Bateman, Sam --- "Naval Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects" [2000] MarStudies 14; (2000) 112 Maritime Studies 21

This paper discusses issues associated with naval cooperation in Northeast Asia against the background of a history of naval conflict and tensions still latent in the region today. The need for naval cooperation is highlighted by both the continuing maritime insecurity of the region and the size and growth of regional navies but major problems and difficulties must be overcome before the potential benefits of naval cooperation are realised.

Limitations on naval cooperation are evident both politically and technically. The security perceptions of regional nations differ and some countries are suspicious about the capabilities and intentions of their neighbours. Regional navies are at different stages of technological development and there are inherent difficulties with them operating together. No natural naval ‘partners’ exist in the region and the tentative first steps towards naval cooperation between Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States risk sending the wrong signals to China in particular. Despite these limitations and problems, naval cooperation needs pursuing and the paper includes some suggestions aimed at extending the fairly narrow web of naval cooperation that exists at present in Northeast Asia.

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Background

Naval confrontation and rivalry figure prominently in the maritime history of Northeast Asia and instances of cooperation between regional navies are few and far between. The legacy of naval conflict stretches back over many centuries. As most present day visitors to Seoul are aware, in the late sixteenth century, the Korean Navy of Admiral Yi Sun-Sin with the world’s first ironclad ships (the so-called turtle ships) defeated the Japanese Navy which lost more than 500 ships in less than six months of conflict.^[3]

Naval conflict was a prominent feature of the region’s history in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Major naval battles of the period included the Battle of the Yalu River in 1894 when a Japanese fleet defeated a larger Chinese one^[4] and the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 involving the defeat of the Russian fleet of Admiral Rozhestvensky by a technologically superior and more expert Japanese force led by Admiral Togo.^[5] Relatively little naval action occurred in the region during World War I but World War II in the Asia-Pacific region developed into a major maritime conflict – perhaps the greatest in maritime strategic terms that the world will ever see.

The Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region was predominantly maritime in character, particularly after the end of the Vietnam War. This maritime flavour was most evident in the Maritime Strategy adopted by the United States Navy (USN) in the mid-1980s. Geoffrey Till has described that strategy as ‘a Pacific Fleet formulation’, noting that

Now at the end of the twentieth century, latent naval competition and rivalry are still more evident in the region than naval cooperation despite some hesitant first steps towards cooperation. These tentative steps include: fairly low level cooperation, including reciprocal port visits and low-key exercises, between the navies of Japan (the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force or JMSDF) and the Republic of Korea,^[7] multilateral naval talks involving USN and regional navies,^[8] the first port visit by a Russian warship to Japan in over one hundred years,^[9] talks on trilateral naval cooperation between Japan, the United States and South Korea,^[10] and the signing of some bilateral Avoidance of Incidents (INCSEA) agreements.^[11] However, despite these initiatives, the general atmosphere in the region remains one of maritime insecurity and barely submerged naval tensions. In some ways the perceived need for INCSEA agreements is more indicative of a risk of naval conflict rather than evidence of any desire for naval cooperation in the region.

Necessity

The need for naval cooperation in Northeast Asia is highlighted by both continuing maritime insecurity in the region and the size and growth of regional navies. Maritime insecurity is evident with ongoing uncertainty over the possible power projection aspirations of China,^[12] the perceived need for a theatre missile defence (TMD) capability, spying incidents by North Korea against Japan and South Korea, and conflicting claims to several groups of islands in the region. Disputation is starkly evident in Northeast Asian seas, especially between North and South Korea, between Russia and Japan over the southern Kuriles, between Japan and South Korea over the Takeshima or Tok-do Islands, and between China and Japan over the Senkaku or Diayou Islands.

