1, 40.
[114] Rob Johnson, ‘Police to give on-the-spot fines for minor crimes’ (Media Statement, 8 September 2010) <https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/Barnett/2010/09/Police-to-give-on-the-spot-fines-for-minor-crimes.aspx>.
[115] Crimes (Sentencing
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A; See Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988)
164 CLR 465; Also of significance in the last three decades is the rise of
‘restorative justice’ measures. These
measures emphasise
reintegration, reparation, and mediation between offenders, victims, families,
other affected parties and the
wider community, and may include circle
sentencing, reintegrative shaming, reconciliation, and new and emerging forms of
conflict
resolution. David Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Materials and
Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New South Wales (Federation Press,
6th ed, 2015) 1228.
[116] A
cursory reference was made to deterrence. The Minister for Police said in the
Second Reading Speech to the Bill that CCINs would
still ‘provid[e] an
incentive for behaviour change’: Western Australia, Parliamentary
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 September 2010 6138
<http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/Hansard/hansard.nsf/0/9b4f1c5d51fc1370482577d8003006bb/$FILE/A38+S1+20100908+p6137d-6139a.pdf>
.
[117]
The Minister outlined that the ‘key objectives’ of the scheme would
be: ‘to reduce the administrative demands on
police in relation to
relatively minor offences by providing a quick alternative to arrest ...to
reduce the time taken by police
in preparation for and appearance at court; to
allow police to remain on front-line duties rather than having to take the
offender
back to the police station; to provide an additional general tool in
the array of responses available to police; to provide police
with greater
flexibility in their response to criminal behaviour; to ... reduc[e] both court
time and trial backlogs; and to provide
a diversionary option for the community
as a means of avoiding court appearances for minor offences’. Western
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 October 2010
6138–9.
[118] Rob
Johnson, Media Statement: Police to Give on-the-Spot Fines for Minor
Crimes (8 September 2010) Parliament of WA
<https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/Barnett/2010/09/Police-to-give-on-the-spot-fines-for-minor-crimes.aspx>.
[119]
Kate Doust (Labor, Opposition), in her contribution to the debate on the Bill,
stated: ‘I imagine it will make the lives of
police on the street a lot
easier, particularly given that they will have the discretion to issue these
notices. I imagine that it
will save them a lot of paperwork, which will
ultimately free them up to have a greater presence on the streets, and I think
that
is something we all want to see’ Western Australia, Parliamentary
Debates, Legislative Council, 22 February 2011 782. The Greens Party also
supported the Bill, Giz Watson (Greens) stated in the debate on
the Bill:
‘we do in principle support the bill, but we want to ensure that the
scheme is evaluated properly and in its entirety,
and successfully moved an
amendment that the Ombudsman keep under scrutiny the operation of its
provisions, with particular regard
to the impact of their operation on
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities’. As did the National
Party - see contribution
to the debate of Philip Gardiner (Nationals) Western
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 February 2011
910–11,
915–6.
[120] (Liza
Harvey, Police Minister), Questions: Criminal Code Infringement Notices, Western
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 25 March 2015
2169b-2169b.
[121] See
Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis and the Marketization of Public
Discourse’, above n 20,
147.
[122] Police to Issue
On-the-Spot Fines for Disorderly Conduct (8 September 2010) ABC News
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-09-08/police-to-issue-on-the-spot-fines-for-disorderly/2252724>
.
Then Minister for Energy, Peter Collier, similarly represented the positive
contribution that CCINs will make by the use of
high modality phrases:
‘... it is an eminently sensible bill. It will free up time for police to
do their work in other areas.
It will reduce the administrative demands on
police. It will reduce the time taken by police for court appearances and it
will save
court time, amongst a number of other advantages’: Western
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 February
2011.
[123] For discussion of
transformations see Roger Fowler and Gunther Kress, ‘Critical
Linguistics’ in Roger Fowler et al (eds),
Language and Control
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979) 185,
207–8.
[124] Li Lan and
Lucy MacGregor, ‘Colour Metaphors in Business Discourse’ [2009]
Language for professional communication: Research, practice and training
11, 19–20.
[125] Barry
Bozeman, ‘A Theory of Government “Red Tape”’ (1993) 3(3)
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 273,
274.
[126] SIL, Glossary of
Linguistic Terms
<http://www.glossary.sil.org/term/ontological-metaphor>
.
[127]
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (University of
Chicago Press, 2nd ed,
2003).
[128] Government of
Western Australia, ‘Police Back on the Beat after Red Tape Slashed’
(Media Statement, 18 November 2015)
<https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/Barnett/2015/11/Police-back-on-the-beat-after-red-tape-slashed.aspx>.
