


TASMANIA.



1926.

ANNO SEPTIMO DECIMO

GEORGII V. REGIS.

No. 5.

ANALYSIS.

1. Short title.
2. Repeal of Section 2 of 7 Vict. No. 10, and substitution of new section.
Provision for postponement of Courts and trials.

AN ACT to amend the Law relating to the holding of Sessions and Sittings of the Supreme Court. [17 September, 1926.]

A.D. 1926

BE it enacted by His Excellency the Governor of Tasmania, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and House of Assembly, in Parliament assembled, as follows :—

1 This Act may be cited as “The Supreme Court Sessions and Sittings Act, 1926.” Short title.

2 Section Two of the Act 7 Victoriæ No. 10 is hereby repealed, and the following section substituted therefor :—

Repeal of Section 2 of 7 Vict. No. 10 and substitution of new section.
Provision for postponement of Courts and trials.

“2 And be it enacted that if in any case any such Judge shall from any cause be prevented from opening, or shall not actually open, the Session or Sittings appointed to be held at any place on the day

Supreme Court Sessions and Sittings.

A D. 1926.

appointed for that purpose, the same shall be opened and holden either by the same Judge or some other Judge of the Supreme Court as soon afterwards as practicable: And be it further enacted that, notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, in any case in which any Session or Sittings has been appointed to be holden at any place, the said Judges or any one of them may, if they or he are or is of opinion that the matters requiring to be dealt with at such Session or Sittings are not of sufficient number or importance to justify the holding of such Session or Sittings, or, if they or he for any other reason deem or deems it fit so to do, by order in writing, postpone such Session or Sittings to some subsequent date to be by them or him determined, or direct that such matters be dealt with at some subsequent Session or Sittings to be holden at the same place; and, in any case in which the trial of any person has been postponed by virtue of any such order as aforesaid, such person shall be deemed to have been remanded to stand his trial at the time fixed thereby, and any bond or recognizance entered into in respect of the appearance and trial of such person shall be construed accordingly."