Theoretically minor irritants, such as the conflicting claims of Korea and Japan to the Takeshima/Tok-do Islands, can be quite disproportionate in terms of both their impact on regional relations, the boost to nationalistic fervour, and the incentive they provide for acquisition of naval capabilities. Maritime insecurity is also apparent with the declaration of excessive straight baselines^[13] and maritime security zones,^[14] fisheries disputes, and incompatible uses of the sea, particularly waste disposal and land-based pollution. This situation is not improved by countries pressing maximum claims to sovereign rights under the law of the sea. The existence of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in particular, has been ‘more divisive than integrating’ with some coastal States initially not establishing EEZs ‘for economic and realistic (fishing), practical (delimitation), scientific (resource management), political and strategic (navigation) reasons’.^[15]

The expansion of naval forces has been evident in Northeast Asia.^[16] Japan is placing less reliance on the umbrella of the military power of the United States. With heavy dependence on imports of energy and other strategic commodities, Japan must inevitably look beyond the limit of one thousand nautical miles as the current extent of Japanese interest in capabilities for the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The JMSDF is a very sophisticated, technically advanced force that ‘is in fact a navy in all but name and the most powerful one in Asia-Pacific after the US Navy (USN)’.^[17]

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) has major plans for more powerful sea control capabilities, including large AAW destroyers, broadly equivalent to the Japanese Kongo Class vessels, and new generation submarines. These plans have been dampened only slightly by economic problems. The rationale for the new acquisitions lies in concern for the security of seaborne trade, the need for self-reliance in the face of concerns over the reliability of US presence in the region, longer term prospects for reunification with North Korea, and deeply-held suspicions over the motives of Korea’s larger neighbours, Japan and China.

Like the ROKN, until recently Taiwan’s navy was largely comprised of former USN ships of World War II vintage. A major naval modernisation program has been underway for some years now, with new surface combatants, and submarine and amphibious capabilities. Along with the continued acquisition of fighter and strike aircraft, Taiwan is building up powerful maritime forces necessary to resist any landing or blockade by the mainland. But in view of the status of Taiwan, it is difficult to see the Taiwanese Navy being included in cooperation with other regional navies as such moves would inevitably be vetoed by mainland China.

	China	Japan	S. Korea	N. Korea	Taiwan	Russia
SSBNs	1 (1)					6 (18)
Attack Submarines	69 (50)	16 (18)	19 (3)	26 (25)	4 (4)	11 (34)
Cruisers						1 (9)
Destroyers	18 (18)	9 (8)	6 (7)		16 (22)	7 (6)
Frigates	35 (32)	46 (55)	33 (33)	3 (3)	21 (16)	2 (34)
Patrol/Coastal Combatants	676 (870)	3 (6)	84 (122)	309 (413)	104 (98)	41 (25)
Mine Countermeasures	119 (121)	34 (38)	14 (14)	23 (25)	12 (16)	33 (53)
Amphibious	70 (54)	6 (6)	14 (15)	10 (231)	18 (21)	4 (14)
Personnel	230,000 (260,000)	43,800 (43,700)	60,000 (60,000)	46,000 (46,000)	68,000 (68,000)

Source: IISS Military Balance 1999-2000 and 1995-1996 (figures in brackets are 1995-96).

The Chinese navy remains an enigma. While the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLAN) has over fifty major surface combatants, a large submarine force (including SSNs) and possible aspirations to acquire an aircraft carrier capability,^[18] regional naval experts are divided as to the effectiveness of this force. As Eric Grove has observed, ‘There is a tendency to over-estimate China’s naval forces’.^[19] On the other hand and notwithstanding the possible problems of technology levels, maintenance, reliability and crew training, the PLAN is learning fast and recent experiences in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea have provided salutary experiences of the importance of sea power. Also, the PLAN is increasingly concerned about the growing naval power of other regional countries that could pose long-term security problems to China, particularly Japan.^[20] It is in view of these considerations that the relative importance of the three branches of the PLA has changed in recent years and the PLAN, which in the past has been the least important, is ‘now deemed the senior service, followed by the air force’.^[21]

The order of battle for the regional navies of Northeast Asia is shown in Table 1 for 1999-2000, along with similar data for 1995-96. Little change is evident overall during this period of four years, except for submarine numbers in some navies and the continued and fairly sharp decline in the order of battle of the Russian Pacific Fleet. A visit by Eric Grove to the Russian Pacific Fleet in 1995 ‘revealed a numerically much reduced force of modern destroyers and large anti-submarine ships and an equally slimmed-down but efficient submarine force’.^[22] All indications are that this rundown has continued.