[129]
Western Australia Department of Treasury, Red Tape Rapid Assessment Tool
<http://www.treasury.wa.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Site-content/Economic_Reform/Reducing_Red_Tape/Red-Tape-Rapid-Assessment-Tool.pdf.>
Parallels can be drawn to the Commonwealth Liberal/National Party’s annual
‘red tape repeal day’, which commenced
in 2014, when the Australian
Government under then Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced plans to ‘cut
$1 billion in red tape
every year’: Australian Government Department of
Jobs and Small Business, Deregulation Agenda | Department of Jobs and Small
Business, Australian Government (9 March 2018) Department of Jobs and Small
Business
<https://www.jobs.gov.au/deregulation-agenda>.
[130]
Western Australia, Inaugural Speech: Mrs Liza Harvey, Legislative
Assembly, 25 November 2008
<http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/parliament/Memblist.nsf/(MemberPics)/F47B019922A3A598C82574D0001EBED1/$file/Inaug+Harvey+final.pdf>
.
[131]
As then Finance Minister Bill Marmion stated: ‘By cutting red tape, WA
Police have been able to reduce the administrative burden
on their officers and
ensure they are on the beat responding to crime, providing a more efficient
service to the community’:
Government of Western Australia, above n
128.
[132] Sandel, above n 19,
7.
[133] Lakoff and Johnson,
above n 127, 156.
[134] See
also then NSW Attorney-General Bob Debus comment on CINs in NSW: ‘I am
told by my colleague the Minister for Police that
he has visited dozens of
police stations during his time in office, and he has been told on dozens of
occasions not only that officers
would like to be less involved with paperwork
and red tape but also that officers have consistently supported a scheme of this
nature
is a way of cutting down on paperwork’: NSW Ombudsman, ‘Put
on the Spot - Criminal Infringement Notices Trial’
(Discussion Paper, NSW
Ombudsman, August 2003), 6
<https://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/3484/Put-on-the-Spot-Criminal-Infringement-Notices-Trial-Discussion-paper-August-2003.pdf>.
[135]
Lakoff and Johnson, above n 127,
12–13.
[136] See Allan
Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Springer
Science & Business Media,
1988).
[137] Herbert Kaufman,
Red Tape: Its Origins, Uses, and Abuses (Brookings Institution Press,
2015) 1.
[138] Fowler and
Kress, above n 123,
211–12.
[139] Of course,
these are just a couple of the multiple meanings which can be ascribed to this
abstract word in the context of CCINs and
the criminal justice
system.
[140] Kate Doust,
Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 22
February 2011 781b-787a; Peter Collier; Phillip Gardiner Western Australia,
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 February 2011 900c-916a;
Government of Western Australia, above n 129; Western Australia Police,
Criminal Code Infringement Notices Western Australia Police
<https://www.police.wa.gov.au/About-Us/News/Criminal-Code-Infringement-Notices>;
Western Australia,
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21
October 2010; Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative
Assembly, 9 November
2010.
[141] Kate Doust, Western
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 22 February 2011
781b-787a; Phillip Gardiner Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates,
Legislative Council, 23 February 2011 909c-916a; Liza Harvey (Police Minister)
Questions: Criminal Code Infringement Notices Western
Australia,
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 25 March 2015
2169b-2169b.
[142] See Tim
Cresswell, In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression
(University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An
Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1966).
[143] See Hogg and
Brown, above n 38.
[144] Deputy
Leader of the Opposition, Kate Doust, stated: ‘The application of this set
of arrangements is probably commonsense;
I imagine it will make the lives of
police on the street a lot easier, particularly given that they will have the
discretion to issue
these notices. I imagine that it will save them a lot of
paperwork, which will ultimately free them up to have a greater presence
on the
streets, and I think that is something we all want to see’. Member for the
Greens Party, Giz Watson, voiced concerns
about the potential disproportionate
impact of CCINs on Indigenous communities, but stated that ‘we [the
Greens] do in principle
support the bill, but we want to ensure that the scheme
is evaluated properly and in its entirety’. Western Australia,
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 22 February 2011
781b-787a.
[145] Bourdieu and
Wacquant, above n 15, 3.
[146]
Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits’ The New York Times Magazine (New York), 13 September 1970;
Frank Stilwell, Oh, the Morality: Why Ethics Matters in Economics The
Conversation
<http://theconversation.com/oh-the-morality-why-ethics-matters-in-economics-5963>
.
[147]
John Lanchester, How to Speak Money (Faber and Faber, 2014)
16.
[148] This is not to say
that the return of property to the victim, and the victim’s experience in
the criminal justice system, should
not be improved where possible; rather, it
is to say that the immediate return of property to the alleged victim should not
trump
the proper investigation of criminal offences and the evaluation of the
most appropriate action to be taken for the alleged offence
by the police
officer.
[149] WA Ombudsman,
above n 6, Recommendation 11, vol 1,
56.
[150] NSW Police Force,
Corporate Plan 2016-2018 <
https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/publications/publications/corporate_plan>.
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