Table 1 shows that the Chinese Navy is the largest of regional navies in terms of ship numbers with 69 submarines and 53 major surface combatants, followed by Japan (16 submarines and 55 major surface combatants) and then by South Korea (19 submarines and 39 major combatants), Russia (17 submarines and 10 major combatants), Taiwan (4 submarines and 37 major combatants) and North Korea (26 submarines and 3 major combatants). The two navies that seem to have the most ambitious force development plans are those of South Korea (having replaced Russia as the third largest regional navy over the last year or two) and Taiwan.

Table 1 shows how regional submarine numbers have increased with a total of 145 attack submarines in regional navies in 1999-2000 as compared with 134 in 1995-96. Setting aside the Russian Pacific Fleet which has continued removing submarines from the order of battle during the period, the number of regional attack submarines increased from 100 to 134. This figure will continue to grow as regional submarine building and acquisition programs proceed.^[23] This is not an encouraging trend for naval cooperation in the region as submarines, by their very nature, are not well suited to cooperative activities.

Overall naval activity in the region is increasing. While activities by the Russian Navy and the United States Navy in the waters of Northeast Asia have decreased over the past decade, the regional navies of China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are now of more consequence. Regional seas are a more complex operating area for naval forces than they were in the past. There is increased risk of incidents between maritime forces with the ships, submarines and aircraft of so many different countries operating in similar areas of relatively confined waters. As Paul Bracken has observed ‘Frictions can be expected not from the size of the fleets in question but from their size proportional to the maritime space they operate in.’^[24] The risk is heightened both by potential causes of conflict, such as overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction and fisheries disputes, and by the presence of submarines and long-range missile systems at sea. The latter require well-developed procedures and effective command and control systems if incidents are to be avoided, particularly during periods of tension when there could be ‘itchy trigger fingers’.

Do the trends in Table 1 suggest that a naval arms race is underway at present in Northeast Asia? The same question has been asked before about the naval situation in the Asia-Pacific region generally.^[25] Invariably the answer to that question has been in the negative with reference to arms dynamics rather than arms racing. Unfortunately the situation is now rather different in Northeast Asia where there appears to be an element of acquiring new capabilities competitively to keep up with other navies. Certainly a strong element of technical modernisation is present but there is also a large element of competitiveness.

Possibility

Naval cooperation and dialogue are often put forward as a possible means of reducing naval competition and tensions. Naval cooperation encompasses all military activities associated with the sea (recognising that in some regional countries, maritime aircraft are operated by the air force). Its scope ranges from low-key, confidence-building activities (e.g. ship visits, fleet reviews, personnel exchanges, navy-to-navy talks, and multilateral naval conferences); through more ambitious activities (such as information/intelligence exchanges, joint doctrine development, standard operating procedures (SOPs) for exercises and peacetime operations, bilateral and multi-lateral exercises, avoidance of incident at sea (INCSEA) agreements, naval peacekeeping, and cooperation on tasks such as marine scientific research and anti-piracy); to the top end of combined operations (e.g. cooperative maritime surveillance, standing regional naval forces, cooperative sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, and mine-countermeasures).

The major forum specifically for naval dialogue and cooperation is provided by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).^[26] The WPNS brings together leaders from the navies of the Western Pacific to discuss issues of common concern. Its membership comprises the navies of the ASEAN countries, Japan, Papua New Guinea, China, Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Recent meetings of the WPNS are understood to have concentrated largely on civil responsibilities (marine safety, search and rescue, disaster relief, protection of the marine environment, etc.) because these were ‘safer’ issues for the forum to consider. This is despite the fact that in most Asia-Pacific countries, agencies other than navies generally have responsibility for these matters. It is also apparent that navies generally have a preference for bilateral cooperation and some Asia Pacific countries, particularly China and the United States, were not comfortable about having military and naval activities considered in a multilateral forum.

The biennial RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercises conducted by the USN off Hawaii remain the major multilateral naval exercises at present conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. These exercises involve the navies of Australia, Canada, Japan, and Korea. The main objective of these exercises is to help maintain inter-operability with the USN and some constraints are in fact placed on whether units of individual navies will operate with units of other navies (e.g. South Korean ships are understood not to operate in the same group as Japanese vessels).

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has started to move specifically into the areas of maritime and naval cooperation. Many of the representatives who attended the inaugural ARF Maritime Specialist Officials Meeting (MSOM) in Honolulu in November 1998 were in fact serving naval officers so in some ways the meeting can also be seen as a form of naval cooperation. Topics discussed included domestic Y2K efforts to prevent marine casualties, information-sharing about sub-standard vessels, oil-spill response arrangements, measures to minimise the generation of shipboard waste, maritime law enforcement (particularly the control of piracy), marine information data exchange and the ratification of maritime conventions.

Limitations

Prospective limitations on regional naval cooperation are evident both at a political level and a technical one. Navies may be uncomfortable about discussing operational and doctrinal issues and prefer to keep dialogue, at least initially to the small ‘s’ side of the security spectrum. This might include, for example, environmental protection and pollution issues which are the responsibilities of other agencies and are also covered by other forums such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Regional Seas programs of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

While ‘ample political and strategic grounds exist for increased two- and three-way naval cooperation in Northeast Asia’,^[27] this consideration is normally limited to Japan, South Korea and the US. A leading forum in which this trilateral cooperation has been discussed has been legitimately concerned about the potential reaction of China to such cooperation.^[28] Chinese concerns have already been raised by the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation which are viewed by China as expanding the potential for Japan to support American military operations in any conflict with China over Taiwan.^[29]

Another limitation concerns the role that the USN will play in regional naval cooperation. Some have seen this role as being a leading one but others have been more circumspect. A more cautious approach would appear to be the view expressed by one American analyst that

For example, China has high sensitivity, if not hostility, towards potential ROK-US-Japan security cooperation.

A feature of naval conflict in Northeast Asia over the centuries has been that an element of a possible ‘revolution in naval warfare’ has often been present. The turtle ships of Admiral Yi Sun-Sin, the successful Japanese fleet at the Battle of Tsushima, and the U.S. aircraft carriers of World War II all demonstrated some form of technical advantage over their opponents. Advances in naval technology are a central feature of contemporary naval developments in the region with AEGIS cruisers, concepts of TMD and ‘state of the art’ conventional submarines.

Driven by concerns over the North Korean missile capability,^[31] the Northeast Asia region is the focus of developments with TMD.^[32] However, a trilateral workshop on naval cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the United States concluded that the three countries should not pursue trilateral TMD because of the possible negative reaction from China, particularly the risk of Chinese fears that the system could be deployed in defence of Taiwan.^[33] Generally it would seem that TMD is one area of prospective naval cooperation that has a significant downside with the Far Eastern Economic Review noting last year that

Problems

It is not hard to find problems with strengthening naval cooperation in Northeast Asia. Tensions are apparent throughout the region with regard to the latent, and from time-to-time not so latent, suspicions held by some countries concerning the capabilities and intentions of their neighbours. A possible bilateral security threat is perceived to exist whichever pair of countries is lined up against each other (i.e. Japan and Russia, Korea and Japan, China and Russia and so on, in a series of intersecting and potentially threatening relationships). It is these differences in security policies among regional states that are ‘the most notable obstacles to the formation and development of (naval) coalitions.’^[35]

There are no natural naval ‘partners’ in the region. However, some recent attempts have been made to build some sort of naval cooperative framework between Japan and South Korea based on the bilateral relations enjoyed by the navies of these two countries with the USN. The navies of Korea and Japan have exchanged ship visits^[36] but the two countries still ‘have very deep ill feelings toward each other’.^[37] In addition to the political sensitivities involved, there are practical problems that inhibit the scope of naval cooperation. All regional navies face tight operating budgets and exercises and port visits can be relatively expensive.

There are problems with common doctrine, language and inter-operability of equipment. Regional navies acquire their ships, submarines and aircraft from a wide range of sources. The problems involved become even more acute as the technological levels of navies increase. The navies of Northeast Asia are at different stages of technological development. Technical deficiencies in some navies may significantly inhibit cooperation with the less advanced navies being reluctant to engage in operational cooperation for fear that their deficiencies will be too apparent. The level and use of combat data systems are particular areas where differences might appear. Generally though, the capability to complement each other’s operations may well be more achievable than an ability to integrate naval forces.

Another problem is that naval cooperation may be used to gain intelligence on the capabilities of a potential adversary. It is well-known that even innocuous naval port visits provide an opportunity to gather intelligence both by the host nation collecting information about the visiting ship and by the visiting ship about the host nation (including by signals intelligence gained by listening in on the host nation’s naval communications while in port). Normally it is standard practice for a host nation to close down sensitive transmissions while a ‘potential intelligence collector’ (PIC) is in port. Much vital information on another navy, particularly data on weapons, sensors and communications systems (including the possible identification of highly sensitive frequencies to support prospective electronic warfare), can be obtained by expert intelligence collectors during operations with ships of another navy. It is no wonder that in the current environment of maritime insecurity in Northeast Asia, regional navies are cautious about going too far with joint exercises, particularly those that involve more than basic seamanship drills.

The maritime geography of Northeast Asia is not favourable for naval cooperation, being ‘one of narrow straits, key choke points, and most importantly, highly concentrated commercial shipping lanes’.^[38] Operational naval cooperation, particularly naval exercising, is facilitated if it is conducted on the high seas rather than in confined waters where there are considerations of overlapping EEZs and sovereignty. These considerations add to the sensitivity of operational naval cooperation.

Prospects

A Korean defence analyst, Hyun-Ki Kim, has suggested that the United States should take the lead in fostering naval cooperation between the ROKN and the JMSDF.^[39] This may be possible but it could also send the wrong signals to China in particular. From a Chinese perspective, trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the United States is not ‘harmless’ and, even in its most modest form, will be perceived by China as a threat to its legitimate maritime interests in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea.

Seaborne trade, the protection of shipping and the security of SLOCs stand out as common interests of most Asia-Pacific countries that may lead to naval cooperation becoming more of a reality. In many ways, international maritime commerce is the classical multilateral maritime security interest. Its protection always involves at least two countries (i.e. the exporter and the importer), and perhaps a third (i.e. the Flag State of the ship carrying the cargo). Historically, as with convoy operations in two world wars, the development of NATO maritime doctrine, and arrangements for the naval control and protection of shipping (NCAPS), it has provided a fundamental basis for multinational naval cooperation. It also provides a basic demonstration of how a nation’s maritime security interests extend beyond its own waters (e.g. the interest of Japan in the security of SLOCs in Southeast Asian waters).

Submerged submarine operations are invariably excluded from INCSEA agreements but, in view of the increasing number of submarines in Northeast Asian waters, the safety of submerged submarines should be of increasing concern. The regional ASW capability is also increasing with the greater probability that regional navies may detect ‘intruder’ submarines from time-to-time. This may create a potentially serious situation if there is tension between or among countries, or if the detection is made in a sensitive area such as the approaches to a naval base or in the vicinity of a naval exercise.

It is clear from discussion in this paper that there will be problems in going too far and too fast with naval cooperation. Rather it will be necessary to start with some cautious initiatives. The types of low-key measures that might be included are:

Navy-to-Navy Contacts. An increased program of reciprocal naval port visits and navy-to-navy contacts, including the offer of places on naval staff courses, navy-to-navy talks, and exchange lecturer programs. The latter programs could involve, for example, invitations from one country to notable naval ‘thinkers’ in another to lecture at naval headquarters and staff colleges on matters such as maritime strategy, security perspectives and naval doctrine. There is clear benefit in naval experts from different countries meeting periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest. Networks of people working in particular fields should be encouraged. Good human relations and communications are important but these will be hampered by problems of language. The availability of interpreters and a translation facility in each other’s language are fundamental to successful navy-to-navy contacts. Perhaps a regional language training school could be established on a cooperative basis to teach the main regional languages to naval students.

Regional Fleet Review. This would be hosted by one particular navy and attended by ships from all other regional navies. It should be supported by social occasions for the crews of the visiting ships, friendly sporting events and a seminar on some topic of common interest. Desirably the first Review should be restricted to just the navies of Northeast Asia to maintain the impression as far as possible that the navies participating in the review were doing so on an equal footing.

Exercises. Exercises present several opportunities, including routinely providing prior notice of exercises (‘transparency’) and exchanging observers at national naval exercises. With regard to actual exercises at sea, tactical exercises based on exercising war-fighting skills and doctrine would be too sensitive but search and rescue (SAR), humanitarian assistance or disaster relief exercises, involving two or more regional navies, may be possible. It may be appropriate to precede these by command post exercises (CPX) to sort out problems of command and control and communications.

Joint Training Periods. Exercises can also send wrong messages in the sense that they might be perceived as exercising against a particular threat. But ‘exercises’ do not have to have a tactical scenario that presume an ‘enemy’. Joint training periods could be considered based initially on seamanship and ship-handling skills, such as underway replenishment, towing, and formation manoeuvres. These would require some pre-planning to agree on procedures.

Naval Peacekeeping. Recent regional forums, including the WPNS and the trilateral talks between Japan, South Korea and US,^[40] have given considerable consideration to the concept of cooperative naval peacekeeping. While superficially this may appear attractive, it is also true to say that that there are also ‘major practical problems and ambiguities with it’.^[41] Prospective operations associated with the Korean peninsula have been identified as leading contenders for cooperative naval peacekeeping, specifically trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States and Korea.

Humanitarian Relief Operations. Parts of Northeast Asia are potentially vulnerable to natural disasters, including earthquakes, storm surges, tsunamis and typhoons. Also, a possible need for humanitarian and refugee-rescue operations has been identified in the context of a possible collapse of North Korea.^[42] Naval forces are well suited to providing initial relief after a natural disaster because the infrastructure of airports, hospitals and communications may often have been damaged. Naval cooperation for humanitarian relief could include the development of plans for a humanitarian relief ready force comprised of units from regional navies. Amphibious vessels are particularly well suited for this role.

Search and Rescue. Regional cooperation in search and rescue (SAR) is underdeveloped in the region at present. Areas of SAR responsibility have not been defined by regional countries although each country has undertaken on receipt of a distress alert to ensure that action will be taken in the most expeditious manner.^[43] A basis for cooperation exists in that all regional countries, with the exception of North Korea and Taiwan, are parties to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979. This particular convention is not extensively ratified around the world at present and in 1998, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted a revised SAR Convention which clarifies the responsibilities of Governments and puts greater emphasis on the regional approach and coordination between maritime and aeronautical SAR operations.^[44] While individual navies may not have lead responsibility for maritime SAR at the national level, there is scope for naval cooperation in implementing a higher level of coordination in maritime SAR in Northeast Asia than exists at present.

A Regional Naval Conference? The last suggestion for a possible initiative for naval cooperation that could be put forward by a regional navy is that of a conference attended by delegates of all regional navies but excluding all non-regional navies. The objective of this forum would be to identify mutual interests of regional navies and the scope for talking about common procedures for activities such as SAR, humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations. A first step for such a forum could be to overcome the problem that has been identified of ‘ambiguous definitions’ leading to ‘misunderstandings and miscommunication’ that could threaten naval cooperative activities.^[45] The conference may first have to ensure that all participants have a common understanding of what they were talking about. Or not talking about!

Unfortunately the mindset among some navies in the region is against even low-key cooperative activities. This is due in part to the historical legacy in the region of conflict and confrontation, political sensitivities, and the lack of preparedness (or political authority) of any regional navy to take the lead with initiating cooperative activities. During discussions in the Maritime Cooperation Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) on the proposed Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation, representatives of several countries were concerned that some of the guidelines could imply a significant abrogation of their claimed sovereignty at sea in that adherence to the Guidelines could involve some reduction of a right to independent action.^[46] The Chinese delegates were also not comfortable with the particular guidelines that sought to encourage naval cooperation. This was on the apparent grounds that China did not engage in naval cooperation itself and possibly would feel threatened if some navies were cooperating while other navies did not.

There is a presumption in this paper, and the other papers on naval cooperation cited in the footnotes to this paper, that naval cooperation would be good for the region. But this may not be so. Rather than being a ‘building block’ for regional security, the pursuit of naval cooperation could in fact turn out to be a ‘stumbling block’ that heightens maritime insecurity in the region and increases tension between regional navies. This could occur, for example, through increased awareness of each other’s strengths and weaknesses leading to a naval arms race or by the creation of ‘alliances’ among some particular navies that were prepared to cooperate while others were not. The search for naval cooperation can also have the undesirable effect of emphasising differences in security perceptions and capabilities. This is not to say that naval cooperation should not be undertaken, rather it is to stress the need to proceed with caution.

Conclusion

There is little prospect of the current pace of naval acquisitions in Northeast Asia Pacific region slowing down. Regional navies believe that uncertainties in the current strategic environment provide ample justification to acquire the types and numbers of the ships, aircraft and submarines that are under procurement at present. The ghosts of Admirals Yi Sun-Sin, Rozhestvensky, Togo and so on continue to haunt the corridors of naval headquarters in the region reminding the current generation of naval officers of the great naval battles of the past and the debts that may still have to be settled. The region needs to tread warily with naval cooperation while still trying to exploit the potential that exists for regional navies to play some role in developing confidence and security-building measures, particularly with regard to transparency and contributing a naval dimension to the broader processes of dialogue and cooperation.

Navies have a clear advantage over the other military services in promoting regional security cooperation in that they form part of both the defence community and the maritime community. They tend to carry less political ‘baggage’ than armies and air forces and are also more able to find ‘safe’ issues to talk about, such as naval peacekeeping, SAR and basic procedures for operating together in the international medium of the sea. Also, in addition to their war-fighting role, navies have important constabulary and diplomatic roles to perform in peacetime, including their ability to provide a practical demonstration of regional cooperation, or a national contribution to multinational peacekeeping forces.

Despite the possible benefits of naval cooperation, there are still many limitations and problems with increasing cooperation in Northeast Asia. Prospective cooperation between the navies of Japan, South Korea and the United States is being actively studied and will probably prove feasible. But the much more difficult step is extending this cooperation to the other regional navies. The navies that do engage in cooperative activities must be careful that they do not send the wrong signals to the other navies by appearing to be members of an exclusive club. For this reason, the basic recommendation in this paper is the establishment of some inclusive forum of regional navies that can address these problems and sensitivities before proceeding too far with cooperation between only a limited number of navies.

The ‘bottom line’ though is that something has to be done to avert the undesirable consequences of the current pace of naval force development. This is a particularly acute need given the historical background of regional naval conflict and tensions. As Jin-Hyun Paik has observed,

Endnotes

[1] Paper for Concurrent Session on Maritime Confidence Building in Northeast Asia: How It Can Be Achieved at 14th Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 3-7 June 2000.

[2] Principal Research Fellow, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia 2522.

^[3] A large statue of Admiral Yi Sun-Sin is a prominent feature of the Central Business District of Seoul providing a reminder of Korea’s rich maritime history.

^[4] Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon – A History of China’s Quest for Seapower, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1982, pp. 106-110.

^[5] The technological advantage possessed by the Japanese over the Russians was apparent in superior gunnery theory and technology, as well as torpedoes. Eric Grove, Fleet to Fleet Encounters, London, Arms and Armour Press, 1991, pp. 20-26.

^[6] Geoffrey Till, ‘Maritime Disputes in the Western Pacific’, Geopolitics and International Boundaries, vol. 1, no. 3 (Winter 1996), p. 328.

^[7] Hyun-Ki Kim, ‘The Possibility of Naval Cooperation Between Korea and Japan’ in Choon Kun Lee, Sea Power and Korea in the 21st Century, Seoul, The Sejong Institute, 1994, pp. 179-199; Paul Bracken, ‘Naval Cooperation in Northeast Asia’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. IX, no. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 203-214; and Paul Bracken, ‘Maritime Peacekeeping in Northeast Asia’, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. XII, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1998, pp. 577-598.

^[8] For example, those sponsored by Stanford University between the JMSDF, the USN and Russian Navies in the early 1990s. Captains Moreland, Ota and Pan’kov, Naval Cooperation in the Pacific: Looking to the Future, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, February 1993.

^[9] Lieutenant Commander Duk-Ki Kim, ‘Cooperative Maritime Security in Northeast Asia’, Naval War College Review, Winter 1999, vol. LII, no. 1, p.66.

^[10] Workshops jointly sponsored by the Center for Naval Analyses (US), the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and the Okazaki Institute (Japan) were held in Tokyo in February 1997 and Honolulu in May 1998. Center for Naval Analyses, Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan-US-Korea Workshop II, Alexandra VA., Center for Naval Analyses, 1998.

^[11] INCSEA agreements have been agreed between the United States and China (a ‘Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety’ signed in January 1998); between Japan and Russia; and between the Republic of Korea and Russia. For a discussion of the application of the INCSEA concept in the region, see Peter L. Jones, ‘Maritime CBMs in the Asia-Pacific: The Application of the INCSEA Concept in the Region’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. VIII, no. 1, Summer 1996, pp. 7-30. Also, Bracken, ‘Maritime Peacekeeping in Northeast Asia’, p. 578.

^[12] You Ji, ‘A blue water navy Does it matter’ in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising – Nationalism and Interdependence, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 71-89.

^[13] Jin Hyun-Paik ‘Strengthening maritime security in Northeast Asia’, in Bunn Nagara and Cheah Siew Ean (eds), Managing Security and Peace in the Asia-Pacific, Kuala Lumpur, ISIS Malaysia, 1996, pp. 182-3.

^[14] China and North Korea have both claimed offshore security zones that impair the right of innocent passage. J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, ‘Excessive Maritime Claims’, International Law Studies, Volume 66, Newport, Naval War College, 1994, p. 106.

^[15] Jin-Hyun Paik, ‘The Fisheries Regime in Northeast Asia’ in Dalchoong Kim, Jiao Yongke, Jin Hyun Paik, Chen Degong (eds), Ocean Affairs in North-East Asia and Prospects for Korea-China Maritime Cooperation, Institute of East-West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, 1994, p. 86.

^[16] For a description of these developments and the implications for regional security, see relevant papers in Sherwood, Dick (ed.), Naval Power in the China Seas, Canberra, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1994.

^[17] John Downing, ‘A Japanese navy in all but name’, Jane’s Navy International, vol. 104, no. 3, April 1999, p. 33.

^[18] Thomas J. Hirschfeld, ‘China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: A Virtual Dragonfly?’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. X, no. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 141-153.

^[19] Eric Grove, ‘Sea Power in the Twenty First Century’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, vol. 23, no. 3, August/October 1995, p. 11.

^[21] John Downing, ‘Maritime Ambition – China’s naval modernisation’, Jane’s Navy International, vol. 103 no. 3, April 1998, p. 12.

^[23] Current submarine programs in Northeast Asia include up to 22 Kilo-class SSKs by China; construction of two Oyashio-class for Japan; a programme for the acquisition of six locally-built SSKs for South Korea; and the ‘urgent need of additional SSKs’ for Taiwan. Prasun K. Sengupta, ‘Submarines for Asia-Pacific Navies: From SSK to SSN/SSBN’, Asian Defence Journal, 2/98, pp. 50-54.

^[25] Panitan Wattanayagorn & Desmond Ball, ‘A Regional Arms Race?’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 18, no. 5, September 1995, pp. 147-174.

^[26] Dick Sherwood, ‘The Navy and National Security: The Peacetime Dimension’, Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defence No. 109, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, pp. 61-64.

^[28] Center for Naval Analyses, Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan-US-Korea Workshop II, pp. 23-5.

^[29] Susan V. Lawrence, ‘Miles to Go’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 November 1998, p. 21.

^[31] Peter Landers, Susan Lawrence and Julian Baum, ‘Hard Target’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 September 1998, pp. 20-21.

^[32] For a description of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) and the role of naval surface combatants, see Scott C. Truver, ‘The threat is real…’, Jane’s Navy International, vol. 103, no. 9, October 1998, pp. 20-28.

^[33] Center for Naval Analyses, Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan-US-Korea Workshop II, p. 5.

^[34] Center for Naval Analyses, Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan-US-Korea Workshop II, p. 5.

^[35] Sumihiko Kawamura, Rear Admiral JMSDF (retired), ‘International Cooperation for SLOC Security’, Paper to the 12th International Conference on Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) Studies 6-7 April 1999, p. 7.

^[40] Center for Naval Analyses, Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan-US-Korea Workshop II.

^[43] Admiralty Charts and Publications, The World Maritime Search and Rescue Regions, Chart published as an appendix to the 1998/99 edition of Admiralty List of Radio Signals Volume 5 (NP285).

^[45] Center for Naval Analyses, Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan-US-Korea Workshop II, p. 32.

^[46] The Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation are available on the AUSCSCAP website at: http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSPAS/AUSCSCAP/Guidelin.mcw.html

Maritime Studies